Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

890F.7962/7–2049

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Bergus) to the Secretary of State

secret

Jidda, July 20, 1949.

No. 179

Subject: Successful Termination of Dhahran Airfield Negotiations.

Sir: I have the honor, with reference to the Embassy’s telegram No. 419 of June 23, 1949,¹ to report that the notes embodying the new Dhahran Airfield Agreement were signed and exchanged at 10:30 a. m. on Thursday, June 23, 1949—just three hours before the departure from Jidda on leave of Ambassador Childs.

There are enclosed, with reference to the Department’s unnumbered circular instruction of June 25, 1947 [1949],¹ for the use of the Treaty Section of the Office of the Legal Adviser and of other interested offices of the Government, the following documents:

1. Original signed Arabic text of Note No. 10/4/68/2119 of June 28, 1949 from Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Childs.¹

2. Original signed Arabic text of Note No. 10/4/68/2120 of June 23, 1949 from Shaikh Yusuf Yassin to Ambassador Childs.¹

3. Certified copy of Ambassador’s reply dated June 23, 1949 to No. 1 above.

4. Certified copy of Ambassador’s reply dated June 23, 1949 to No. 2 above.

5. Parchment mat copy of No. 3 above.¹

6. Parchment mat copy of No. 4 above.¹

I worked closely with the Ambassador throughout these long, difficult, and at times irritating negotiations. Before the Ambassador’s departure, a discussion of the history of these negotiations was held with him, and we agreed that the following conclusions could be drawn from these events as of possible interest to, and future use by, the Department:

1. The main source of difficulty would appear to have been the number of negotiators with whom we had to deal. The opening talks on this matter were held with Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in Jidda. These preliminary discussions appeared to be most successful, and it is felt that Shaikh Yusuf had been made fully aware of our position and was, in general, sympathetic to it. It seemed to us that just exactly the right sort of atmosphere had been prepared for beginning the actual clause-by-clause negotiation of the Agreement. Shortly after our first suggested draft was submitted to the Saudi Arabian Government, however, Shaikh Yusuf was sent off to Cairo on Arab League affairs, and the Ambassador was informed that the negotiations would be held in Riyadh with Fuad Bey Hamza, Royal Councillor.

There is a distinct possibility that Shaikh Yusuf may well have arranged to get out of the country at the time that the final negotiations were due to commence. Shaikh Yusuf negotiated the previous Dhahran Airbase Agreement, and it is understood that he was subjected to much criticism by Fuad Bey and others close to the King in this matter. Shaikh Yusuf’s critics stated that in the original agreement he had compromised Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty. The question of sovereignty is one of those delicate issues that can always provoke a sensitive reaction from the King. Whether or not there was any design in Shaikh Yusuf’s movements, the fact remains that he was not in Saudi Arabia during the actual negotiations nor did he return until complete agreement had been reached, just in time to sign the Saudi Arabian notes on behalf of his Government. Upon his return, Shaikh Yusuf was in the excellent position of being able to sympathize with the Ambassador over the many difficulties which the negotiations had entailed as well as to make the bland statement that if he had been here, the course of the negotiations would have been much smoother.

As reported fully in the Ambassador’s despatch No. 84 of April 2, 1949,² the Ambassador arrived at Riyadh to find the King very much upset over what the Saudi Arabian Government looked upon as implications in our first suggested draft which would serve to undermine Saudi Arabian sovereignty. It is almost certain that while the King’s first apprehensive reactions may well have been spontaneous on his part, Fuad Bey did not fail to play on the King’s uneasiness with the end in view of proving to Riyadh circles that Fuad Hamza was the most skillful negotiator in the Saudi Arabian Government. After over a week of exhaustive discussions, we finally arrived at the March 25 draft agreement which was to be augmented by the note from the Saudi Arabian Government requesting the appointment of Colonel Richard J. O’Keefe, USAF, to act on its behalf in the administration of certain functions at Dhahran Airfield.

