Sir Hoyer Millar handed me an informal paper (Annex A) containing Mr.
Bevin’s reply to the Secretary regarding possible Anglo-American
talks on the Balkan situation. Mr. Bevin fully agrees that the
matter should not be discussed with the Soviets in Paris nor become
connected in any way with the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr.
Bevin suggests that staff talks occur in London or Paris and
welcomes the possibility of discussing the matter with the Secretary
at some point during the CFM.
I suggested to Sir Hoyer Millar that we have one or two further staff
exchanges on the subject before attempting to reach any conclusion
as to the nature of any further talks we should have and the place
and timing of such talks. Sir Hoyer agreed.
I then handed to Sir Hoyer a staff paper prepared in the Department
of State (Annex B) as an informal staff reaction to Mr. Gromyko’s
proposals. I stated that this paper did not necessarily represent
the Secretary’s views but that we thought it would be useful to let
the Foreign Office know the lines along which we were thinking in
the Department and that we would be glad to have any comments or
additional suggestions from the Foreign Office. I drew his attention
particularly to the desirability of informing Sophoulis, Tsaldaris
and Dendramis on a top secret basis of the Gromyko conversations at
an early date. He said that he would inquire specifically on that
point and added that the Embassy had thus far had almost nothing
from London on this subject as a whole.
I told Sir Hoyer that we were not entirely clear as to just what Mr.
Bevin had in mind in his reference to “the Balkan situation as a
whole”. Although we had tried to indicate certain points in our
paper which had a bearing on the general situation in the Balkans,
we would be glad to have any suggestions from them on the broader
aspects of the matter. Sir Hoyer said that the Embassy did not have
any idea what Mr. Bevin had in mind and had specifically asked that
the reference to the Balkan situation as a whole be clarified.
Annex B
[Washington, undated.]
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State5
top secret
Preliminary US Reactions to the Gromyko
Balkan Proposals on the international aspect
(1) The basic issue in the Greek situation is the aid extended to
the guerrilla movement across Greece’s northern border. If the
Russians were to exercise their influence to terminate this aid,
the Greek guerrilla problem in its present serious proportions
would disappear.
(2) This is the aspect of the Greek problem with which the United
Nations is seized and which the General Assembly has declared as
endangering peace in the Balkans and as inconsistent with the
purposes and principles of the Charter. The United Nations is
the proper forum for international discussion of an issue of
this character and that forum should not be changed.
(3) While we should listen to whatever the Russians may wish to
Bay regarding Greece, we should not engage in any negotiations
on this matter without the participation of the Greek
Government. We suggest that Sophoulis,
Tsaldaris and Dendramis be informed immediately on a top
secret basis of the Gromyko conversations.6
(4) We cannot recognize that the guerrillas have any status under
international law. The extent of negotiation, if any, with the
guerrillas by the Greek Government is for the latter to
determine.
(5) We will not relax our determination to support the
independence and territorial integrity of Greece.
(6) We do not subscribe to the sphere-of-influence concept and we
do not regard the northern frontier of Greece as a dividing line
between two such spheres.
[Page 327]
on the internal greek aspect
(7) Internal arrangements in Greece for the cessation of
hostilities—such as a cease-fire, amnesty, setting up of a
“neutral” Government, and parliamentary elections—are
fundamentally matters for determination by the Greek Government.
International discussion of these subjects would require the
participation and consent of the Greek Government.
(8) We might, however, suggest to the Greek Government that it
clarify its own position on these matters, pointing out the
advisability of avoiding the appearance of intransigence and
vindictiveness and of adopting as generous policies as would be
compatible with the safety of the Greek State.
(9) We must resist the temptation to buy an illusory peace in
Greece by pressing the Greeks to accept formulae which would be
politically unrealistic or morally unjustified and which would
not restore the tranquility in Greece essential for Greek
economic rehabilitation and Balkan stability. We feel, for
example, that the Greeks should not be expected to relegalize
the EAM Parties, although they
might work out some formula whereby the parliamentary elections
would record views other than those represented by the legal,
participating parties.
