501.BC Kashmir/7–2949: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India
554. Urtel 851 July 29. Fol paper prepared in Dept as basis for response to Bajpai. You may make such deletions and changes as you deem advisable. In view informal character Bajpai approach Dept [Page 1730] believes preferable reply be made orally but no objection your leaving memo of conversation if you feel it desirable. Pls inform Dept action taken, mentioning any substantial departure from fol text:
“US officials in Wash and NY have on numerous occasions expressed to Indian officials and other responsible Indians concern over the slow progress toward a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The Dept learns with regret that these expressions of concern have been misinterpreted as indications that this Govt questions the good faith of the GOI in its approach to the Kashmir problem. The Dept remains convinced that both India and Pak desire a peaceful solution of the problem, and US officials have endeavored to emphasize this fundamental conviction in all discussions of the Kashmir question.
“The concern of this Govt stems from its support of the objectives of peace and orderly progress in the Indian subcontinent to which the GOI is dedicated. The principal threat to the attainment of these objectives is the continued existence of the Kashmir dispute. The cease fire on Jan 1, 1949 encouraged the Dept to believe that this threat might be removed at an early date. Subsequent slow progress toward a truce agreement has been disappointing and has inevitably aroused apprehension within this Govt of an indefinite prolongation of the dispute.
“Factors attributable to both parties have accounted for the slow pace of the Kashmir negots. Among these may be included the emphasis placed by the GOI on the legal and mil-security aspects of the problem.
“In referring to the GOI’s emphasis on its legal rights in Kashmir, the Dept wishes to make clear that it is not herein addressing itself to the validity of the Indian interpretation of those rights. It is suggested, however, that greater flexibility on strictly legal points wld facilitate solution of the problem.
“The Dept was struck by the preponderance of security considerations in the GOI’s reply to the Apr 28 truce proposals of the UNCIP. Stress on mil-security factors makes it appear that the GOI lacks confidence in the UN’s ability to implement a peaceful settlement of the dispute. To the extent that India’s preoccupation with mil-security factors may derive from concepts of the strategic importance of Kashmir, the Dept wld observe that strategic considerations in Kashmir become significant only in the event of war between India and Pak or of invasion of the Indian subcontinent. The Dept cannot believe that responsible statesmen in either India or Pak hold the disastrous view that their two countries will resort to war to resolve their differences. Shld there be external aggression against the subcontinent, the strategic value of Kashmir wld depend, not on its polit affiliation, but on the degree of cooperation between India and Pak in resisting the invader.
“The refusal of the GOI, in connection with the Comm’s truce proposals of Apr 28, to permit the UNCIP prior to signature of the truce agreement to inform the GOP of the Indian sched of troop withdrawals reflects emphasis on both security and legal aspects. No major Indian interest seems to have been served by this insistence on its legal position unless the probability of renewed hostilities in Kashmir were assumed. If the GOI did make this assumption, the [Page 1731] Dept believes that it was led to do so by its over-emphasis on security factors, as neither the UNCIP, its mil observers nor this Govt considered a resumption of fighting probable.
“The Dept reiterates its conviction that both India and Pak desire a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The recent agreement on a definitive cease fire line affords further evidence of the good faith of both parties. The Dept strongly hopes that the GOI and the GOP will take advantage of this advance and press forward to the conclusion of an over-all truce agreement. To that end and in response to the friendly and constructive inquiry of the MEA, the Dept has set forth in the preceding paras its frank views on certain aspects of the GOI’s approach to the Kashmir problem. It is hoped that the MEA will accept these comments in the friendly spirit in which they are offered, and that they will serve to remove any misunderstandings which may have arisen with respect to the Dept’s position.”1
Dept gratified by your prompt and forceful presentation US position in initial reply to Bajpai. Dept paper omits certain points which you properly emphasized in order make Dept presentation more palatable in event brought Nehru’s attention. Paper is necessarily general to avoid compromising US position as member UNCIP.
Shld Bajpai press you for other examples GOI-created difficulties you cld cite position on northern areas as example security emphasis and seating Kashmir Reps in Constituent Assembly as example legal emphasis. Shld he justify security emphasis by pointing to existence Azad forces, you might remind him that GOI agreed to UNCIP Jan 5 Res which deferred this problem to plebiscite period. Moreover, UNCIP has in Dept opinion shown full regard for necessity maintaining balance between Azad forces and GOI and State forces during truce period.2
Dept has not discussed Bajpai’s approach or reply with Brit or with Indian Elmb. Shld you consider desirable inform Brit, advise Dept.
- On August 9 Henderson handed to Bajpai an unheaded memorandum which followed closely the language suggested here, with the addition of this passage following the first sentence of the third paragraph: “It should he recalled at this point that the United States Government has not hesitated to express its concern to both parties and it has done so frequently to Indian and Pakistan officials alike. In this document, however, which results from an informal discussion in regard to the United States attitude towards the Indian approach to the Kashmir problem, only those factors relating to the position taken by the Government of India are mentioned.” (501.BC Kashmir/8–1049)↩
- In despatch No. 690, August 10 (in amplification of telegram 911, not printed), Henderson reported that Bajpai “seemed not too pleased with what I had to tell him. He remains of the opinion that the Department has not given his Government full credit for the concessions which he considers that it has made.…” Henderson added that he thought that the exchange of views had been useful in demonstrating “that we do not accept without critical evaluation the Indian Government’s own estimate of its position.” He was uncertain what Nehru’s reaction might be, but even if he should take offense, Henderson was “convinced that we could not in all honesty have made a more disarming or milder reply. …” (501.BC Kashmir/8–1049)↩