The months of April and May were largely taken up by a series of discussions between the Embassy and the Saudi Arabian Government regarding proposed amendments by the United States Government to the March 25 draft and the Saudi Arabian Government’s comments on these amendments. The Ambassador discussed these questions with Khairadeen Bey Zirickly, then Acting Head of the Foreign Office. Khairadeen was completely unfamiliar with the background of the Rayadh negotiations and thus acted, on the whole, as a mere postbox, transmitting Embassy communications to Riyadh and presenting the Saudi Arabian Government’s replies, which also came from Riyadh to the Ambassador. I am quite sure, however, that despite his ignorance of the background, Khairadeen did not hesitate occasionally to add gratuitous comments to our communications when he transmitted them. This only served to muddy the waters further.

The Ambassador again visited Riyadh on Memorial Day, May 30, 1949 to acquaint the King with regard to the Department’s latest decision respecting military assistance to Saudi Arabia.³ At that time conversations were held regarding the agreement with yet another representative of the Saudi Arabian Government, Khalid Bey Gargani, Royal Councillor. Our sole points of difference at that time were the text of article five of the agreement as well as the exact wording of the note requesting the services of Colonel O’Keefe. When Khalid Bey indicated that the Saudi Arabian Government could not accept the United States proposal for the wording of these two points, the Ambassador, upon his return from Riyadh, telegraphed the Department asking that the Saudi text of article five be accepted and that the text of the note regarding Colonel O’Keefe be reworded in such a way as to meet most of the Saudi Arabian objections.⁴ The Department did not fail to do this and our new proposals were submitted to the Saudi Arabian Government.⁵

It was therefore a matter of no little dismay to all of us when on June 14, 1949 the Foreign Office informed us, without explanation, that our latest proposals were unacceptable.⁶

2. At this point the Ambassador felt that the United States Government had gone as far as it could and did not hesitate so to inform the Saudi Arabian Government. The Foreign Office was informed in the strongest terms that it was our belief that up to now we had done our best to meet Saudi Arabian desires and had conceded point after point.⁷ The American point of view was also presented to the all-powerful Minister of Finance, Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, and to Prince Mansour, Minister of Defence. These two officials quickly realized our positions and promised to lend every assistance. The Department graciously supported the Ambassador in his position and sent a firmly worded telegram to the effect that we could make no more concessions.⁸ The Ambassador felt that the time had come to take a strong stand. For one thing, the behavior of the Saudi Arabian negotiators had been such as to give the impression that they were no longer willing to make any attempt to appreciate the position of the United States. Furthermore, it was believed that any additional concessions on our part would only give to the Saudis the impression that they could expect a weak acquiescence to any of their demands, regardless of the reasonableness of such demands.

The Ambassador’s determined stand did not fail to have its effect. Fuad Hamza, who had left Saudi Arabia for the Lebanon on sick leave, was hastily summoned back to Riyadh for consultations and then sent to Jidda for further negotiations.⁹ It might be stated at this point that the illness which led to Fuad Bey’s departure from the Kingdom was not diplomatic. Fuad, who suffers from hypertension and nephritis, was certainly not the picture of health when he appeared in Jidda.

A final session of negotiations was held on June 21. It was obvious that Fuad had received definite instructions to conclude the negotiations and to come to agreement.¹⁰ After a few face-saving protestations and a few minor changes in the text of the note regarding Colonel O’Keefe (changes which would appear to be more favorable, rather than otherwise to the United States) agreement was reached. The Department’s approval to the changes was received within less than twenty-four hours and the Saudi Arabian Government was so notified on June 22.¹¹ At this juncture the Saudi negotiators telegraphed the entire text of both notes to Riyadh for the final approval of the King. This was forthcoming on the morning of June 23, 1949 and the notes were signed and exchanged at about 10:00 a. m. that morning; Shaikh Yusuf, who had just returned from Egypt, signing on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government.¹² All sides breathed a sigh of relief after the notes were signed and the Ambassador left within a few hours for his well-deserved leave with a clear conscience. Fuad Bey returned to Beirut on the next day.

3. The Ambassador stated to me before his departure that it was his belief that the Saudi Arabs had indulged in so much sparring because they were fully aware that this one-year agreement was only a stop-gap arrangement. They wished to arrive at an agreed document which could be used, to their advantage, as a basis for the negotiations which presumably will commence this autumn looking toward a long-term agreement. They wanted to give as little as possible in this short-term document in the hope that further concessions can be gained from the United States Government in the long-term arrangement in return for language more to the liking of our Government. In other words, as has so often been expressed by the King, the Saudi Arabian viewpoint is that once we are in a position to make a firm commitment of some kind with respect to assistance to Saudi Arabia in her defense problems, we can count upon receiving every necessary facility in this country. Until that time, we can only expect the Saudi Arabs to exact as hard a bargain as they can.

