501.BB Balkan/5–2849: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Acting Secretary of State
1046. I find myself in almost complete accord with constructive and far sighted views expressed Deptel 760, May 20.1 I am also in general sympathy with what I believe to be Greek views on subject which I ventured to assess in Embtel 1032, May 26.
Department has placed finger on heart of problem in paragraph one Deptel 760. President has placed question in true perspective by saying that no special negotiations or discussions are required and that Russians can prove in Greece their desire to make contribution to peace. In my opinion we are well along way to winning battle of Greece and to temporize at this point may place victory in jeopardy.
It seems Department and Greeks are in agreement as to how conversations, if held, are to be conducted. Question is rather whether any conversations should be held at this time. In absence more concrete evidence of Russian good faith on this issue it seems to me that Greek view that conversations should be postponed is entirely sound.
Greeks it seems to me are on strong ground in desiring to prevent Russian involvement in Greek internal affairs. They are also correct to believe in their determination not give legal status to KKE which would only be used for further subversive activities looking toward round four. They go as far as they reasonably can in welcoming Russia and Poland to UNSCOB which could be utilized as Department and Drew suggest in whole field of pacification of Greece.
I am in full accord with Department’s point 4. Department’s view in point 7 is entirely sound and constructive. However, the point re a “neutral” government requires some clarification. We should be careful to avoid pitfall developed by skillful Soviet propaganda to effect that Greece is monarch-fascist state which requires shift to democratic element. In point of fact, Greek Government is more democratic and representative than at least half UN members. Elections will speak on this score but in the meantime I recommend we resist any idea that a change to some kind of “neutral” government is required.
I believe that Greeks are entirely justified in refusing to make an amnesty call prior to laying down of arms by rebels. Sophoulis tried [Page 349] this without success but at least his effort had advantage of showing Greek good will. To repeat it would merely show weakness. Greeks seem generally in mood to carry out rebel surrender in dignified and just manner. I believe we can accept their assurances that they will proceed in this fashion. I quite realize that there will be abuses and excesses which are inevitable in country which has suffered as sorely as Greece. We ourselves should be vigilant in watching this situation and in giving guidance to Greece.
Department’s point ten on foreign supervision of elections meets with my full approval. Greeks are desirous of holding elections as soon as possible after restoration of order. I believe they are capable of conducting elections which would be reasonably representative and fair. We should be alert in advising and guiding them so that no criticism can be made that any Greeks do not have opportunity to express their views freely and without intimidation.
It seems to me there is merit in idea of Pipinelis of countering Russian suggestions for supervision of elections and Greek border by UN or other agency with recommendation that similar action be taken in satellite countries. This theme was also developed in Sofia’s telegram No. 19 May 23.3 It was also proposed by Tsaldaris (Embtel 1003, May 214) in suggesting that spotlight be turned on Albania.
Department’s point 5 is cornerstone our policy in Greece. There should be no relaxation until Greece is safe. Our success in Greece I believe has been one of basic factors in our improved situation vis-à-vis Communism. Our military mission should be withdrawn when the guerrilla warfare has ceased either through effective military or political action. After the withdrawal of our military mission, our military aid through supply should continue as part of our overall general policy of military aid to European countries. Even after guerrilla warfare has ceased, Greece will continue to be particularly vulnerable to attack and will require special concern and vigilance on our part.
Sent Department 1046, repeated London 43, Belgrade 47, Sofia 36, Moscow 23.
- Not printed; it transmitted the text of the paper prepared by the Department of State, included as Annex B to Rusk’s May 19 memorandum of his conversation with British Minister Hoyer Millar, p. 326.↩
- Same as telegram 429, May 23, from Sofia, p. 336.↩
- Not printed; it reported that the contents of telegram 749, May 19, to Athens (p. 322) had been conveyed to Greek Prime Minister Sophoulis and Foreign Minister Tsaldaris. Tsaldaris suggested that it might be a useful tactic for the United Nations to consider the future of Albania and the role of the Soviet Union in Albania. (868.00/5–2149)↩