Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

611.41/1–2550

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Rusk )

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[ Washington ,] December 19, 1949.

I am attaching for your information informal summaries of the discussions which were conducted with Mr. Michael Wright of the British Foreign Office (Tab A¹). Mr. McGhee and Mr. Wright held the talks between November 14 and 17 and I continued them on November 22. There is also attached for reference the full record of the meetings (Tab B) as agreed with the British.²

As was brought out by Mr. McGhee is his introductory remarks at the first meeting with Mr. Wright, it is clearly understood by both parties that the conclusions reached did not constitute binding agreements but that the talks were designed to afford an opportunity for finding areas of agreement subject to further examination and to the obtaining of higher approval as required.

A summary of the conversations with Mr. Wright on the former Italian Colonies (included here as part of Tab B) was sent to you separately under cover of my memorandum of November 29, 1949.³

Copies of this record have been furnished S/P and EUR, both of which were represented during the talks.

[Annex 1]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

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[ Washington ,] November 14, 1949.

Introductory Discussions

In his introductory remarks, Mr. George McGhee said that such intimate discussions had now become a normal aspect of Anglo-American relations. It was clearly understood by both parties that the conclusions from the talks constituted no binding agreements on the parties concerned and that the purpose of the exchanges of view was to find areas of agreement. In the case of the United States Group the opinions expressed and conclusions reached were tentative until the conclusion of the conference of American representatives in the Near East which was opening in Istanbul on November 26th. (Following the conclusion of this meeting it would be necessary to spell out the discussions and obtain higher approval for more precise definition of policies.)

Mr. Wright confirmed Mr. McGhee’s view of the status of the talks and pointed out that conclusions reached on the British side would also be for approval by higher authority. He hoped that the talks would lead to agreement on the same set of principles for tackling problems in the Middle East.

Mr. McGhee said he had considered carefully Anglo-American relations in the Near East and had come to the conclusion that the objectives of the two countries in the area were identical, although there might be a difference of method in seeking to attain them. Both countries attached high importance to the area from a security point of view. American interests were parallel and not competitive and both countries shared a common desire for the stability of the area and its orientation towards the West. The difference in methods might arise from the fact that the influence and material interests of the United Kingdom and the United States were not the same in each country. Points of asymmetry, therefore, were only superimposed on an area of broad agreement. He emphasized that the United States Government had no desire to compete with or to hinder the United Kingdom in carrying out its policy in the Middle East. The United States policy was, however, governed by the limitations imposed by the nature of the United States Government, its policy of non-interference, and the difficulty of securing ad hoc treatment.

Mr. Wright agreed in general with the above analysis. He said that in the United Kingdom view the Middle East was a key to the struggle with the Soviet Union. If Western influence was removed from the Middle East, either voluntarily or by force, Communism would certainly fill the vacuum left. The Middle East under Communist control would bring alarming results. It would affect the whole United Kingdom relationship with Asia. It would prejudice the future of Europe and would pave the way for Communist domination in Africa. The triumph of Soviet ideology in the Middle East and Africa would secure a tremendous strategic prize for the U.S.S.R., the possession of which would in other circumstances cost her a great expenditure of blood and treasure. With this prize, the U.S.S.R. might be emboldened to take further aggressive action. The loss of the Middle East to Communism would have a devastating economic effect on the United Kingdom. Post-war recovery would be prejudiced and, deprived of Middle East oil and to a lesser extent, cotton, the United Kingdom economy would be irretrieveably damaged. It was to our common advantage that the United States Government should increasingly concern itself with the Middle East. The United Kingdom Government had no desire to persuade the United States Government in this matter. It was entirely a decision for the United States Government but he wished to make it clear that the presence of the United States in the Middle East was considered by the United Kingdom to be to the common advantage.

Mr. McGhee replied that the importance of the Middle East to the United States Government was determined to a considerable extent by its importance to the United Kingdom Government. The Americans had no comparable position in Africa and Asia to protect and, in the matter of oil, was not so dependent as the United Kingdom on Middle East supplies. Nevertheless, American oil interests were large and the area was important from the point of view of strategic position and air communications. For the United States to take an increased interest in the Middle East was the assumption of a new responsibility. In these discussions the pervading problem from the American side was how far to go in accepting new responsibilities and in taking a more positive role in the area. It was not sufficient just to ward off Communism in the Middle East, it was essential to assist the peoples of the Middle East to improve their living standards and social and political institutions and to acquire self respect and their proper place among the nations of the world. The United States Government had found it advantageous to back nationalism against communism. But nationalism was not necessarily friendly to British and American interests. We should aim at putting the Middle East countries on their own feet and persuading them voluntarily to turn toward the West. The United States was in the process of deciding how far it should and could go in a positive approach to the area to achieve the foregoing objectives.

Mr. Wright agreed that support of nationalism could be used effectively against the spread of communism. But nationalism and communism could not be fought together. It should be our objective to convert the nationalism of the Middle East countries into a friendly force. France, Belgium and Holland did not yet wholly share this view. The preoccupation of the youthful countries of the Middle East with political problems made it very difficult for economic progress to be made. It was, however, the view of the United Kingdom that the effect of the Palestine problem was fading and the moment for more constructive action by the United Kingdom and the United States was approaching.

The conclusions drawn from the above discussion are as follows:—

(a) The general objectives of the United States and United Kingdom Governments in the Middle East are basically the same.

(b) The maintenance and extension of a friendly attitude on the part of the Middle Eastern countries to the United Kingdom and United States influence is a vital factor in the security of the Western Powers. The denial of the area to Communist influence, in peace no less than in war, is essential.

(c) The United States has no desire to compete with or hinder the United Kingdom Government in its activities in the Middle East area but on the contrary both have a desire to reinforce the general position of the other.

(d) Should the United States Government choose to assume a greater responsibility in the area, such a decision would be welcomed by the United Kingdom as being to the common advantage.

(e) It must be our common aim to align the forces of nationalism in the Middle East against communism and to guide them into channels friendly to the Western Powers.

(f) With the bitterness of the Palestine problem receding the moment for United States and United Kingdom to take more constructive action to achieve common objectives is at hand. The United States Government is at present considering how far it can go in making a more positive approach to the area.⁴

[Annex 2]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

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[ Washington ,] November 14, 1949.

Discussion on a Palestine Settlement ⁵

Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the State Department drew attention to four points outstanding in the Palestine settlement arising directly from the Resolution of December 11, 1948. These points were:

(1) What was to be the future of the Palestine Conciliation Commission?

(2) Could the scope of present discussions be extended to lead towards a solution of the boundary question?

(3) What was to be the future of the Jerusalem area?

(4) What was to be the decision on the right of the refugee to return—repatriation and settlement?

Mr. McGhee said that it was the United States policy to keep the solution of the Palestine question in a United Nations framework and not to intervene on a national basis. The United States Government had decided that it was neither desirable nor possible for the United States itself to propose any overall solution. It was not considered that the United States had sufficient influence on the countries concerned to persuade them to accept such a solution, and the result would only be to create bad relations and impair the position of the United States in assisting the United Nations or the states concerned in arriving at an agreement.