4. It would therefore seem to follow that the Department should not be too discouraged over what may have appeared to have been quibbling on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government in these negotiations. I have tried to set forth the Embassy’s analysis of the reasons behind this behavior. At the same time, despite the many surface struggles, there was never any indication on the part of the Saudi Arabs of a lessening of their earnest desire to strengthen the ties between our two countries. It is our belief that the Saudis, if anything, are even more eager to establish close relations with us and that if we are able to bring to the forthcoming negotiations for a long-term agreement tangible evidence of a like feeling on our part, we should be able to arrive at an arrangement highly satisfactory to both parties.

Respectfully yours,

Donald C. Bergus

[Enclosure 1]

The American Ambassador (Childs) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yassin)

secret

Jidda, June 23, 1949.

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency’s note No. 10/4/68/2119 of June 23, 1949 reading as follows:

“I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency herein below the articles upon which our two Governments have agreed concerning the means for the use by military aircraft of the United States Government of the facilities and services at Dhahran Airfield. It is my hope that your Excellency will agree to this and consider this note and Your Excellency’s reply an agreement which will constitute a complete accord in this regard.

• “1. The Saudi Arabian Government agrees to grant the transient aircraft of the United States military forces the following privileges:
  • a. Landing rights at the Saudi Arabian Government airport at Dhahran, mentioned throughout this agreement as Dhahran Airfield, for refueling and other technical services such as repair and maintenance;
  • b. Authority to fly over those air routes of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which are commonly used by civil aviation aircraft;
  • c. The authority for aircraft to fly and use landing sites within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to perform actual air rescue missions and to give aid to missing aircraft upon notice to the Saudi Arabian Government. In the performance of American and Saudi Arabian training air rescue missions, prior clearance will be obtained from the Saudi Arabian Government and a Saudi Arabian Government representative will accompany the air rescue party.
  • d. In case land vehicles and crash boats are needed to be used for air rescue missions, authority will be given by the Saudi Arabian Government.
• 2. The Saudi Arabian Government will permit the United States Government to employ military and technical personnel and supporting aircraft at the Dhahran Airfield for the purpose of performing services for transient aircraft of the United States military forces provided that the number of military and technical personnel will not exceed five hundred (500) persons, and the supporting aircraft will not exceed ten (10) airplanes.
• 3. The Saudi Arabian Government agrees to grant to the United States Government the right to employ an additional number of civilians on the airfield on condition that such civilian employees shall be the subject of one of them, or the subject of a third state friendly to both, and that the number of such employees shall not be more than double the number of military personnel authorized in article 2; and provided further that such employees will not be personally objectionable to the Saudi Arabian Government. The United States Government will submit a detailed statement to the Saudi Arabian Government concerning such employees.
• 4. The Saudi Arabian Government agrees to place at the disposal of the military and civilian personnel of the United States Government those installations and buildings existing at Dhahran Airfield as indicated on the attached lists.
• 5. The United States Government is authorized to administer and supervise only those matters connected with United States military aircraft and United States military and civilian personnel employed at Dhahran Airfield. The American authorities at Dhahran Airfield will not act in other matters except when specifically authorized by the Saudi Arabian Government.
• 6. The Saudi Arabian Government, in its administration of civil air and related matters, will take necessary action to prevent interference with the operations of the United States Government authorized under this agreement.
• 7. The Saudi Arabian Government agrees to offer every possible and reasonable aid, within its capabilities which will assist the American operators in performing weather, radio communication, air rescue and aircraft traffic services for aircraft of the armed forces of the United States of America.
• 8. The United States Government is authorized to construct any installations it deems necessary to be established at Dhahran Airfield provided that the construction of such installations will be at the expense of the United States Government and that such installations after completion become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government. It is agreed that during the period of this agreement such installations shall remain at the disposition of the United States Government.
