Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BC Kashmir/9–1449

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. F. D. Collins of the Division of South Asian Affairs

secret

[Washington,] September 14, 1949.

Participants:	Mr. M. E. Dening, Head of the Southeast Asian Dept., British Foreign Office
	Mr. C. A. Meade, Counselor, British Embassy
	Mr. C. Michael Walker, First Secretary, British Embassy
	Mr. G. C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary, NEA
	Mr. R. A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
	Mr. S. K. C. Kopper, NEA
	Mr. W. Allen, UNP
	Messrs. E. G. Mathews, D. D. Kennedy, B. E. Usher and F. D. Collins, SOA

At the suggestion of the British Embassy, Mr. Dening, British Foreign Office, accompanied by Messrs. Meade and Walker, visited NEA for discussions involving a number of problems of current interest to the UK and to the US.

Mr. Mathews, after alluding to the recent clarification given by the Commission following the Indian rejection of arbitration, stated we doubted whether a rewording of the Commission’s recent proposal would have any material effect upon the GOI. Mr. McGhee inquired as to whether clarification of the points raised in the Indian reply would be of help and Mr. Dening indicated that it would only be of help in the event that Nehru had changed his mind and realized that he had gone too far. Mr. Dening then referred to the Attlee reply to the negative response on the part of the GOI to the arbitration appeal and indicated that he thought the British answer which in brief consisted of an expression of disappointment could have been stronger. Mr. Dening remarked that it would be a pity if the Indians felt that we were accepting their negative response and that we did not contemplate doing anything further on this matter. He stated further that the British have considerable doubts regarding a reference of the Kashmir issue to the Security Council, adding that old wounds would probably be torn open when the discussions began in the Security Council.

Mr. Dening mentioned that the recent legal opinion of the British to the effect that the accession of Kashmir to India could be seriously questioned in view of the Stand-Still Agreement which Kashmir had concluded with Pakistan was a bit late and that he did not see that the UK or anyone else at this time could effectively make use of this.

Mr. McGhee inquired as to what we should recommend that the President say when receiving the Indian negative reply (the Indian reply had not as yet been delivered to President Truman, but was subsequently delivered at 12:45 p. m. on September 15). Mr. Dening indicated that he thought it would be helpful if we could express the hope that in view of clarifications by the Commission to the GOI that they would reconsider their negative answer to the Commission’s arbitration proposal.¹

At this point it was mentioned that such an approach might be more effective by the American Embassy in New Delhi where they could talk directly with the GOI and express the same hope of India’s reconsidering. Mr. Dening mentioned that the British contemplated taking advantage of this opening to further point out to the Indians the desirability of their accepting the arbitration proposal and that in view of this and the possibility of a similar approach by the US he believed we should await further developments in the next few days before deciding on any further action which might have the effect of a reference back to the Security Council.

Mr. McGhee asked the question, “If India turns down the Commission’s arbitration proposal are we agreed on the next step?” Mr. Dening replied that there appeared to be little left short of reference to the Security Council but that the thought of reference to the Security Council by the British Government was “horrible”. The discussion then centered on what the US and UK might do in the event the issue was referred to the Security Council. It was pointed out that we could recommend to the Kashmir Commission that they word their report in such a way so as to recommend that the Security Council, in dealing with the Kashmir issue, would confine itself to procedural recommendations and avoid any substantive recommendations.

The British were asked what their viewpoint was with respect to partition, considering the recent Nehru–Nye conversations in which the question of partition came up. Mr. Dening replied that the British had given long and careful consideration to various partition proposals but felt that the crux of the matter was the Vale, and that by recommending partition you merely compress the problem into the question of the “Vale of Kashmir”. In addition there was the very decided objection which Pakistan would raise to any partition proposal. Mr. Mathews indicated that the US, as a member of UNCIP, would find it difficult to take any initiative in support of partition as UNCIP was committed by its January 5 resolution to preparing for a plebiscite.

1. Telegram 642 to New Delhi, September 15, recommended to the Embassy an approach to the Government of India to request reconsideration of their position on arbitration (501.BC Kashmir/5–2649).