Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F–132

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Leonard J. Cromie of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

top secret

[Washington,] April 1, 1949.

Subject: Greek Proposal for Western Military Action against Albania in the Event of a Cominform Move against Tito in Macedonia

Participants:	H. E. Vassili Dendramis, the Greek Ambassador
	Mr. Joseph C. Satterthwaite1—NEA
	John D. Jernegan2—GTI
	Leonard J. Cromie—GTI

The Greek Ambassador called at 4:00 p. m. by appointment at his request to present a memorandum,³ prepared by the Greek Foreign Office, dealing with current Macedonian developments in their relationship to Cominform pressure against Tito⁴ and possibilities of western counteraction.⁵ (Copy attached.)

The memorandum outlines the “extremely dangerous” consequences for Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Italy and the Western Democracies in general should the Cominform succeed in overthrowing Tito either by force or by subversive activities in Macedonia. In the event of a Cominform move in this direction, statements of protest by the Western Powers or appeals to the United Nations would be of no avail, for the former would merely demonstrate “the inability of the West to face the new thrusts of world communism” while the latter would become “bogged down” by procedural delays. Decisions should rather be made at once which will prove “the determination of the Western Democracies to face developments not merely by righteous indignation and recourse to the legal procedures of international law, but by strong and decisive action.” Preferably this should take the form of “a naval operation of the Western Powers …⁶ to storm Albania,” which would “bring about with certainty the rapid collapse of the Hoxha⁷ regime” and Western occupation of Albania. This action, which could be justified on defensive grounds coupled with a promise of eventual withdrawal conditional upon improved Soviet behavior in the Balkans, would cover Tito’s western flank and an important sector of Greece’s northern flank and “would provide the Western Powers with a valuable pawn.” Turkish participation in this operation would be desirable, since the realization of Cominform objectives in Macedonia “would unavoidably be followed by … a move for the seizure of the Straits.” The memorandum proposes that the Western Powers make preliminary contact with the Turks on this matter without Greek participation. It foresees, however, that the Greek role in the contemplated Balkan military operations would be “most important” and that aid to Greece “should be accordingly adjusted.”

The Ambassador read, under instructions, some accompanying “verbal remarks” (copy attached⁸), explaining that the Greek Government does not regard Cominform aggression against Yugoslavia as inevitable nor does it contemplate immediate action in Albania but merely proposes that the Western Powers give joint consideration to this matter to lay the groundwork for eventual action should events require it.

Mr. Satterthwaite told the Ambassador that the Greek memorandum would be taken under advisement.

1. Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
2. Chief, Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.
3. The Greek Embassy memorandum, dated April 1, 1949, is not printed.
4. Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), Yugoslav Prime Minister and Minister of Defense; Secretary General of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
5. For documentation, see vol. v, pp. 854 ff.
6. Omission appears in the source text.
7. General Enver Hoxha, Albanian Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Commander in Chief; Secretary General of the Albanian Workers’ Party (the Communist party of Albania).
8. Not printed.