• 9. The United States Government is authorized to extend and improve existing runways and taxi strips and to construct new runways and taxi strips at Dhahran Airfield in order to meet technical advances in the field of aviation provided that such improvements will be at the expense of the United States Government. The Saudi Arabian Government will instruct the appropriate authorities to prohibit the construction of buildings or obstacles in the plain west of the present airfield, and it will also issue instructions to prevent the construction of obstacles in the approaches to runways.
• 10. The United States Government may construct at its own expense a railway spur from the airfield to connect with the railroad to the city of Dhahran in the event it becomes desirable to do so. This spur, with all its facilities and installations, will become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government upon termination of this agreement.
• 11. The United States Government may expand and improve at its own expense the facilities of weather service, radio communications, navigational aids and other maintenance facilities as may be necessary. The United States Government is authorized to employ radio codes at Dhahran Airfield without any restrictions.
• 12. The United States Government is authorized to alter and repair fixed installations at Dhahran Airfield and also to replace equipment and supplies which are necessary to the efficient operation and maintenance of the Airfield.
• 13. The Saudi Arabian Government will accord to the United States Government and its military personnel exemption from customs duties, Government taxes, or any other charges imposed on equipment, items and supplies for the operation and maintenance of the airfield and for the personal use of its military personnel. It is understood that the United States Government will submit to the Saudi Arabian Government the official bills of lading and manifests on the equipment, items and supplies imported for the operation and maintenance of the airfield.
• 14. The United States Government is granted the privilege of receiving and sending its military mail to and from Dhahran Airfield exempt from customs, taxes, or any other restriction.
• 15. The United States Government is authorized facilities for the recreation and well being of its military personnel at Dhahran Airfield on condition that such facilities should not violate the customs and laws in effect in Saudi Arabia.
• 16. The United States Government is authorized to engage in appropriate activities for the training of its personnel in military and technical proficiency.
• 17. The United States Government may withdraw, upon the expiration of this agreement, all equipment and supplies which it has brought to Dhahran Airfield for its operation and maintenance. It is agreed that the United States Government will not withdraw equipment which has been installed and has become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government. If the United States Government replaces any semi-fixed installations or equipment which have become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government, the replacements will then become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government and the replaced items will become the property of the United States Government.
• 18. All United States military personnel, civilian employees and dependents are bound to obey all applicable laws and regulations of the Saudi Arabian Government. Offenses which may be committed by military members of the United States military forces at Dhahran Airfield will be subject to United States military law. In the cases of offenses committed outside the Airfield, the Saudi Arabian authorities will arrest the offenders and deliver them to the American authorities at the Airfield for their repatriation and punishment. The United States Government will set up a claims commission to consider all claims for compensation for injuries presented against military personnel and civilian employees acting in their official capacities by residents of Saudi Arabia.
• 19. Personnel of the United States Government, both military and civilian, will be in the possession of valid identification papers or passports upon arrival at Dhahran Airfield. In lieu of Saudi Arabian visas, however, if such are not available at the point of departure, the Saudi Arabian Government will honor competent United States Government travel orders.
• 20. In consideration of the rights and privileges granted by the Saudi Arabian Government to the United States Government in this lease, the United States Government agrees to provide to the Saudi Arabian Government the services as enumerated in articles 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26.
• 21.

  The United States will offer training in the maintenance and operation of the Airfield to a maximum at one time of one hundred Saudi Arabian students selected by the Saudi Arabian Government.

  The Saudi Arabian Government will select from these students in consultation with the United States authorities twenty Saudi Arabian students to pursue at United States Air Force Schools in the United States advanced technical training in the operation and maintenance of an airfield, under the following conditions:

