Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

125.0081 Conferences/6–1349

The Chargé in Morocco ( More ) to the Secretary of State

secret

Tangier, Morocco , June 13, 1949.

No. 129

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a report on the political items on the agenda of the North African Conference¹ held at this Legation on June 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, 1949 pursuant to the Department’s instructions. The officers who attended the Conference are listed in Enclosure 1.

It was my privilege to preside at the opening session, after which Mr. Earl L. Packer, Consul General at Tunis, acted as Chairman. I designated Mr. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., of the Legation, as Drafting Officer and he was greatly assisted by Mr. Ridgway B. Knight, of the Embassy at Paris, as well as by the Chairman and other officers in preparing the report, all sections of which were unanimously approved.

The Legation’s despatch no. 130 dated June 13, 1949 includes a discussion of the other items on the agenda.

Respectfully yours,

Bolard More

[Enclosure 1]

List of Officers Attending

Tunis Chairman	Earl L. Packer	Consul General
	John A. Sabini	Vice Consul—PAO
Algeria	George Tait	Consul General
	Thomas L. Nicholson	Vice Consul—PAO
Casablanca	C. Paul Fletcher	Consul General
	Robert M. Beaudrv	Vice Consul—PAO
Rabat	Maurice Pasquet	Consul
Tripoli Department of State	Orray Taft, Jr.	Consul
	Harry A. Schwartz	Assistant Chief, Division African Affairs
	John R. Kennedy	Assistant Chief, Division Foreign Reporting Services
	Mrs. Ruth C. Sloan	Public Overseas Program Staff
Department of Commerce	Paul Hawk	Office of International Trade
Paris	John L. Stewart	First Secretary and consul (Agricultural Attaché)
	Ridgway B. Knight	Second Secretary and Consul
Madrid	Charles Sitler	Labor Attaché
Cairo	Philip W. Ireland	First Secretary and Consul

Tangier (The following officers of the Legation attended some or all of the sessions):

	Bolard More	Chargé d’Affaires a.i.
	Robert M. Sheehan	Second Secretary and Vice Consul—PAO
Drafting Officer:	Albert W. Sherer, Jr.	Second Secretary and Vice Consul
	Elmer E. Yelton	Third Secretary and Vice Consul
	Converse Hettinger	Third Secretary and Vice Consul
	Fred K. Blackburn	Resident Radio Engineer
	George E. Palmer	Vice Consul
	Robert G. Caldwell	Attaché
	Margaret M. Barrett	Research Analyst
	Bernice Cloutier	Librarian USIS
	Colonel Marion Carson	Military Attaché
	Captain John P. Bedford	Air Attaché

[Enclosure 2]

Report on Political Problems

appraisal of present political situation in north africa

I French policy

It was the sense of the meeting that the record of French reform achievements in North Africa since the 1948 North African meeting has been definitely discouraging—in particular, it was unanimously agreed that the programs of minimum reforms which had been drafted by the French during the summer of 1947 have largely, and at least temporarily, been abandoned in fact if not in theory, especially in Morocco. Concern was expressed that the French authorities have allowed themselves to become overconfident as a result of the apparent calm reigning in North Africa. Different theories were expressed with reference to the effect of plentiful crops on both French policy and nationalist activities. It was, however, agreed that the French authorities would be making a grave mistake should they believe that economic well-being alone is sufficient to replace political evolution and sufficient to assure long term stability. On the contrary, the Conference unanimously endorsed the reform programs with time-tables adopted in 1947 and 1948 and further agreed that France should and could usefully exploit these favorable economic circumstances in order to implement such a liberal and constructive policy. Such concessions would thus appear voluntary rather than forced, and consequently should have the maximum effect on Moslem public opinion.

