501.BC Kashmir/6–149: Telegram
The Chargé in Pakistan (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State
secret
Karachi, June
1, 1949—5 p. m.
190. Following principal points GOP reply UNCI[P] proposals April 28:
- 1.
- Accept cease-fire line etc. as proposed.
- 2.
- Proposal ID [Ind?] re northern areas is not in accord UNCI[P] resolution August 13, is unnecessary and is likely create unrest insecurity.
- 3.
- Pakistan has been denied information re schedule troop withdrawal and proposals appear nullify provision for synchronized withdrawal promised by command create disequilibrium after 7 weeks.
- 4.
- Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed soonest but with or without appointment, should participate all discussions re disposal Azad, Indian and State forces.
- 5.
- Reply concludes as follows: “The Pakistan Government are sincerely desirous of advancing to the plebiscite stage as early as possible and to this end they wish to assure the Commission of their wholehearted cooperation in the tasks devolving upon the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator. In pursuance of this policy they are anxious that the truce agreement leading to the withdrawal of the armed forces should be concluded at as early a date as possible. Since this is an essential preliminary to the holding of a plebiscite they have, as the Commission is aware, carried out important part of their obligations in effecting the withdrawal of tribesmen and of almost all Pakistan nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting. They are also ready to withdraw all Pakistan troops from the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the terms of the Commission’s resolution of 13 August, 1948, as elucidated to the Pakistan Government. The Commission will, no doubt, appreciate that without knowing the schedule of withdrawal of the Indian forces on the basis of which the synchronized withdrawal of the two armed forces could be arranged, the Pakistan Government are not in a position to take a decision on the Commission’s truce terms, the central feature of which is the withdrawal programme of the two [Page 1715] armed forces. They trust that they would soon be put in a position in which they can take such a decision.”
Sent Department 190, repeated Delhi 34; pouched Rangoon; repeated London 17.
Doolittle