It, therefore, supported the continuation of the work of the United Nations through the Palestine Conciliation Commission. In Mr. McGhee’s view there was no quick solution and the Conciliation Commission had a long pull before it. Its affairs appeared at the moment to be in a critical state as a result of the Israelis’ refusal to utilize it for indirect talks, and the Arabs’ unwillingness to talk direct to the Jews. The United States delegate to the P.C.C. would, however, urge the Commission to seek a solution in every way possible, including encouragement of direct talks. If acceptable to both parties, the Commission would mediate between the disputants.

Mr. McGhee wished to keep the Commission entirely divorced from the relief and development program. In his view coordination between the two could be achieved outside the area by the governments represented in them. In the United States view, the Commission should continue with its existing terms of reference as it appeared desirable not to risk raising the question of modified terms of reference in the General Assembly and thus precipitate general discussion of the Palestine problem.

Mr. Wright of the Foreign Office generally shared these views and was anxious to avoid a debate in the Assembly, and he considered it inadvisable to tamper with the present terms of reference of the Commission.

Mr. McGhee pointed out that the Jerusalem settlement and the report of the Economic Survey Mission must necessarily be fully debated. If the United States is to take a positive role in the economic development of the Near East, it is necessary that this development be associated with the solution of the Palestine problem. No other policy or legislative basis for United States participation in the development of the Middle East exists at present, except for the Point Four program, which is limited to technical assistance. The United States desired the United Nations to continue to assume responsibility and to provide the machinery through which the parties could solve the Palestine problem themselves. The United States wished to avoid further general statements which might serve to postpone the parties coming to grips with the problem, rather than assist them.

Mr. Wright drew a distinction between private and public advice on a settlement and cited cases in which the U.K. Government considered that informal action could facilitate settlement.

Mr. McGhee agreed, but emphasized that the parties must themselves come to grips with the problem.

On the question of Jerusalem Mr. McGhee said the United States supported the P.C.C.’s proposal. The United States would not wish to take the initiative to amend the proposal in the General Assembly, but would be prepared to consider the amendments of others on their merits and if they appear to contribute to obtaining agreement. The plan was in their view a good compromise proposal. It was the general view of the meeting that it might be desirable to get a Sub-Committee appointed after the discussion of Jerusalem in the ad hoc Political Committee. This Sub-Committee could, under the supervision of the P.C.C. try to work out a plan based on the amendments presented. It was agreed to consider the Jerusalem problem further on the arrival of Mr. Sheringham from the Foreign Office.

Mr. Wright then raised the question of the incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan. The Foreign Office considered the present state of uncertainty was bound to introduce an unnecessary element of instability into the area. The incorporation of Arab Palestine into Jordan, besides removing a cause of instability, would be a material factor in solving the refugee problem. The Arab League appeared to be reconciled to the step and it seemed unlikely that the Israelis would object.

Mr. McGhee replied that when the Secretary of State, Mr. Bevin, had raised this question with Mr. Acheson, the U.S. considered that the moment was not ripe for incorporation. It was pointed out at that time that this might lead to similar declaration by Israel with respect to her occupied territory, and might be resisted by the other Arab states. New factors had now been introduced. Israel had asserted title to the territory already occupied by them and had stated there would be no cession of it.

The United States Government accepted the principle of incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan and was concerned only with the question of timing.

Mr. Wright suggested that some time after the General Assembly Jordan should, by proclamation, incorporate the area. The U.K. would raise no objection and he hoped that the United States would follow suit. The Anglo-Jordanian Treaty would automatically be extended to the enlarged area. He agreed with Mr. Hare that the move would in practice mean the liquidation of the greater part of the outstanding territorial settlement and would be a marked step forward.

Mr. McGhee agreed to discuss the point with the United States representatives at the coming meeting at Istanbul and reaffirmed the United States Government’s agreement to the step in principle. He said that the U.S. would consider the matter further after the General Assembly.⁶

[Annex 3]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

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[ Washington ,] November 14, 1949.

Points Arising from the Discussion on Long Range Development in the Middle East

1. The U.K. considers that positive action is now essential in the area on two lines.

(a) Actual works measures.

(b) Drive for the improvement of social conditions.

As far as (a) was concerned it is considered that the survey period is now over and that a number of schemes are now ripe for execution. A priority list of projects has accordingly been drawn up in consultation with Departments in London and is now communicated to U.S. Government for their consideration, and in hope that they would support its proposals.

2. The U.K. feels that the cost of long range development in the Middle East is of manageable proportions and will yield substantial results.

3. The U.K. had no feeling of reserve or antagonism towards the United States taking a more prominent role.

4. In the view of the U.S. Government and the U.K. the Arabs must take the major responsibility for carrying out development work. For this reason and in view of national susceptibilities it would be profitable to work through Development Boards set up in the Middle East countries themselves. Any regional development organization arising out of the ESM report could assist those Boards in technical matters and coordinate outside assistance forthcoming as a result of the ESM report.

5. From the U.S. point of view the Point Four and any long range development programme must be coordinated with the Clapp report.⁷ It is important that the Clapp report lay the basis for longer range development programs. The Foreign Office proposals (see 1. above) might be communicated to Clapp on a personal basis.

6. U.K. and U.S. Government agreed that the area should not be parcelled out into “spheres of influence”. It was also agreed that it would be desirable to approach long range development plans on a country to country basis.

7. In general private capital was not attracted by the type of project envisaged for the Middle East countries. The U.S. Government emphasized that Point Four program did not involve direct financial assistance and that other countries must be prepared to contribute to development programs.⁸

[Annex 4]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

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[ Washington ,] November 14 and 15, 1949.

Points Arising From a Discussion of the Report of the Economic Survey Mission

1. The proposal of the Economic Survey Mission to set up a new agency for the administration of relief and relief works projects was exhaustively discussed. In approaching this problem the Foreign Office said that they had seven criteria:

(a) That the transition from relief to relief works be made as soon as possible.

(b) That any new agency set up should not be administered or controlled by the secretariat of the United Nations.

(c) That the new agency should not include Slav or other undesirable membership; and should, if possible, be composed of British, American, French and Turkish representatives, i.e. the same membership as the Economic Survey Mission.

(d) That the local governments should be associated as closely as possible in responsibility for the execution of the program.

(e) That the new agency should not, at this state [stage], be made responsible for all development in the Middle East Area as a whole.

(f) That the proposed arrangement should not involve any government directly in the responsibility of handling relief funds raised under U.N. auspices.

(g) That the U.K.’s contribution could be in non-convertible sterling only.

2. The United States Government agreed with the above criteria and emphasized their anxiety to avoid national responsibility for the distribution of funds derived from international sources. From their point of view, it is essential that the Clapp Report lays the basis for long-term development program as the situation arising from the war in Palestine was the only basis on which funds for development in the Near East could be requested from Congress at this time.