(10) The Russians refused to participate in observing the Greek
1946 elections. Fair elections were nevertheless held under
international observation and resulted in the resumption of
normal parliamentary government in Greece. To provide for
further formal foreign observation of the new elections would be
retrogressive and unwarranted, unless the Greek Government, for
politico-propaganda reasons, should make such a request.
on the balkan aspect
(11) While concrete confirmation is virtually lacking, it is our
impression that Western policy toward the Balkan satellites is
progressing somewhat more favorably than heretofore. The
development of the Yugoslav situation in opposition to the USSR
gives promise of appreciably accelerating the attainment of
Western objectives.
(12) We have been exploring the possibilities of projecting
Western policy in the area through the intensification of
psychological warfare, utilization of economic leverage and
political activity. Although we fire not yet prepared to
recommend specific additional courses in regard to any of those
three aspects of policy, our present thinking is that increasing
possibilities for exploitation of those instruments are
developing.
[Page 328]
(13) As indicated in paragraph 17 below, a realistic solution of
the Greek issue would appreciably advance the possibilities for
the expansion of Western effort in the satellites to the North.
Although the Russians may feel that the liquidation of their
commitment in Greece would facilitate the concentration of their
efforts against Tito, it could also be argued that
tranquillisation of Greece’s northern frontier would tend to
alleviate the threat to Tito from Macedonia and enable him
better to meet Eastern pressure.
(14) We are convinced that our interests dictate our keeping a
maximum pressure on the minority Communist regimes in the
satellites through such means as are at our disposal such as the
human rights treaty procedures. Likewise we should continue to
make clear that> under present circumstances, Bulgaria,
Albania, Rumania and Hungary do not qualify for UN
membership.
on bargaining points and the possibilities
of accord
(15) Appraisal of the Greek military outlook indicates that the
Russians are leading from weakness in advancing the Gromyko
proposals. Undoubtedly they have other motives. They also have
the capability of exacerbating the Greek situation in many ways,
and notably by introducing non-Greek elements into the guerrilla
ranks.
(16) On balance, it appears that we are in a strong bargaining
position and that some face-saving formulae might be acceptable
to the Russians. This possibility should be explored, since we
would welcome a solution of the Greek problem, which now
requires a diversion of our military resources from more
profitable areas.
(17) We might, therefore, stress to the Russians that we seek no
special advantages in Greece which would constitute a threat to
the security or legitimate interests of the USSR or of any other
country.
(18) We might also agree that Greek pacification would open the
way to the normalization and improvement of other Balkan
relationships. For example, correct behavior of Albania and
Bulgaria toward Greece could be an important factor in bringing
about a revision of our own attitude towards those countries. It
would likewise facilitate the solution of many other problems of
mutual interest between Greece on the one hand and Albania,
Bulgaria and other eastern European countries on the other—such
as diplomatic relations, transit and communications facilities,
trade relations, exchange of minorities.
(19) We might tactfully point out to the Russians that their own
interest would seem to call for a solution through the United
Nations rather than through Big-Power negotiations. The Greek
Government would participate by right in any discussions within
the UN framework, whereas it would have to be specially invited
to participate in any other discussions. Moreover, for the
Russians to negotiate
[Page 329]
directly concerning the Greek situation would constitute an
admission that they control it.
(20) While adhering and referring to our basic position and
observations outlined above, we might comment as follows on the
Russians’ three specific conditions:
-
a)
- The Greek Government has already declared its
intention to hold free and democratic elections, which,
in the absence of peacetime censorship or travel
restrictions in Greece, will be open to the scrutiny of
world opinion.
-
b)
- The USSR and Polish seats on UNSCOB remain open and
may be taken at any time. Alternatively, we would
consider any Russian proposals for the creation of a
sub-committee of UNSCOB on which the Russians could
participate or of some other UN organ to follow
developments on Greece’s northern frontier. However, if
foreign aid to the guerrillas ceased, such international
control would probably be superfluous. In that
circumstance, moreover, UNSCOB’s report to the Fourth GA, instead of again
castigating Greece’s northern neighbors, would probably
merely record the favorable turn of events.
-
c)
- The United States cannot relinquish its right to
provide military assistance to the Greek Government.
However, the American military assistance program in
Greece was made necessary by a situation in Greece
created by foreign aid to the guerrilla movement. If the
guerrilla warfare in Greece were terminated, the size of
United States military aid and of American service
establishments in Greece would naturally reflect the
improved situation. (We assume that the British would
likewise wish to reconsider their own military
commitments in Greece in this circumstance.)
