Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Balkan/5–2649: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

secret

Athens, May 26, 1949—3 p. m.

1032. Deptel 779, May 24. Following estimate Greek opinion based on appraisal press and public reaction and on conversations with Tsaldaris and Pipinelis. It is of course tentative and informal. Greek officials given assurances suggested reftel although unnecessary as they appear well satisfied we will not take action detrimental to Greece or without consultation.

1. Pipinelis states that he and Greek Cabinet lay considerable stress on timing. They believe time plays on our side and suggest postponement any conversations for following reasons:

(a) Morale of army is adversely affected by conversations. Papagos confirmed this at Cabinet meeting and said if conversations continue he will not assume responsibility for consequences.

(b) Time increasingly on our side due present favorable military trend and decline bandit position.

(c) There is hope of working out better relations with Yugoslavia which would have favorable influence on Greek question.

(d) Time will reveal reasons for altered Russian tactics. By hastening conversations now we may fall into Russian trap.

2. When discussions take place they should by all means be channeled through UN and its agencies. They should not take place at CFM or through any special agency. They should not be carried on secretly by Allies.

3. Greek officials believe whole Russian policy turns on desire to have foreign troops leave Greece. Premature action to withdraw them would spell disaster. If Russians press this point Pipinelis suggests that prudence [presence?] foreign troops in Greece be linked with Russian control satellite powers. Foreign troops, advisers and influence can be withdrawn from Greece when Soviet domination satellite powers terminates, so that with return democracy to those countries Greek relation with them may be normalized.

4. Greeks will be adamant in resisting Russian involvement in Greek internal affairs. They believe that these internal matters are for Greek resolution although they have every intention of consulting us fully. Thus they will not agree to Russian supervision of Greek elections, but if this point is raised might counter with suggestion UN supervision elections in satellite countries. They would have no objection to Russia and Poland taking their places on UNSCOB and thus participating in UN consideration of question and even in border control.

5. Greeks in general feel that KKE cannot be legalized. To do so would place Communists in position to begin preparations for fourth round.

6. Amnesty cannot, of course, again be offered prior to laying down of arms by rebels. Almost all Greeks feel that at such time Greek attitude should be lenient and fatherly, not vindictive. Rebels should be given every guarantee of safety. Those inducted by force and not guilty of crimes should be quickly screened and returned to normal life. Small minority guilty of crimes will have to be tried. It is anticipated most of this category as well as hard-core Communists will seek refuge abroad, which exile Greeks probably would not wish disturb. While no commitment can be given that death and other sentences could be commuted, it seems that tendency would be in that direction. Pipinelis warns that Slavophile minority on northern border numbering about 100,000 (of whom only about one-tenth active) will require special attention. While they will not be persecuted or moved en masse, ways will have to be found to settle them elsewhere in Greece.

7. Elections are desired by almost everyone in Greece and will be held as soon as possible. Greeks do not desire foreign supervision and would strongly resist Russian inclusion in any supervisory group. They have no intention asking for foreign supervision but might consent if we insisted. Guerrillas would not participate in elections but officials assure Embassy full and free opportunity would be given all Greeks express opinions.

8. My views on these and related subjects will follow in later telegram.

Sent Department 1032; repeated Belgrade 46; London 42; Moscow 22; Sofia 34.

Grady

1. Ambassador Grady returned to Athens on May 22 and resumed charge of the Embassy on May 23.