3. In considering national contributions the U.S. representatives saw no reason why the U.K. £1 million interest-free loan to Jordan should not be considered (for “matching purposes”) as part of the U.K. subscription, the extent of which would have to be considered further in London. The U.S. Government indicated that it was not its policy to consider extending loans to countries not fully credit-worthy.

4. As a result of the discussions, agreement was reached on the attached draft resolutions and the supporting State Department memorandum subject to drafting amendments. (Also attached is a revised draft of the resolution.)⁹

[Annex 5]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

secret

[ Washington ,] November 15, 1949.

Discussion on Arab Unity

Mr. Wright said that in the British view one of the reasons for Arab bitterness against Western countries was the territorial settlement after World War I. This settlement, in the Arab view, created artificial territorial divisions which have been continuously resented. There existed amongst the Arabs a deep-seated desire for some sort of union and this desire was a potent factor in their political thinking. It had so far found expression only in the Arab League, whose record was on the whole unsuccessful. The policy of the Arab League had been one of extreme nationalism orientated against the western powers. This policy had to a large extent now been discredited. He felt that if every move towards closer union between Arab countries was blocked by Western Countries the Arabs would fall back again on the extremism which had characterised the first stage of Arab League development. There was in the Middle East countries a strong desire for some change and in Arab minds social, economic, and political reform or change were linked. However illogical it might appear to the U.K. and the U.S., any attempt to block political change in the Middle East was automatically interpreted as an attempt to block economic and social change. The U.K. attitude towards any movement for closer union in the Middle East, was based on the foregoing analysis. The U.K. was opposed to change by force but had decided that it could not oppose change brought about in a peaceful and constitutional manner. The U.K. could not share the French desire for retaining the status quo at all costs.

Mr. McGhee replied that the U.S. Government was in general agreement with this analysis. There could be no doubt that the instability of the area was increased by the existence of several small states which were not viable either politically or economically. He believed a more stable situation would exist if the states could get together in some way. The U.S. Government did not seek to maintain the status quo but in the case of the proposed Iraq-Syrian Union¹⁰ had not considered that the moment was ripe nor the auspices correct. It had therefore counselled caution and careful consideration. He thought that the attitudes of the U.S. Government and the U.K. were close on this point.

Mr. Wright said that the proposed union in its extreme and immediate form would undoubtedly cause serious difficulties with neighbouring Arab states. The U.K. had felt, however, that it could not come out against it. It was possible that the idea would in fact now come to nothing. He noted with interest that the states had been considering steps short of complete union.

It was agreed that much of the instability in the area arose from a feeling of insecurity in the countries concerned. There was a general discussion on how far this insecurity could be removed from which the following points emerged:—

1. The Egyptian proposal for a general Arab collective security pact was in too elementary a stage for judgment to be passed upon it. The U.K.-U.S. attitude should for the time being be non-committal.

2. A Middle East pact on the Atlantic model was excluded by the present policy of the U.S. Government and, in any case, such a pact did not by itself meet U.K. strategic requirements. Bilateral treaties between the U.K. and Arab countries were necessary and their stabilising effect was recognised.

3. As a result of the existing Palestine situation it was necessary for U.S. Government to seek to maintain a balance of its favours between Arab states and Israel.

4. U.S. Military Assistance Programme could not be extended to Near East countries other than to Greece, Iran and Turkey with the possible later exception of S[audi] A[rabia].

5. The approval of the U.S. and its influence on the side of the maintenance of existing U.K. Arab treaties would be of great assistance to the U.K. Government and would increase the stability of the area.

6. The United States would examine its attitude toward the extension of U.K. treaty obligations to additional Arab countries, although such an extension did not at first glance seem attractive to Foreign Office representatives. The maintenance of the U.S. air base at Dhahran was a stabilising influence.

7. A revision of Arab League activities leading to more concern with economic development should be encouraged.

8. Both U.S. and U.K. Governments are opposed to political change by force but would not obstruct change brought about in a peaceful and constitutional manner.¹¹

[Annex 6]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

secret

[ Washington ,] November 15, 1949.

Discussion on the Former Italian Colonies ¹²

1. Mr. Moose opened the discussion by saying that he had heard a suggestion to the effect that the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations was considering moving, in a plenary session, an amendment to the First Committee’s Resolution on the Former Italian Colonies in so far as it affected the Commissioner and the Advisory Council. He understood that the United Kingdom Delegation was thinking of trying to get the resolution amended in a plenary session to provide for the earliest possible turn-over to the Italians of the administration of Italian Somaliland. While the United States was in full sympathy with the British aims in these respects, they saw some danger in re-opening these issues in a plenary session. Although the Resolution had been carried in the Committee by 49 votes in favor to one against, with eight abstentions, it would be a pity to endanger its passage through the plenary.

2. Mr. Wright began his remarks by saying that only the administering power could appreciate the difficulties of trying to run a territory satisfactorily from the point of view of its inhabitants, to safeguard long-term British interests, and to keep in step with the U.N. If the United Kingdom had at times seemed hard to please, it should be remembered that they alone had all these difficulties to contend with.

italian somaliland

3. Mr. Wright said that the United Kingdom had never been really happy that an Italian return to Somaliland was the right policy from the point of view of the future of the territory but the United Kingdom had agreed to support an Italian return as the lesser of several evils. The major danger attaching to it was that the Italians might run into serious trouble when they got back to the territory. Whether they did or not would depend largely on their behavior when they returned and on the kind of officials they took with them. The United Kingdom was anxious not to see any trouble develop, particularly before British troops had withdrawn. From the British point of view, therefore, the sooner the Italians took over, the better it would be. Details of the hand-over had already been planned under the title “Operation Caesar”, as suggested by the Italians. It was expected that the hand-over would take two months from the commencement of the operation. The British authorities would do everything possible to help the Italians before and during the hand-over but they would leave no one behind after the hand-over period. The United Kingdom would like the hand-over to take place in February or March at the latest, so that it could be completed before the monsoon season. The United Kingdom would therefore be very grateful for the assistance of the United States Government in getting a trusteeship agreement for Italian Somaliland approved as soon as possible. In response to an American question, Mr. Wright indicated that the paragraph in the Committee resolution for the transfer of administration to the Italians was satisfactory.

