Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

868.002/6–2849: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

secret
priority

Washington, June 29, 1949—7 p. m.

976. Embtel 1255 June 28.¹ Dept sympathetic with ur own and King’s line of thinking re desirable solution crisis and approves position you have taken this connection.

We continue believe that in period of grave threat to Grk independence and integrity major polit groups shld be willing patriotically to submerge partisan differences, to share responsibility of govt and, above all, to ensure participation in Govt of best men available regardless polit color. Tsaldaris’ claim to Premiership based on his position as leader principal party is understandable. At same time formation of purely Populist Cabinet wld expose Govt to damaging criticism in Grk Parliament and abroad (with Congressional hearings in offing) and wld, as you say, exclude many of most efficient men from admin. It wld probably also spell finish of decentralization program. Earnestly hope, therefore, that Venizelos will withdraw opposition, which possibly founded on exaggerated notion of US support, to serving as Deputy under Tsaldaris or other reasonable solution. In ur discretion you may tell Venizelos Dept officials greatly disappointed his attitude this critical juncture and consider continued refusal cooperate will place on him personally full responsibility for consequences prolongation of crisis.

Urtel 1264 June 29² just reed. Question workability solution one on grounds divided responsibility and probability that each Premier wld attempt postpone unpopular measures during his incumbency and take credit for popular ones. However we leave this matter ur judgment.³

Acheson

1. Prime Minister Sophoulis died on June 24, and discussions ensued among Greek political leaders regarding the composition of a new cabinet. The telegram under reference here, not printed, reported Tsaldaris was seeking to form a cabinet composed exclusively of members of his own Populist Party. Liberal Party leader Sophocles Venizelos refused to participate in any new government that included Tsaldaris. Ambassador Grady had held conversations with both Tsaldaris and Venizelos and impressed upon them the necessity of cooperating in a new government. The King for his part favored the continuation of the Sophoulis cabinet with Tsaldaris as Prime Minister (868.002/6–2849).
2. Not printed. In it Ambassador Grady reported that after a series of meetings at his house, British Ambassador Norton and he had agreed to present to Tsaldaris and Venizelos two alternative solutions to the current political crisis: (1) continuation of the old Sophoulis cabinet with Tsaldaris as Prime Minister and Venizelos as Deputy Prime Minister for a 3-month period followed by an equal period with Venizelos as Prime Minister and Tsaldaris as Deputy Prime Minister; (2) agreement to a neutral Prime Minister suggested by Tsaldaris (868.00/6–2949).
3. In his telegram 1275, July 1, from Athens, not printed, Ambassador Grady reported that Alexander Diomedes had been sworn in as Greek Prime Minister on June 30 with a cabinet largely the same as that of the deceased Sophoulis. Tsaldaris continued as Foreign Minister and also became Deputy Prime Minister. Venizelos became Second Deputy Prime Minister.