868.20/3–3149

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Franks)1

top secret

Excellency: I have the honor to refer to the analysis of the Greek situation prepared by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and presented to me by the British Foreign Minister during our conversation on March 31, 1949.2 This report has received careful consideration both in the Department of State and in the National Military Establishment and by their representatives in Greece.

The problems raised in this report have been given continuous study for many months. The Government of the United States recognizes that military success in Greece in the near future is important and that it is a prerequisite to economic recovery. The Government of the United States notes with gratification the recent action of the United Kingdom in donating twenty-two Spitfire airplanes to the Greek Air Force and in extending additional economic assistance to Greece in the form of a further grant of drawing rights under the Intra-European Payments Plan.

The Government of the United States continues to believe, however, that the present Greek Armed Forces are adequate, from a military point of view, substantially to clear Greece this year of organized banditry up to the border areas, assuming foreign aid to the guerrillas [Page 301] is not augmented appreciably. It is felt that replacement of older men and other noneffectives included in the present ceiling strength of the Greek Armed Forces, which it is hoped can be accomplished, will contribute materially to current efforts to increase the combat effectiveness of the Greek Army.

Although thorough examination of the propositions contained in the report of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff has resulted in no change in the estimate of the military requirements of the Greek situation by the Government of the United States, the mutual interests of the United Kingdom and the United States in Greece make a periodic exchange of views on these topics extremely valuable and welcome. A more detailed military commentary on the report of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff will be transmitted by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff.

Accept [etc.]

Dean Acheson
  1. This note was handed to British Minister Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar by Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, during a call at the Department of State on April 28. Satterthwaite explained that the inability of the United States Government to give a favorable reply to British suggestion for some immediate increase in American military aid to Greece, a suggestion which had been given very careful consideration by all competent government officials, was not to be interpreted to mean that the United States did not welcome British comments and recommendations with respect to Greece. Satterthwaite also asked Hoyer Millar to assure Foreign Secretary Bevin of American regret that press stories regarding the British suggestions attempted to draw the inference that there was an unfriendly difference of opinion between the United States and United Kingdom Governments with regard to Greece. Satterthwaite expressed the confidence that the very fine cooperation between American and British officials in Greece would continue in the future. (memorandum of conversation by Baxter, April 28, 1949: 868.20/4–2849)

    A brief summary of this note was transmitted in telegram Gama 28, April 28, to Athens, not printed, with the suggestion the position of the United States as therein stated be made known to the Greek Government (868.20/4–2849). Lieutenant General Van Fleet, in his capacity as Acting Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, transmitted the main points of the note in a letter of May 2 to Greek Prime Minister Sophoulis, not printed (868.20/5–249).

  2. Regarding Secretary Acheson’s conversation with Foreign Secretary Bevin on March 31, see the editorial note, p. 285. A synopsis of Field Marshal Slim’s report under reference here was contained in telegram Gama 22, April 5, to Athens, p. 290.