4. Mr. McGhee asked whether Mr. Wright thought the United Nations Council would work satisfactorily. Mr. Wright replied that, in his opinion, it would be extremely difficult to make the United Nations scheme work satisfactorily. The United Kingdom would never have agreed to administer a territory under such terms, but as the Italians had agreed to it, it would be their problem. It was asked on the United States side whether the Italians had a draft trusteeship agreement ready since it was felt that this would save a good deal of time. Mr. Wright said that he was not certain whether a draft agreement had yet been worked out by the Italians.

eritrea

5. Mr. Moose mentioned that the Commission to be sent by the United Nations to investigate the situation in Eritrea was composed, as at present, of representatives of Pakistan, Norway, Burma, Guatemala and South Africa. Mr. Wright said that there seemed nothing to be done but to wait and see how the Commission did its work. If the Commission was objective, it would probably have to recommend something more or less similar to the U.S.–U.N. proposals. Mr. Wright mentioned that he had heard a rumour that the United States Delegation was considering re-introducing its proposal for the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. The United Kingdom would at this stage prefer to let the present proposal for a Commission go through. Mr. McGhee said that since the United Kingdom would have to bear the burden of another year’s administration of Eritrea under the proposal for a Commission, it was for the United Kingdom to say whether they preferred to bear that burden rather than try to get a solution involving personal union under the Emperor. Mr. McGhee agreed to find out what the United States Delegation had in mind.

libya

6. Mr. McGhee asked what the United Kingdom intended to do regarding the possibility of amending the First Committee’s Resolution. Mr. Wright replied that the United Kingdom Delegation had at present merely reserved the right to raise the matter in a plenary session. Meanwhile the matter had been referred to London. He felt personally that the United Kingdom Delegation was unlikely to move any further amendments.

7. Mr. McGhee asked what objections the United Kingdom had to the Committee’s proposal for a U.N. Commissioner and a Council. Mr. Wright replied that the only workable principle was that one authority alone should be responsible for the administration of a territory. He understood that the United Nations had now decided to omit the word “advisory” which had previously been used to qualify the Council. Mr. McGhee pointed out that the Resolution provided that the Council would “aid and advise” the Commissioner. But he agreed that some of the functions laid down for the Council dealt with matters such as the setting up of a constitution which closely affected the administration of the territory.

8. The problem of where the Council would sit was also discussed. Mr. Wright said that this point had not been made clear in the resolution; but if the Council were to sit in the territory itself, immense difficulties would arise. A Council of ten people sitting, for example, in so small a place as Tripoli would be quite out of balance, even if the Council were harmonious. But in fact the Council was unlikely to be harmonious, since so many different national interests and aims would be in play. Mr. Moose recalled that the U.S. favored having the headquarters of the Council outside of the territory. He added that Geneva had a good deal to commend it for the seat of the Council. If the Council resided in the territory itself, they would have constant appeals from the local inhabitants to intervene in the administration. Mr. Wright said that the British authorities had been told both by Tripolitanian notables and by the Emir of Cyrenaica that they did not want a United Nations commission. With regard to the Commissioner, it was agreed that the personality would be of great importance. Dr. Bunche and Dr. Padilla Nervo had been mentioned.

9. Mr. Wright then recalled that the Interim Committee was to consider the procedure for the delimitation of frontiers. There were three main problems:—

(a) The frontier between Cyrenaica and Egypt where the Egyptians wanted and the Emir seemed disposed to concede some rectification near the Sollum Plateau.

(b) The frontier between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania where the Emir wanted some minor rectification in his favour.

(c) The frontier between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia which presented by far the most serious problem. The Ethiopians were aggrieved at the behavior of the United Nations in respect of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland and were angry with the Italians because of the means they had employed to arouse a movement in Eritrea in favour of independence. The undelimited frontier between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia could provide endless opportunity for the Ethiopians to make trouble if they wished.

10. Mr. Wright then raised the question of future developments in Libya. This was the most important outstanding question. If the United Nations Resolution was passed, the United Kingdom would like, within a fairly short time, to see Cyrenaica fully independent and to sign a Treaty with her. The Emir had long been asking the British Government to do precisely that, especially because he was afraid of an Italian return and of Egyptian intentions. Mr. Wright asked whether the United States Government were satisfied that if the United Nations Resolution as it stood at present were passed by the General Assembly, that the United Kingdom would be able to go ahead in this way. Mr. McGhee replied in the affirmative but said that it depended on the method which was adopted.

11. Mr. Wright said that one of the British difficulties was that it was not possible to make a Treaty valid in international law with a country which was not independent. It was therefore impossible for the United Kingdom to sign a Treaty with Cyrenaica until the territory had been made independent. The Foreign Office were considering three alternative methods on which they would welcome the views of the United States Government. These alternatives were:—

(a) The United Kingdom, as administering power, would declare Cyrenaica to be independent.

(b) The Emir would himself declare Cyrenaica to be independent and the British Government would recognize that independence.

(c) The United Kingdom would conclude a Treaty with Cyrenaica which would contain both an alliance and a declaration of independence.

12. Mr. Moose asked whether it would not be possible to make a Treaty dealing with defence alone and avoiding the subject of independence. Mr. Wright said that this would not be possible for two reasons:—

(a) The Emir would not sign a Treaty unless it gave him independence, and

(b) The Treaty would not be valid if Cyrenaica were not independent at the time when it was signed.

13. In reply to a question, Mr. Wright said that the United Kingdom wanted a long-term Treaty of, say, twenty years’ duration, perhaps on the lines of the Treaties with Iraq and Jordan. It was also asked on the American side what would happen to the Treaty when the Union of Libya came about. Mr. Wright replied that this was one of the questions which had caused the British uneasiness about the wording of the Resolution. It might be necessary to revise the Treaty or renegotiate it with a central Libyan government in respect of Cyrenaica. The British Government had decided that it was unwilling to make a Treaty which would commit them to the defence of all of Libya. Mr. McGhee said that there was an agreement on the objective which the United Kingdom had in mind and the United States must accept the British decision regarding the size of the territory of which it was prepared to undertake the defence. It would be desirable to discuss in future meetings what could be done to further this objective. Mr. Wright said that if the United Nations Assembly wanted to withdraw Cyrenaican independence once it had been granted by the administering power, the Assembly would find itself engaged in an unpleasant task.

14. Mr. Wright then said that the United Kingdom planned to begin setting up a Tripolitanian administration and to start turning over powers to it in a manner similar to what had been done in Cyrenaica. He understood that the United States had defence interests in Tripolitania and it would be helpful to the British authorities in trying to further these interests if they could be informed of the United States desires in this regard. As long as the United Kingdom remained the administering power in Tripolitania everything would be done to safeguard United States interests. But the question remained as to what would happen once independence was achieved? Did the United States Government intend to conclude a Treaty with the authorities that would become responsible for Tripolitania? Events might move quickly and it would not be safe to assume that independence would not come until 1952. Mr. McGhee replied that the United States did wish to maintain its base rights in Tripolitania, but he promised to check with the United States military authorities what their requirements were. Mr. Wright said that it might be possible for the British authorities to give a helping hand as events moved along and that they would be anxious to do so. But this would depend on their knowing what U.S. requirements were in the area. Mr. McGhee expressed appreciation and said that the United States member of the U.N. Council for Libya might also be able to keep an eye on the United States interests.

