501.BC Kashmir/3–2849: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
377. Comkas 29. USDel agrees Department’s view paragraph 4 Kascom 63.1 Department will realize ability UNCIP take “speedy and decisive action on truce agreement” has hitherto been circumscribed by recognition truce essentially matter for two governments and that moment had not come for UNCIP take any action in nature ultimatum. It was hoped pace would be accelerated from moment PA nominated and there are indications Nimitz appointment having desired effect. UNCIP does not regard present truce delay as “deadlock” or “impasse” but regards present phase one of bargaining while simultaneously Indian political circles which loath to loose [lose?] hold of Kashmir will have be reconciled with more practical minded military elements which are actually desirous prompt truce agreement.
[Page 1694]2. Reference numbered subsections paragraph 5 Kascom 63: (1) and (4): USDel has taken position and UNCIP agrees that GOP must abandon these proposals if India insists in favor some compromise. However, here abandonment proposals would not meet difficulty since UNCIP and both governments would still be concerned about maintenance law and order territory to be evacuated by Pakistan and possible difficulties arising from presence Azad area uncontrolled and uncoordinated Azad Army.
(2) GOI is not demanding immediate disbanding and disarming Azad troops having agreed that this will not occur during truce period but only after plebiscite period.
(3) Stages withdrawal Indian troops not yet discussed in detail between UNCIP and GOI as dependent upon initial Pakistan withdrawal.
(5) GOI originally acquiesced in UNCIP interpretation of “local authorities” meaning local Azad elements, GOI has never proposed that representatives Abdullah Government be included in administration Azad area recognizing that this not envisaged by UNCIP.
(6) Establishment cease-fire line is basic issue. Discussions have gone ahead while awaiting GOI’s views other above substantive issues on theory that implementation any part truce would hardly be possible until cease-fire line fixed because of increased danger of incidents if line remained undefined and because line would seem necessary point of departure in arrangements for troop evacuations. Cease-fire line has ever [never?] been purely technical question and parts it are now in dispute and have acquired political aspects.
3. Re paragraph 7 Kascom 63: (1) We intend press for signature truce agreement by April 15 (see also Comkas 28 March 282).
(2) Believe PA who must be formally appointed to office by government Jammu-Kashmir can assume duties in states shortly following date truce agreement. Timing and publicized purposes arrival important for reasons discussed Comkas 28.
(3) Date plebiscite while initially depending upon decision by commission that conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite have been achieved will also have, to be considered in connection Kashmir climate which precludes plebiscite in winter. Therefore except in unlikely event plebiscite could be held before winter this year April or May 1950 would be good target date.
(4) UNCIP Secretariat has been engaged some time preparation various studies electoral procedures, power PA, special plebiscite problems. Is endeavoring obtain documents relating referenda NWFP and [garble]. UNCIP subcommittee has obtained information electoral conditions Azad area.
Sent Department 377, pouched Karachi.