Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

868.00/5–2049

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Leonard J. Cromie of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

secret

[Washington,] May 20, 1949.

Participants:	Vassili Dendramis, Greek Ambassador
	Mr. Rusk
	Mr. Economou-Gouras, Greek Minister
	Mr. Cromie (GTI)

The Greek Ambassador, accompanied by the Greek Minister-Counselor, called at 4:30 p. m. at Mr. Rusk’s request.

Ambassador Dendramis opened the conversation by saying, with implied annoyance, that he had first learned of Mr. Rusk’s conversations on Greece with Messrs. McNeil and Gromyko when he had questioned Mr. Cadogan¹ about current rumors. Mr. Cadogan had told him that Mr. Gromyko had made some suggestions about Greece but had received no answer from Mr. McNeil. Mr. Cadogan told Ambassador Dendramis that he was not at liberty to reveal the substance of Mr. Gromyko’s suggestions.

Mr. Rusk referred to today’s Department press release² and explained that he had first brought up the subject of Greece at Trygve Lie’s dinner during the course of an ordinary, normal conversation covering the Italian Colonies and other agenda items.³ He thought the Russians might exercise a helpful influence, for example, on. Albania and Bulgaria in connection with the Evatt conciliation talks. Mr. Gromyko’s reaction, however, was unchanged. The conversation was regarded, therefore, as more or less routine, the type of diplomatic exchange that we and presumably the Greeks are always carrying on, and it was felt that there was nothing new to report to the Greeks.

At the May 4 conversation,⁴ Mr. Rusk continued, Gromyko just pulled out of his pocket the Porphyroghenis proposals. The Greeks already knew of these proposals and thus nothing new had been added to the situation. This impression appeared to be confirmed by the May 7 guerrilla radio broadcast, which seemed to wipe even the Porphyroghenis proposals off the record.

It was thus not until last Saturday, May 14, that Gromyko came up with something that was not part of the general public record.⁵ These were his proposals for “Great-Power” commissions to control the Greek border and supervise Greek elections and for the withdrawal of all foreign military aid, including materiel and personnel. Mr. Rusk thereupon reiterated to Gromyko that we would not negotiate without the Greeks and, in fact, we immediately set up the machinery to inform the Greeks of the conversations to date. However, first we wanted to check with London to see what the British thought.

Mr. Rusk assured Ambassador Dendramis that in his conversations with Gromyko he had adopted a very simple and direct position—the same as we have always taken. This was, namely, that the issue in the Greek situation is the aid to the guerrillas across Greece’s northern frontier and not any domestic situation inside Greece, that UNSCOB or some other UN channel is the proper forum for discussion of this issue, and that we could do nothing that would give any status whatever to the “northern forces.” Mr. Rusk concluded by emphasizing that he had never undertaken to speak on behalf of the Greeks, that he had not made any proposals, and that he had merely listened to Gromyko and spoken with regard to procedural problems.

Ambassador Dendramis stated that the Greek Government’s concern was that the fellow-travellers would make capital out of these conversations with Gromyko and considered that that was part of the Russian intention in making the talks public. The Russians also wanted to influence the American Congress and the morale of the Greek Army. Ambassador Dendramis then inquired whether the Secretary had seen the British Ambassador about this matter.

Mr. Rusk answered that he had. However, Mr. Rusk assured Ambassador Dendramis that the British took the same attitude as we toward the Greek situation. In fact, there were no suggestions made by anyone during the talks with Gromyko differing in substance from the positions taken during United Nations discussions of the Greek case. The Russians continued to emphasize an internal Greek problem. We and the British continued to emphasize the external Greek problem. The British were interested in exploring whether the Gromyko proposals might be of some interest in connection with the general Balkan situation, but there was nothing for the Greeks to worry about. Mr. Rusk said also that he was not worried about the reaction of our Congress. As in the case of Berlin, Congress understood very well that these Russian developments were the fruit of our foreign policy and that there was accordingly every reason not to change that policy. The Greek assistance program was reported out of Congressional committee yesterday, and there would be no relaxation of our determination to support Greece.

Ambassador Dendramis said his Government felt it would be better not to discuss these matters with the Russians at all. The Greek position is that the guerrillas must first lay down their arms. “Amnesty and all that could come after.” The Greek Government was especially concerned with the appeal the Russian proposals might have for fellow-travelling elements—like the Athens newspaper Eleftheria. The New York correspondent of this paper is a communist named Kyriazides. At New York, and with his own eyes, Ambassador Dendramis had seen Kyriazides talking every day and exchanging papers with Katz-Suchy⁶ and Malik.⁷ Such papers as Eleftheria maintain that peace would be possible if Leftists were admitted to the Government and that Britain and the United States might try to force this on the Greeks. Ambassador Dendramis then said it was his impression that the Russians are changing their strategy.

Mr. Rusk commented that the Russian basic objectives always remain the same. Their tactics change sometimes and their strategy, maybe, once in a generation. Ambassador Dendramis interjected that the Russians were now appealing, for example, to the desire of the German people for national unity and the evacuation of the Allied troops. Mr. Rusk said he was “not so sure” the German people wanted these things.

Mr. Rusk then said that Gromyko had made two points of some interest which were not covered in the Department’s press release. Asked what he meant by “elections,” Gromyko had explained that he was talking about parliamentary elections and not a plebiscite on Macedonia or some other issue. Similarly, when asked about the border control, Mr. Gromyko had said “Greece has its borders and we are talking about the borders of Greece.”

Mr. Gouras inquired how Mr. Rusk interpreted this dropping by Gromyko of the Macedonian question. Had this something to do with Tito?

Mr. Rusk said that it was his impression that, through the medium of Great Power talks, the Russians were trying to get the Communists back into Greek political life and reestablish the communist influence which had been destroyed in two years of fighting. The Russians may, of course, be looking for some face-saving formula for withdrawing from Greece, but we see no definite signs that this is the case. Mr. Rusk concluded the conversation by saying that we have no plans for further discussions with the Russians on Greece. There is nothing more on the program, at least until we have a joint understanding with the Greeks and the British on the matter. He advised Ambassador Dendramis to confine his remarks to the press to saying that he had been given an explanation of the Gromyko talks. Ambassador Dendramis said he would do so, but would add that the Greeks require that the guerrillas lay down their arms.

1. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations.
2. Regarding the press release under reference, see the editorial note, supra.
3. For the record of the April 26 conversation referred to here, see p. 301.
4. For the record of this conversation, see p. 303.
5. Regarding the conversation referred to here, see the editorial note, p. 320.
6. Julius Katz-Suchy, Permanent Polish Representative to the United Nations and Chairman of the Polish Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.
7. Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and Vice Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.