15. It was pointed out on the United States side that there was no tribal system to build on in Tripolitania as there had been in Cyrenaica. It was thought that Boshir Bey Saadawi was satisfied with the present United Nations resolution and might form one of a group of notables who would be willing to cooperate in setting up an administration.

16. The discussion then turned to the Fezzan. Mr. Moose said that the Fezzan had always been regarded by the United States as a dependency of Tripolitania. Independence for the Fezzan alone was not feasible. Mr. Wright said that the problem of the Fezzan was particularly difficult because of the French attitude. The French had always been opposed to progress in Tripolitania. Otherwise the United Kingdom would have probably pressed faster with the constitutional development in that territory. The French were also suspicious of the Senussi and worried about the future of their own North African territories.

17. Mr. Moose said that the present United Nations Resolution would seem to preclude the French from taking over the Fezzan. Mr. McGhee added that the United States was interested in the stability of French North Africa for strategic reasons but was not too happy about French policy there. In fact, the United States had urged the French to allow the local population a greater share in the government of those areas. He wondered whether it would be possible for the United States and the United Kingdom to keep up a gentle pressure on the French with regard to their North African possessions. Sir Derick Hoyer Millar¹³ pointed out that the French were very touchy about this matter and that it was very difficult to give them advice in such a way that they would not resent it. Mr. Wright said that the United Kingdom was not at present prepared to approach the French in this matter. Experience showed that this was only likely to do more harm than good.¹⁴

[Annex 7]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

secret

[ Washington ,] November 17, 1949.

Discussion on Long-Term Economic Development in the Middle East Based on Papers Submitted by Foreign Office Representative

1. Mr. McGhee said that he had carefully read the Interim Report of the Middle East (Official) Committee on Economic and Social Development¹⁵ and found himself in general agreement with the policy outlined therein. This policy was consonant with President Truman’s Point Four Statement and also with the statement which he issued at the time of the establishment of the Economic Survey Mission. The Interim Report of the Economic Survey Mission did not cover Egypt and Iraq but with this difference the two reports fitted in well together. Any differences in the United States’ thinking were mainly matters of emphasis, e.g. the United States connected the problem of economic development with that of the Palestine refugees generally more closely than was the case in the M.E. (O.) C. report.

2. Mr. McGhee said he wished to consider the question of technical assistance to the Middle East under the Point Four program, particularly the impact of the large number of American experts who would be available, both on the British position in the Middle East and on the Middle East countries themselves. Around five million dollars would be available for the Near East under the Point Four program and this represented a very large number of experts. The availability of technicians would, in all probability, be the limiting factor, not funds available. There was the possibility that in exceptional cases Point Four funds might be available to pay the salaries of suitably qualified local technicians. Nevertheless, the number of American experts might be very considerable in comparison with the eight or nine experts at present employed by the B.M.E.O. The problem of coordinating the British and American efforts in the technical field was clearly important.

3. Mr. Wright said that he warmly welcomed any effort which the United States Government felt it could make in the technical field in the Middle East. On this subject, the United Kingdom Government had absolutely no reservations. He pointed out, however, that a great deal of survey work had already been done in the Middle East and that what was generally required was not fresh surveys and “winter visitors” but the selection and execution of projects which had already been worked out. This did not, of course, mean that no survey work was required—Mr. Wright referred in particular to the need for water surveys in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. In general, however, the need was for the early execution of projects. He also pointed out that there was a great need for education, particularly in the technical field, which many competent observers thought was the ultimate key to the problem. As regards the coordination of the British and American effort, Mr. Wright said that he had given thought to the possibility of a joint Anglo-American Middle East Office to replace the existing B.M.E.O. There was, however, the danger that such an effort would incur the charge of Anglo-American imperialism and it might be preferable to leave the British Middle East Office as it was, provided links could be created to prevent overlapping between British and American technicians. Alternatively, the Americans might establish an American Middle East Office parallel to the B.M.E.O. but here too there was an inevitable risk of duplication.

4. Mr. McGhee said that such arrangements might be neat and tidy from the organizational point of view but there was the danger that the Middle East Governments would consider them as an attempt to develop the Middle East from the West and they would consequently resent it. In the diplomatic and political field the United States had no coordinating mission in the Middle East. Coordination was effected in Washington and Mr. McGhee thought that in the field of technical assistance the coordination of American effort throughout the area might best be effected in Washington. This was the case as regards South America and effort there was coordinated by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in Washington. He agreed that it might be preferable not to embark on any new organization in the field as the risk of any charge of imperialism would in this case be less and there was also the point that communications with Middle East capitals were easier from Washington than from any point in the Middle East. Coordination between the British and the Americans could best be achieved in London and Washington.

5. As regards Point Four assistance in the educational field Mr. McGhee said that American experience in Latin America was that assistance on the primary and secondary level was likely to raise political, religious and social difficulties. Technical or vocational training on what was known as “basic education” was on the other hand a field in which the Point Four assistance might play a part. In connection with water surveys for Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, Mr. McGhee said that the Point Four budget had not yet been worked out in detail and that American representatives in the countries concerned and the local governments would need to be consulted. He recognized the need for the execution of projects already surveyed rather than for new surveys but the difficulty was that Point Four legislation as at present proposed only provided funds for the salaries of experts and for limited technical equipment.

6. Mr. Wright handed Mr. McGhee as background information to the recommendations contained in the M.E.(O.)C. Interim Report copies of reports on economic and social development in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Aden and ex-Italian colonies.

Mr. Wright agreed that the United States should send copies to the American representatives concerned on condition that they should not discuss the reports with the local governments or give any publicity to them in the press.

7. Finally, Mr. Wright said that he had been authorized to discuss with the International Bank the recommendations contained in the interim report, and also a suggestion for the establishment of an International Nile Waters Advisory Board. He inquired whether the State Department would care to send a representative to be present at the talks. Mr. Wright explained that the membership of the International Board would be confined to the principal technical advisers of the government concerned though it might be attended by a representative of the International Bank as an observer. It was intended that the Board would serve as a link with the International Bank and that it might serve as a pattern for similar organizations in other areas. He emphasized that it was important in order to avoid any possibility of Slav intervention that Nile waters development should not be dependent on the United Nations. The International Bank was, of course, another matter and the proposed Board might also call on United Nations’ technicians under the expanded program of technical assistance. He emphasized the great experience which the Egyptians had in the control and utilization of Nile waters and pointed out that it was important to encourage local responsibility in this field.

8. Mr. McGhee said he thought it would be preferable for the discussions with the International Bank to be conducted without American representation but added that he would, of course, welcome any indication which Mr. Wright might feel he could give him regarding their outcome.

9. The following general conclusions emerged from discussion:—

(i) There was general agreement on the program of Economic and Social Development outlined in the M.E.(O.)C. Interim Report.

(ii) The United Kingdom would welcome any measures which the United States felt it could take in the field of technical assistance.

(iii) The coordination of United States and United Kingdom effort in the field of technical assistance could best be achieved in London and Washington. This matter would be further studied in London and at Conference of United States representatives at Istanbul.

