501.BB Balkans/2–1949: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 1


258. Balcom 245. While we agree possibility Yugo-Grk rapprochement enhanced by Markos ouster and intensified Cominform pressure against Tito (Combal 368 Feb 19), we feel end Yugo aid to guerrillas more likely occur spontaneously if at all. If Tito decides stop aid (and it would seem only logical he must eventually reach this decision), he will do so on basis self-interest and self-protection and [Page 258]not because of prompting by UNSCOB or Big Powers. Such intervention might, in fact, retard or prevent desired reversal Yugo policy by irritating Tito and exposing him, thru strong possibility disclosure, to further embarrassment vis-à-vis Cominform and own followers in Yugo.

We therefore believe Grk reply UNSCOB communication (Dept’s A–123 Feb 212) should be straightforward and for record. (Presumably some public reply necessary any case.) This would not, of course, preclude quiet, direct soundings of Yugos by Grks along lines proposed by Pipinellis, which direct approach would not be open same objections as UNSCOB or Big-Power intervention. According Tsaldaris, Yugos have already made “very real” overtures to Grks (Embtel 302 Feb 183). Fruitful outcome such direct contacts, concerning which Grks might so far as practicable consult UNSCOB confidentially, or spontaneous end Yugo aid to guerrillas would provide solid basis for effective conciliatory role UNSCOB thru provision technical assistance on frontier conventions, refugee exchange, etc. Meanwhile, pending real Yugo change of heart, we believe conciliatory gestures by UNSCOB, Evatt or anyone else will probably remain fruitless though UNSCOB conciliation moves must of course continue for record. (Foregoing subject to further comment when full text Pipinellis draft recd.)

  1. Sent to Belgrade as 93; repeated by air to London, Moscow, and Sofia.
  2. Not printed; it stated that the Department of State favored the idea of having the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans address a communication to the Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Yugoslav Governments calling attention to U.N. General Assembly resolutions on diplomatic relations, frontier conventions, and refugee questions (501.BB Balkans/2–2149).
  3. Not printed; Ambassador Grady added that Foreign Minister Tsaldaris was vague as to the form the alleged Yugoslavia overtures had taken (868.00/2–1840).