501.BC Kashmir/12–2949: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
1481. Remytels 1467, December 22 and 1469, December 23.1 Bajpai informed McNaughton late today [December 28] that he had received new instructions from Delhi permitting him to modify GOI reply to Canadian proposals so as to avoid insistence on legality GOI position and to make specific suggestions for amendments to proposals. He did not reveal nature or extent these amendments, but promised to deliver revised reply Thursday a.m. He indicated GOI felt it desirable replies of parties not be made public this stage. He further stressed GOI desire that McNaughton continue his efforts to mediate.
McNaughton agreed that replies of parties would not be circulated to Security Council tomorrow but intends to proceed with his plan to table his proposals and still feels strongly other members of Council will indicate their support of them.
In light this apparent modification GOI attitude, McNaughton now less reluctant continue his current efforts, provided GOI adheres to intention as stated to McNaughton and refrains from interjecting question GOP guilt. We outlined possible procedure for keeping McNaughton in the case by relying on December 17 resolution and on Article 33 of Charter in order to avoid a new resolution appointing him rapporteur, thereby opening door to Soviet double veto.
Article 33 approach had some appeal for McNaughton. He assured us that although Canadians would welcome an opportunity to override double veto he will seek to avoid having this problem arise. McNaughton added that Canada is so opposed to the double veto that his ruling as President may have to reflect that fact. He agreed that if question of his continuance should be forced to a vote our argument can effectively be pressed that the will of the parties acting under Article 33 may not be thwarted by negative vote of any permanent member.
[Page 1774]Cadogan clearly indicated that UK would not be in a position to override double veto in this case. He was not convinced that December 17 resolution, if carefully analyzed, would be basis for continued action by McNaughton of and by itself. He added that it was not so clear-cut as AEC case before him as President. (In subsequent conversation, Ordonneau, France, found US approach appealing and was most concerned that double veto angle should not arise. Ordonneau added that if matter of McNaughton’s continuance is presented lightly and skillfully, Russians will look for no difficulties not clearly presented to them and will therefore not oppose.)
- Telegram 1469 not printed.↩