(iv) It was recognized that great progress had already been made in surveying the economic resources of the Middle East and that what was most required at the present state was the execution of selected projects.¹⁶

[Annex 8]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

secret

[ Washington ,] November 17, 1949.

Discussions on the Haifa Refinery ¹⁷

Mr. Wright said that the aim of the U.K. Government was to get the refinery working at full capacity as soon as possible. It had been estimated that failure to reopen the refinery would represent a drain on the U.K.’s dollar resources amounting to $50 million a year. Every effort had been made to induce the Iraqi Government to allow oil to flow again through the pipeline. This was undoubtedly to the economic advantage of Iraq. The U.K. Government had, however, failed and it was a case where economic arguments carried no weight against political considerations. The Iraqis would only reopen the pipeline if the Egyptian Government first allowed oil tankers to pass through the Suez Canal. The U.K. Government had also exerted pressure on the Egyptian Government with a view to their permitting the passage of tankers. The Egyptian Government had relaxed their restrictions on shipping but the relaxation did not extend to tankers. Both the Egyptian and the Iraqi Prime Ministers were afraid to take the first step and to incur the charge of being the first to break the boycott. Attempts to arrange for action simultaneously by the Egyptians and Iraqis had also failed. The most recent development was a suggestion by the Iraqi Prime Minister that a tanker should take oil from Tripoli (Lebanon) to Haifa and the Lebanese Government was being approached in this connection. No reply had yet been received. Mr. Wright inquired whether the State Department would consider the desirability of instructing its representative in Beirut to support our representations to the Lebanese Government.¹⁸ There was also the possibility that the Israelis would raise in the Security Council the question of Egyptian refusal to allow the free passage of tankers in the Suez Canal. This might have the unfortunate result of making the problem a purely Israeli-Egyptian issue. In all the representations to the Arab Governments the U.K. Government had emphasized that the reopening of the Haifa refinery would be to the benefit of the U.K. and Europe and that the advantage to Israel would be relatively small. There was also the point that such action would give rise to a debate on Palestine in the Security Council. The U.K. Government was as anxious to avoid this as to avoid a general Palestine debate in the General Assembly.

2. In the course of discussion Mr. Wright said that consideration had also been given to a suggestion that the hand of the Egyptian Government should be forced by routing a tanker through the Canal. This had not been proceeded with as it was anticipated either (i) the Egyptian authorities would stop the ship in which case it would have to be sent back or (ii) the ship would have to be provided with armed guards and this would result in a major Anglo-Egyptian clash or (iii) if the Egyptians stopped the ship the matter might be referred to the Security Council which was also undesirable. … Mr. Wright said it was hoped that U.S. representatives in the capitals concerned would continue to support our representations and enquired whether the State Department had any suggestions to make.

3. The United States views as they emerged from discussion are as follows:—

Unlike the U.K. and France the U.S.A. was not directly concerned in the reopening of the refinery and the representations which the U.S. Government had already made in Iraq and Egypt had been in the nature of a supporting action. The U.S. Government fully agreed regarding the desirability of reopening the refinery at the earliest possible date and also regarding the need for continued pressure on the Governments concerned. Pressure should not, however, be made to the extent of bringing about a major clash as the risk to oil investments generally would be too great. Anglo-Egyptian relations might be gravely prejudiced and the United States strategic position in the whole area might be seriously impaired. The reaction in Iraq to shipments of oil from Tripoli to Haifa under U.S.–U.K. encouragement might be serious. It was also felt that the adoption of the “switching” device suggested by the Egyptian Prime Minister involved considerable risks. The proposal for establishing a free port under international control at Haifa was not considered a practical suggestion. Israel had indicated that as part of a general settlement, she would be prepared to give the Arab states free zones in the port of Haifa but this was another matter. It was thought possible that the operation of the refinery on the basis of oil imported from the Caribbean was a profitable proposition under existing world oil prices. American companies found it possible to ship crude oil profitably from the Persian Gulf to Philadelphia; the distance from the Caribbean to Haifa was less and although profits might not be as great as in the case of oil routed through the pipeline there should still be a margin and less risk would be involved. If the Arabs were shown that the refinery was a going concern they might in due course relent and lift restrictions. Finally, it was suggested that if oil production in Iraq were speeded up, for example by the early start on the 30” pipeline, the Iraqis might be less intransigent. Reports that the oil companies were considering the postponement of the 30” pipeline were disturbing.

4. The conclusions which emerged from the discussion were:—

1. It was agreed that it was most desirable that the refinery should be reopened at the earliest possible date.

2. That pressure on the Governments concerned should be maintained but a major clash should be avoided.

3. The United States would continue to instruct its representatives in the capitals concerned to make appropriate supporting representations to the governments concerned.¹⁹

[Annex 9]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

secret

[ Washington ,] November 22, 1949.

Discussion on the Persian Gulf ²⁰

Mr. Hare began the discussion by saying that we approached the question of the Persian Gulf on the basis that the United Kingdom has not only oil interests in the area but also a primary political interest as well. The United States likewise has oil interests and of course also has an interest in connection with the maintenance of peace and stability in the Persian Gulf area.

Referring to the question of development of off-shore oil, Mr. Hare observed that British and American representatives had conferred at great length on that subject in Washington early this year and that the idea of working out some sort of master plan for orderly development in the matter had been explored. However, in going into greater detail, it had been found that so much uncertainty existed regarding basic questions such as the determination of land frontiers and the ownership of islands that it seemed preferable to adopt a less comprehensive approach and to proceed on a more or less ad hoc basis. Subsequent developments would seem to have justified the wisdom of this course of action and proclamations had been made by practically all of the littoral countries of the Persian Gulf without resulting in the serious repercussions which some had feared. On the other hand, it was clear that we were only at the beginning of a long difficult road and that much patience and diligent endeavor would be required in order to reach final settlement.

Mr. Funkhouser²¹ stated that there appeared to be ten major points of conflict in the Persian Gulf. He enumerated them as follows:

1. Trucial–Oman Boundary.

2. Submerged areas off the Trucial coast.

3. Qatar Boundary.

4. Submerged areas off Qatar Peninsula.

5. Abu Saafa problem.

6. Boundary between the Arab Sheikdoms.

7. Island controversies.

8. Submerged areas off Kuwait neutral zone.

9. Southern boundary of Kuwait.

10. Mechanical determination of boundaries.

Mr. Funkhouser briefly described the status of the above issues and stated that any comments on the issues described or any agreement or differences of opinion as to the disputes involved would be welcomed from the United Kingdom.

Mr. Wright said he thought it was desirable to handle these involved questions as in the past either in London or in Washington or through the people on the spot rather than to consider them in any great detail in the present discussions. He said that the United Kingdom approached these questions on the basis of showing impartiality toward oil companies involved whether American or British. In this connection he pointed out that in various negotiations the United Kingdom had made particular effort to make sure that American oil companies were not discriminated against vis-à-vis British oil companies.

