501.BC Kashmir/7–2949: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
priority
851. 1. I called on Bajpai, Director General Foreign Affairs, twenty-eighth at his request. He said he wanted discuss serious matter. Prime Minister and other members government disturbed at reports received from returning Indian representatives and other Indian visitors in US to effect US representatives to UN from Austin down as well as Nimitz and his associates seemed be forming impression GOI was not acting in good faith re Kashmir and through various subterfuges and evasions was endeavoring avoid plebiscite. It seemed likely attitude USDel and other Americans connected with UN was reflection attitude State Department. Furthermore, Birls1 had obtained impression State Department seemed regard India as primarily responsible for failure achieve truce agreement. He hoped that if State Department had feelings this kind it would express them frankly through me to him, pointing out at same time what India had done or failed do to give rise to them. If really friendly understanding was to be maintained between India and US, frankness was essential. He hoped US would not fall into British habit taking evasive attitude when unpleasant or disagreeable matters developed. Frank statement on part State Department of what it considered be India’s shortcoming re Kashmir would not be considered intrusion since they were being invited. He would particularly like know specific actions which US felt India should take to demonstrate good faith. He was fearful that if spirit of suspicion of Indian motives continued be manifested by intimations and hints on part US officials and representatives, hoped for effect of Nehru visit would not be realized and kind relations between our two countries for which he was wholeheartedly striving would not be achieved.
2. I replied I was not aware there had crystallized in State Department belief that India was not acting in good faith. It was only natural, however, that doubt should be raised in minds of various members State Department and perhaps among various US representatives to UN re India’s intentions because (a) India had not shown kind of conciliatory attitude which was likely promote speedy holding of plebiscite; (b) it was well-known that in certain Indian official circles, partition was preferred to plebiscite; (c) since India was in possession most desirable portions Kashmir, postponement of plebiscite seemed more disadvantageous to Pakistan than India. I reminded him that on number occasions I had frankly told him how [Page 1727] disturbed India’s friends in Washington were at what seemed be unconciliatory attitude both India and Pakistan. Furthermore, existence Kashmir problem was cause of discouraging frustration to those officials American Government anxious promote relations between US and India and assist in promoting stability and prosperity south Asia. For instance it seemed almost hopeless for US be able lend really effective economic assistance to India so long as running sore of Kashmir problem was eating into India’s financial position and undermining political economic stability of South Asia. I had been somewhat embarrassed by my failure receive from Washington replies Defense Secretary Patel’s questions re possibility receiving certain military equipment, et cetera. I did not know why these questions had not been answered. I was convinced, however, that Department was postponing from day to day making decisions re them in hope breaking of Kashmir deadlock between India and Pakistan would remove certain negative factors which could not be ignored at present. When Pakistan and India were at each others throats, US placed virtual embargo arms to both countries since it did not wish one use American equipment in fight against other. When cease-fire was announced, we lifted embargo but subsequent developments have caused us again hesitate lest military equipment given one country might be used against other. These represent only two illustrations of handicaps imposed by Kashmir deadlock on American officials working on south Asian matters. On other hand, it was difficult for US as I had pointed out in previous conversations to suggest specific conditions under which India might accept truce since US could not by-pass UNCIP with suggestions of its own.
3. Bajpai again insisted it was important that US talk with complete frankness with GOI re this matter. Existence of UNCIP or reference of Kashmir dispute to UN should not be allowed interfere with direct diplomatic conversations. We must also consider relations between US and India. Full understanding between our two countries achieved through direct talks should be of advantage to UN.
4. I told him I would convey substance our conversation to Washington and ask Department furnish me, for transmission to him, frank statement replete with as many details might be considered appropriate and helpful.
5. He said he would be grateful if I would do so. He hoped my request would be couched in language which would not give offense since his approach to me was not to produce argument but promote understanding. He was particularly anxious that matter should be handled between himself and me and not through Madam Pandit since he feared her version of conversation might have effect opposite to that which he was sure we both desired.
[Page 1728]6. I realize Department’s difficulties in preparing statement of character desired by Bajpai. An utterly frank statement might mortally offend Nehru who is almost morbidly sensitive to criticism which might reflect on his motives or good faith. On other hand, I feel we should not fail register our disappointment at attitude displayed by India re truce negotiations. Without questioning good faith GOI, it might be possible give instances in which India has assumed what seems to me be a legalistic and technical attitude not likely produce kind of atmosphere in which friendly agreements are made. We should exercise care, however, not to present kind of statement which would invite argumentative reply and might lead us into profitless wrangling. In any event it seems important statement be worded in such manner as prepare way for President’s contemplated message to Nehru on arbitration.
Pouched Srinagar for USDel.
- Possibly Ghanshyam Das Birla, Indian industrialist.↩