Several different patterns were recognized as existing in France vis-à-vis the North African problem:

a) Foreign Office and other official thinking: generally confident that the situation has so improved as to render further reforms unnecessary at this time. Furthermore, this element in some instances resents American discussion of such problems as impinging on French sovereignty.

b) General Public Opinion: The French public regardless of party affiliation is traditionally nationalist and conservative when colonial problems are involved. Compared to 20 and 10 years ago, there has been a slight evolution; in particular the cost in treasure and in manpower of the Indo-Chinese war has tended to illustrate the depth of present-day nationalist aspirations and the necessity intelligently to deal therewith. Yet evolution has been slower than the march of events and the Conference does not believe that a sufficiently strong current of public opinion would originate in France sufficiently soon alone to compel the French Government to adopt the programs of evolution thought to be necessary by this meeting.

c) French Political Parties^* and Politicians: The political parties reflecting public opinion and conscious of electoral necessities, have not yet adopted specific programs of concrete liberal action. However, they generally accept a vague and undefined French Union which would, by some slight of hand, eliminate the faults and weaknesses of the old French Empire and yet remain a political organization centered on France. Fortunately it would appear that a number of important French politicians in key positions realize the urgency of the basic problem confronting France and have already engaged in missionary work within their organizations. In particular the Conference noted the already expressed opinion of important MRP elements that France should soon negotiate new agreements with Morocco and Tunisia inspired by the March 8th agreements between President Auriol and Bao Dai concerning the Vietnam, (see Appendix A)²

It was also reported that prominent socialist leaders are actively campaigning for early implementation in fact of the well-known socialist progressive theories concerning dependent peoples.

The meeting unanimously agreed that regardless of France’s desires, her policy in North Africa would necessarily be affected to an unknown extent by both the Vietnam agreements and developments in neighboring Libya. Special mention was made of the impact of the Cyrenaican proclamation of “independence”.

II French reforms since 1948 meeting

[Here follows a discussion of the situation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria with regard to proposed reforms in the fields of elections, education, and administration.]

III Reasons for apparent decrease in nationalist activity since June, 1948

It was unanimously agreed that in Morocco and Algeria such activities have in recent months been less apparent than at any other time since the end of the war, but that very recently there has been a new spurt of activity in Tunisia where the Bey himself appears to have become somewhat involved with the Neo-Destours. It was believed, however, that the current situation does not imply a decrease in the aspirations of the nationalist leaders involved.

Several reasons were advanced as contributing to this situation:

1. An excellent crop year.

2. Lack of faith in the value of Arab League leadership and assistance after the Palestine fiasco.

3. Increased doubts as to United States support.

4. Somewhat increased French prestige resulting from her gradual economic and political rehabilitation—however uneven this may be in various fields.

It was also noted that the activity and influence of the Moghreb Office in Cairo had sharply declined. Such decline appeared to arise, in a large degree, from its discouragement at Arab failures concerning Palestine militarily and before the UN, and from the realization that the decrease in French North African tension and the emergence of new leadership in the North African countries had deprived the Cairo group of its importance. In particular the Arab League had not realized the decline in Abdel Krim’s importance since he left for exile 22 years ago. It was also noted that many of the Moghreb leaders in Cairo had either declined in personal influence, as has Habib Bourghiba, or have left Egypt as have Abdel Khalek Torres, and Allal al Fassi.

It was thought that the decrease in nationalist activity above mentioned may be more apparent than actual and it was agreed that any resulting lesser emphasis on the necessity for reforms would be detrimental to the long-term interests and stability of the area. As previously stated, the Conference is of the opinion that this reduced tension should facilitate the implementation of evolutionary programs.