Mr. Wright indicated that with respect to the boundary negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government this question had been discussed in Jidda at the end of August and the United Kingdom had endeavored to persuade the Saudi Arabian Government to state its claims. It was not until the middle of October before these claims which appeared to be extreme were submitted. The United Kingdom would prefer to settle this matter with the Saudi Arabian Government by direct negotiations rather than by arbitration in view of the special relationship which the United Kingdom has with the Sheikdoms. He thought the situation could be handled successfully provided that the United Kingdom and the United States maintain cooperation. He feared that a most difficult situation would arise if the Saudi Arabian Government felt that the United States was supporting all of its claims.

Mr. Hare replied that the United States would like to stay out of this question as much as possible but of course the possibility that the United States might be brought into the picture by the claims of certain American oil companies could not be excluded. He said that in the case of the controversy over islands off Kuwait neutral zone, the American Company involved had been more than satisfied by the support given by the United Kingdom.

Mr. Wright said he hoped the United States in approaching these questions would adopt the same principle as that adopted by the United Kingdom in considering the claims of the British and American oil companies. He felt it would be better to support the claims on the basis of their merits rather than on whether they were submitted by American or British oil companies.

Mr. Hare suggested that it might be useful to discuss various questions with the oil companies at top level in order to persuade them to be as helpful as possible and to take the initiative themselves in minimizing the areas of conflict. In this connection he referred to the fact that there were cross interests involved. Mr. Funkhouser indicated that although it was highly desirable to talk with the oil companies involved in the disputed areas in order to minimize chances of serious conflict, parent companies customarily defended the position that partially-owned subsidiaries acted [took?] independently.

Mr. Hare said that he thought that both the United States and United Kingdom were hunting for reasonable solutions of the questions, although it was difficult at times to know what a reasonable solution constituted. However, he felt that the United States would not support ipso facto the assertions of claims.

Mr. Wright then adverted to his previous statement that the United Kingdom has an open public policy regarding the equality of treatment for British and American oil companies and expressed the hope that the United States could adopt the same attitude.

Mr. Hare said that the United States’ position was not quite comparable with that of the United Kingdom which had political primacy in the area. Consequently, as both Mr. Hare and Mr. Funkhouser pointed out, there would be many issues not involving American interests on which the United States would have no particular position. Mr. Hare stated that the United States–United Kingdom positions were often parallel and cited the recent instructions to the American Embassy in Jidda taking exception to the Saudi Arabian claims on the six-mile territorial limit.²²

Mr. Funkhouser, referring to the previous remarks on the United Kingdom–Saudi Arabian boundary negotiations, asked whether it might not be possible for the United Kingdom to proceed with negotiations at the present time on boundary issues involving only those Arab Sheikdoms with United Kingdom Treaty relations. Resolutions by the United Kingdom of such issues might establish a basis for settlement of the more complex boundary problems. Mr. Wright said that he would follow this question up upon his return to London.

On the subject of the current Abu Saafa dispute, Mr. Greenhill²³ stated that the United Kingdom was likely to accede to Saudi Arabian demands that all oil operations in the disputed area be stopped but added that in the case of the Bahrein Petroleum Company radar installations on Arabi Island which involved no Bahrein territorial claim, company operations should be permitted.

Mr. Funkhouser asked if it would be practicable and desirable to seek to prevent oil companies from operating in disputed areas by a mutual call for restraint. Mr. Wright said that he would also look into this question in London.²⁴

[Annex 10]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

secret

[ Washington ,] November 22, 1949.

Discussion on the Establishment of an American Consulate in Kuwait ²⁵

Mr. Wright said that the United Kingdom was awaiting a reply from the United States Government on the question which the United Kingdom had raised several months ago regarding the establishment of a consulate in Kuwait.

Mr. Clark²⁶ described briefly the background of this question and said that one of the main points was the British concern regarding the political effects which the establishment of the Consulate might have in Kuwait. Mr. Clark said that the Department wished to raise the question whether the establishment of the Consulate would necessarily alter the situation and result in serious political repercussions.

Mr. Wright said that while he repeated that the United Kingdom understood the needs of the United States Government it did not in fact see how it would be possible to avoid the appointment of consular representatives from a number of other countries if United States consular officers were appointed.

Mr. Clark observed that the United States had greater interests in Kuwait than other countries in view of the number of American citizens connected with American oil companies operating in Kuwait. He indicated that there were certain legal questions involved and that the Foreign Office had requested the United States Government to consider the following three points:

1. That the exequatur be issued by the United Kingdom;

2. That the United States should respect the jurisdictional responsibility of the British political Resident; and

3. That the United States should recognize provisions of existing concessions agreements regarding political matters.

Mr. Clark felt that there would be no difficulty on the last two points, although the United States would probably wish to include observations of a minor nature in its reply. However, the question of exequatur was a most complicated one. It had occurred to the United States that it might be possible to have the exequatur signed both by the Sheik and by the United Kingdom Government. In other words the exequatur would represent not only the authority flowing from the Sheik himself but also would take into account the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the Sheik under the 1899 Treaty. There was also a discussion on the legal necessity for having an exequatur.

Mr. Wright said that he would look into the matter of a double signature upon his return to London. Mr. Clark said that he believed the Department’s reply to the points raised by the Foreign Office would be forthcoming soon.²⁷

[Annex 11]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

secret

[ Washington ,] November 22, 1949.

Discussion on Ethiopia

1. Mr. Wright suggested that the discussion turn to Ethiopia and Mr. Hare said we would be happy to discuss any points which Mr. Wright might bring up. Most important points raised are summarized in the following paragraphs.

2. Mr. Wright said that the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa and the Foreign Office were particularly concerned about the general decline of the political and economic conditions in Ethiopia. A recent incident which raised a matter of principle was the abrupt dismissal of a British judge, Mr. Abbott, of the Ethiopian High Court. Mr. Wright said that it was clear that a clique in the government close to the Emperor had forced the firing of Judge Abbott because he had insisted on taking impartial judicial decisions even when the results were contrary to the desires of the clique. Since the independence of the judiciary was essential to the advancement of any country, the Foreign Office was considering whether they should agree to the nomination of any other Britishers to the vacant posts on the Ethiopian High Court unless they received assurances from the Emperor that the operation of the judicial system would not be interfered with by other branches of the government. While no formal American view had been formulated on the matter, it was agreed that everything possible should be done to maintain and improve the standards of the judicial system in Ethiopia. It was recognized by those present that if British judges are not supplied for the High Court, the situation might become worse than it is now. Mr. Hare said the Department would consider the matter further and let Mr. Wright know further of any views we might have on the matter.

