501.BB Balkan/6–849: Airgram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece
A–404. Department is appreciative of factors and viewpoints set forth Embtel 1121, June 8, and believes no essential substantive difference has so far emerged between Greek and US policies with respect to Russian proposals.
Mild criticism of Greek “intransigence” expressed in Deptel 831, June 3,1 was not directed at basic Greek position but rather at attitude as expressed in certain public statements and confidential communications. We fear such attitude reflects dangerous overconfidence, born of recent military successes, in military outlook and in indefinite flow of US military and economic aid. It overlooks fact that public in friendly foreign nations which are expending large sums of money in supporting Greece and whose own security is threatened by Greek developments will insist that no reasonable opportunity be rejected for settlement in Greece consistent with vital Greek interests and UN principles. US public in particular will require constant reassurance that Greek Government is not trying to prolong appearance of crisis for ulterior motives.
Refusal of Greek Government to define, in advance of guerrilla surrender, what amnesty measures it would apply if surrender occurs, is open to criticism on grounds individual guerrilla cannot know whether he qualifies for “generous treatment” promised certain categories or even what this expression means. Several recent Greek pronouncements, presumably designed to counteract morale effect of communist peace offensive, unfortunately sound somewhat bloodthirsty to foreign ears and are likely to be quoted to Greece’s disadvantage at future UN debates. Some examples as reported by Athens Agency press service follow:
Canellopoulos in Kozani, May 12: “In the Greek question any solution is impossible other than that which will be imposed by the total victory of the national arms.”
Canellopoulos in Siderokastron, May 15: “No other solution in our struggle than that which will be given by armed force, that of the obliteration of the bandits or their unconditional surrender.”
Canellopoulos in Athens, May 24: “Negotiations are plots and intrigue. By arms and arms alone the Greek problem will be solved.”
Rendis in Acropolis interview, May 27: “We believe only in restoring internal order through the armed campaign against the bandits, relying on the fighting spirit of our people and our armed forces and on aid furnished us by the US and Great Britain.”
[Page 359]Rendis in Salonika, May 28: “The bandits have only one alternative: to lay down their arms and repudiate communism or to commit suicide or take refuge in other countries without any hope of returning to Greece.”
Canellopoulos in Salonika, May 30: “The only possible discussion with communist bandits is that effected by arms.”
In sum, Department appreciates exigencies of Greek internal morale, but feels that Greek moral and diplomatic position would be strengthened by emphasizing and clarifying constructive Greek intentions rather than by sabre-rattling and expressing outrage at any foreign comment on internal Greek affairs.
Re communist participation elections, suggestion has been made here that elections might be accompanied by simultaneous plebiscite on relegalization Communist and associated parties. Strongly negative outcome, which foregone conclusion, would provide striking demonstration lack of popular communist support. At same time it might mitigate impression of non-adherence to democratic principles. Your comments this point appreciated.