IV The Arab League and nationalist plans for bringing North African problem before the United Nations

It was unanimously agreed that it was unlikely that the French North African situation would be introduced into the forthcoming September meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. It was recognized that the Arab League remains interested in North Africa (especially Azzam Pasha, who because of his participation in the early Libyan independence movement, feels especially close to Libya and to a lesser degree to French North Africa.) In particular it was believed that the indifferent support received by the Arab League countries from Morocco and Tunisia during the hostilities in Palestine caused some cooling in the member states’ interest in French North Africa for the immediate present. It was also suggested that member states’ interest had been further dampened by their present preoccupation with political and economic problems arising from the creation of the Israeli State and from the influx of Arab refugees from Palestine. In the light of the Arab States’ attitude and of the League’s currently reduced prestige and its present trend towards concentration on economic and cultural activities, the Conference believes that the League would undertake support of the French North African cause at UN only if a reasonably good possibility existed for a result satisfactory to Azzam Pasha and the member states. It was considered possible that the Philippines would be willing to introduce the question but would probably not do so without the agreement and support of the Arab States.

V Libya

It was the sense of the meeting that France for reasons of national prestige and because of the possibility of mineral wealth in the area would continue to make every effort to hold the Fezzan. It was further unanimously agreed that France would in all likelihood continue actively to support some form of Italian administration for Tripoli-tania, for the following reasons:

a) Any form of Italian administration would in all probability be comparable to French methods in the neighboring territories thus preventing invidious comparisons.

b) The mere fact of returning a colonial area to a continental European nation contrary to the trend in evidence since the war would be considered by the French as a vindication of their colonial policy.

c) Independence, however nominal, or trusteeship of any power likely to honor the terms of the trusteeship agreement would be obnoxious to France.

The Conference further agreed that British or American trusteeship with the ensuing quasi certainty that the trust territories would be granted their independence at the end of the trusteeship period would serve to oblige France to institute in French North Africa a reform program of the type advocated by the United States.

While it was the sense of the meeting that full and complete independence would probably exert the same influence, it was thought possible that the French might stall for a few years in the hope that the new countries unprepared for their new responsibility would so misconduct their own affairs as to make French administration in French North Africa appear in a favorable light.

The Conference strongly believed that in the event some form of Italian administration were instilled, Arab armed resistance and bloodshed would ensue. The impact of such fighting on neighboring Tunisia and French North Africa would lead to unrest and perhaps riots though the French forces stationed in North Africa would probably be able rapidly to suppress such disorders. In this connection current reductions in garrison strengths were noted as well as French concern over the adequacy of the remaining effectives for maintaining order.

Material based on Consul Orray Taft’s remarks about Libya is contained in Appendix C.³

VI Communist activities

It was the unanimous opinion of the Conference that temporary tactical changes in the party line for French North Africa in no way alters the ultimate objective of Stalinist Communism: the separation of these dependent areas from the so-called “imperialistic exploiting nations” and eventually their integration into the orbit of Moscow.

In order to achieve this long term objective, it was accepted that the oft-announced communist revolutionary program for colonial areas would be followed.

a) During the first phase the communists can be expected actively to support the various nationalist pro-independence movements regardless of their social policies and notwithstanding any and all rebuffs which they may receive from nationalist or other groups in these countries. The use of the words “independence” or “independence within the French Union” or “liberty” was said to be based on communist needs for their propaganda within French and other such contingencies as the likelihood of the communists coming to power in France and thus not to affect basic policy which remains the separation of the colonial area from the mother country so as both to weaken the “imperialistic power” and prepare the ground for the second phase of the communist blue print.

This second phase calls for the “social revolution” at which time the nationalist-bourgeois temporary allies would be ruthlessly eliminated and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” instituted. The latter, of course, means the dictatorship of the communist party and complete subservience to the Kremlin.

A. Morocco

The meeting noted the recent change in the party line in Morocco when the expression “independence within the French Union” was replaced by “liberty”. It was believed that now, when the Communist Party has, at least momentarily, abandoned hope of capturing the French Government through the ballot box the Communist Party of Morocco can be expected to adopt once again the slogan of full independence.

The Istiqlal Party, which includes the overwhelming majority of Moroccan nationalists, maintained during the year its past policy of refusing cooperation with the communists and participation in any joint “front” organization. Some concern, however, was expressed that should the French maintain their intransigeant and discriminatory attitude on nationalist as compared to communist activities, the nationalists might eventually be led to cooperation with the communists.