3. Mr. Wright inquired if the Ethiopians had tried to obtain arms from the U.S. The answer was that, while the Ethiopians had requested military assistance in obtaining military equipment from the U.S., they had not been granted any credit or priorities for the purchase of such equipment and, in practise, had obtained practically nothing. Mr. Wright said that when the Ethiopians had not been able to obtain as much as they wanted from British sources, the Ethiopians had gone to the Czechs, from whom they had purchased a small arms plant. The British Government were somewhat concerned over the possibilities of Czech, and therefore Communist, infiltration into Ethiopia via this particularly obnoxious means of military assistance. Mr. Hare agreed that the U.S. is equally concerned about the matter but pointed out the difficulty of our doing anything about it unless means could be found for giving greater assistance than had hitherto been the case. In this connection, he mentioned the possibility of the amendment of MAP legislation to restore the originally included provision for arms procurement on a cash reimbursable basis. However, no predictions in that regard could be made at this time. It was agreed to keep in close touch on developments in this matter.

4. Mr. Moose asked if the Foreign Office had any information indicating Ethiopia was being used as a center for training Communist agents and for spreading propaganda through central Africa. Mr. Wright said that they, like the State Department, had received such reports but had failed to obtain confirmation thereof.

5. An American question concerned the present status of negotiations for a new Anglo-Ethiopian treaty and the proposed Zeila-Haud exchange of territory between British Somaliland and Ethiopia. Mr. Wright said these negotiations had been delayed pending a General Assembly decision on Eritrea and Italian Somaliland and the return to Addis Ababa of the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Mr. Aklilou. He reaffirmed, however, that if the proposed ZeilA–Haud exchange were effected, it would be subject to Ethiopia retaining full sub-soil rights to that part of the Ogaden Province (Haud) annexed to British Somaliland. He added that further conversations concerning the Lake Tana project were also dependent on the return to Addis Ababa of Mr. Aklilou.

6. Mr. Wright observed that one of the most serious problems confronting the British administrations of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland was the maintenance of order along the borders of those territories with Ethiopia. He feared serious disturbances when the Italians returned to Italian Somaliland and predicted continued agitation in Eritrea for at least as long as the UN Commission of Investigation remains in that territory. Mr. Hare agreed that these were very real problems and it was agreed that the Foreign Office and State Department would keep in close touch on them.²⁸

[Annex 12]

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

secret

[ Washington ,] November 22, 1949.

Discussion op King Ibn Saud’s ²⁹ Apprehensions Regarding the Hashemites ³⁰

Mr. Hare said that over a period of time the United States had received appeals from King Ibn Saud for guarantees for the security of his kingdom. The King feared particularly the fact that he was surrounded by the Hashemites. While on frequent occasions the United States has informed the King that we had counselled moderation and restraint both in Amman and in Baghdad, the King constantly adverted to his apprehensions. The United States had noted in the most recent expressions of concern made to our Ambassador by the King that the emphasis was slightly different than in previous appeals. … This time the King had referred to the fact that he was surrounded by the Hashemites as well as by the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms with whom the United Kingdom had special treaty relations and he seemed to believe that these countries harbored ill-intentions towards Saudi Arabia. He also appeared to believe that the United Kingdom was not-exercising a restraining hand. Mr. Hare wondered whether it might not be possible for the United Kingdom, in the framework of its present discussions and negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government, to take the opportunity to reassure the Saudi Arabian Government that the United Kingdom was deeply concerned with peace and stability in the area and would not countenance any action by any country which might disturb peaceful conditions.

Mr. Wright said the United Kingdom had also received similar expressions of apprehension on several occasions and that several years ago the United Kingdom had offered to negotiate a treaty with Saudi Arabia similar with those which it has with Jordan and Iraq. While the United Kingdom realized at the time that King Ibn Saud might not wish to conclude such a treaty, it nevertheless had offered it to him in the hope that it might calm his fears. He expressed the belief that the United Kingdom would probably not be inclined to offer such a treaty at this time. Mr. Wright said it had been hoped that the sending of the military missions would be a steadying influence.

Mr. Wright stated that the United Kingdom was constantly endeavoring to allay the fears of Ibn Saud and that the British representatives in Amman and Baghdad had on frequent occasions discussed the situation with Jordanian and Iraqi statesmen. Mr. Wright said he would have no objection if the United States Government wished to inform Ibn Saud that the United Kingdom was exerting a restraining and moderate influence on Jordan and Iraq and had no desire to disturb existing conditions.³¹

1. Not printed.
2. Printed below as annexes 1–12.
3. Memorandum of November 29 not printed; for documentation on the position of the United States regarding the disposition of the Italian colonies, see vol. iv, pp. 526 ff.
4. This paper was approved by Messrs. McGhee and Wright on November 20.
5. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 594 ff.
6. This paper was approved by Messrs. McGhee and Wright on November 20.
7. For information on this report, see editorial note, p. 1472.
8. This paper was approved by Messrs. Wright and McGhee on November 20.
9. This paper was approved by Messrs. McGhee and Wright on November 20. The papers referenced at this point were draft resolutions for the implementation of the Interim Report of the Economic Survey Mission and for assistance to Palestine refugees, and a draft statement on the Near East Relief and Works Agency. The draft resolution for assistance to Palestine refugees is printed on p. 1500 (see particularly footnote 1 to that draft); the remaining papers are not printed.
10. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 180 ff.
11. This paper was approved by Messrs. McGhee and Wright on November 20.
12. See also the memorandum of conversation of November 18, p. 59; for further documentation on the position of the United States regarding the disposition of the former Italian colonies in Africa see vol. iv, pp. 526 ff.
13. British Minister in the United States.
14. This paper was approved by Messrs. McGhee and Wright on November 20.
15. Presumably a paper handed to Department of State officers by Mr. Wright; copy not found in Department of State files.
16. This paper was approved by Messrs. McGhee and Wright on November 20.
17. For additional documentation on this subject, see pp. 91 ff.
18. For Departmental action on this request, see telegram 716, November 23, to Beirut, p. 156.
19. This paper was approved by Messrs. McGhee and Wright on November 20.
20. The Department, on November 4, had suggested to London that this subject be placed on the agenda because it was “increasingly concerned over possibility serious incidents developing from land and sea boundary disputes between Persian Gulf States and their respective oil interests.” (telegram 3981, 711.90F/11–449) London, on November 7, reported Mr. Wright’s agreement (telegram 4460, 890.0145/11–749). For additional documentation on this subject, see pp. 91 ff.
21. Richard Funkhouser, International Economist in the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs.
22. See instruction 60, November 30, p. 157. The instruction was drafted on November 21.
23. Denis A. Greenhill, First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.
24. This paper was approved by Messrs. Hare and Wright on November 25.
25. For further documentation on this subject, see pp. 1566 ff.
26. Harlan B. Clark, Officer in Charge of Lebanon–SyriA–Iraq Affairs in the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs.
27. This paper was approved by Messrs. Hare and Wright on November 25.
28. This paper was approved by Messrs. Hare and Wright on November 25.
29. Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia.
30. For further documentation on this subject, see pp. 1573 ff.
31. This paper was approved by Messrs. Hare and Wright on November 25.