The main communist efforts were described as directed toward the European and Moslem proletariat in Casablanca where the CGT, completely under communist control, is a precious auxiliary. Propaganda efforts among agricultural workers were said to be sporadic and none too effective, the major slogan being higher pay with little if any agitation for division of property or a land reform.

Communist catering to the Moslems was illustrated by a reference to their new committee which includes several Moslems more than last year. These Moslems have taken the place of prominent European labor leaders.

Considerable concern was expressed by the Conference over the apparent under-estimation by the Residency of the strength of communism.

B. Algeria

Importance was granted to several recent reports that the Algerian communist party had established a close working relationship with the “Amis du Manifesto” of Ferhat Abbas. Some of these reports even indicate that a number of the Manifesto leaders are in the pay of the communists and controlled by them.

It was not felt that a similar evolution had occurred in the “Mouvement pour le Triomphe de la Liberté et la Democracie” (MTLD) of Messali Hadj. As in 1947 and 1948 the difficulty of evaluating the relative strength of these two nationalist movements was recognized. Indeed, since 1945 there has been a continuous see-saw with one or the other of these parties dominating the other for brief periods.

The Conference was informed that Governor General Naegelen was fully aware of the communist danger and was rooting out communist influence wherever possible.

The party is continuing to strive, with some success, especially in the “cultural” field, for the establishment of communist-nationalist Moslem front organizations. The party line remains “the creation of an Algerian republic” with lessening emphasis on “within the French Union”.

The Communist strongholds in Algeria are to be found in the large urban centers principally in the Department of Oran which now has the distinction of having the only communist mayor in all of Algeria (Sidi Bel Abbes). In the recent cantonal elections held on March 20th and 27th, 1949 the strength of the anti-communist “entente” between the French political parties was such that a severe defeat was inflicted upon the communists without the necessity of an official coalition as in the previous municipal elections. In the second electoral college (non-citizens) the crushing defeat suffered by the communists is impossible to interpret in view of the admitted manipulation of electoral results in some areas.

C. Tunisia

In view of the contrary situation prevailing in Morocco the Conference was encouraged to note that the Residency at Tunis appears to be seriously concerned by communist developments and the potential communist threat. This attitude is in sharp contrast to the attitude reported in 1948 when French officials were inclined to dismiss the communists with the irrelevant and all too frequently heard statement that “Islam and Communism do not mix”.

Civilian, army and navy authorities are submitting the local communist party to greater surveillance. Communist literature is banned from the Ferryville arsenal and General Duval, commander of troops, has taken legal steps against the communist organ “L’Avenir” for the publication of an item of military importance.

The party line was reported as modified since January 1949 allegedly by orders emanating from Moscow and communicated through the French Communist Party. Essentially there appears to be greater insistence on attaining collaboration between leading nationalists and the communists. To date, however, this cooperation has been manifest in connection with a few strikes and also hi connection with the communist sponsored Peace Congress held at Paris on April 20, 1949. Nationalists were represented in the Tunisian delegation and subsequently a joint local committee was organized to implement the Congress’ resolutions.

The Conference recognized that in Tunisia as elsewhere in French North Africa the relationship between nationalists and communists depends on world events and on the world power ratio more than on purely internal considerations.

Surprisingly enough it was noted that the communist press has recently attacked the nationalist press in Tunisian and the nationalist leaders in Morocco in apparent contradiction to the “greater unity” party line.

1. This conference was similar to other regional conferences periodically conducted abroad by the Department of State. For documentation on the Near Eastern regional conference for diplomatic and consular officers held in Istanbul, November 26–29, see pp. 165 ff.
2. Unless otherwise stated throughout this paper, the term political parties does not include the Communists. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. The appendices to this paper are not printed. Appendix A was a summary of the principal points of the exchange of letters of March 8 between French President Vincent Auriol and Vietnamese Chief of State Bao Dai. For documentation regarding the agreements, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 4 ff.
3. Appendices not printed.