  • a. Transportation from Dhahran to the United States and return will be furnished by the United States Air Force via military aircraft at no cost to the Saudi Arabian Government. Travel within the United States will be at the expense of the Saudi Arabian Government although the United States Air Force will render all advice and assistance to trainees.
  • b. Saudi students will mess at their own expense on a cost basis at Officers’ Messes at the established local rates.
  • c. Where quarters are available, they will be furnished on a scale equivalent to that authorized officers of the United States Air Force. No reimbursement will be made to the United States for this service. Where quarters are not available, the officer trainees of the Saudi Arabian Government will make their own arrangements at no cost to the United States Government.
  • d. All training will be at the expense of the United States Government. Special clothing and equipment required for the prescribed training courses will be furnished for use during the training course upon a temporary loan basis at no cost to the Saudi Arabian Government.
  • e. Commissary, post exchange and similar privileges which are ordinarily available to officers of the United States Air Force will be extended to these trainees.
  • f. Medical care will be furnished when available on the same basis as furnished United States Air Force personnel, at no cost to the Saudi Arabian Government other than for subsistence.
• 22. During the period of this lease the United States Government will make available at cost price to the Saudi Arabian Government for its state-owned aircraft, in cases of emergency in operation, aircraft parts including engines, from its supply stocks at Dhahran Airfield when such aircraft parts are available. In the event that these aircraft parts are not available to Dhahran Airfield, the United States Government will assist the Saudi Arabian Government to procure them from commercial sources.
• 23. The United States Government agrees to return to the Saudi Arabian Government upon termination of the lease, the airfield with all its fixed installations and other property used in operation and maintenance of the Airfield which are the property of the Saudi Arabian Government. The Saudi Arabian Government will have the option at that time of purchasing all semi-fixed installation, equipment and supplies which are not critical to the needs of the United States Government, at a price to be determined by negotiations.
• 24. The United States will make available to the Saudi Arabian Government, within the capabilities of its facilities in operation at Dhahran Airfield, its weather, radio communication, air rescue and aircraft operation services for the use of those civilian aircraft which are authorized by the Saudi Arabian Government to use Dhahran Airfield.
• 25. During the period of this agreement the United States Government will provide at the Dhahran Airfield hospital, within the capacity of personnel and equipment, dispensary service, medical treatment, and dental work for all Saudi Arabian nationals employed by the United States Government at Dhahran Airfield. Moreover, the United States will, in the event of emergency, assist the Saudi Arabian Government to the extent of its available facilities to combat epidemics and infectious diseases in the area.
• 26. The United States Government agrees to maintain in sound operating condition at its expense all fixed installations at Dhahran Airfield of which it makes use or which are at its disposition.
• 27. The period of this agreement is one complete year and terminates on June 23, 1950, unless before the date of termination another agreement between the two Governments is concluded, provided, however, if this agreement is not extended or replaced the United States Air Force shall have at least ninety days after termination of the agreement to withdraw from Dhahran Airfield.”

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have been authorized to convey my Government’s agreement with the foregoing.

I avail [etc.]

J. Rives Childs

[Subenclosure]

The Saudi Arabian Government agrees to put at the disposal of the United States Government for the duration of this lease all the installations and buildings existing at Dhahran Airfield with the exception of the following:

• The Saudi Arabian Customs Building
• The Saudi Arabian Post Office
• Family Quarters Number 371
• Family Quarters Number 369
• Family Quarters Number 367
• Family Quarters Number 365
• Family Quarters Number 363
• Family Quarters Number 356
• Barracks Building Number 127
• Barracks Building Number 128
• Barracks Building Number 131
• Barracks Building Number 132
• Latrine Building Number 130
• Buildings and installations now occupied and used exclusively by International Bechtel Corporation
• Buildings and installations now occupied and used exclusively by the Arabian American Oil Company
• Buildings and installations now occupied and used exclusively by Trans World Airways Corporation

[Enclosure 2]

The American Ambassador (Childs) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yassin)

secret

Jidda, June 23, 1949.

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency’s note no. 10/4/68/2120 of June 23, 1949 reading as follows:

• “1. During discussions looking to the conclusion of an agreement authorizing certain facilities to the United States Government for transient aircraft of its armed forces for landing and maintenance operations the question was raised of distribution of responsibility and that of the installations and services referred to in paragraphs four, five, and certain others, between the Saudi Arabian and American authorities at Dhahran Airfield, with a view to avoiding conflict, interference, and confusion in the operation.
• 2. The Saudi Arabian Government has studied this problem very carefully and has given to it the consideration it merits and came finally to the conclusion that a way must be found to coordinate the civil and military activities conducted at Dhahran Airfield in order to achieve unity and efficiency of operation. To this end the Saudi Arabian Government perceives that the most satisfactory solution would be for Colonel Richard J. O’Keefe to be entrusted to operate in its name for the duration of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement all problems pertaining to civil aviation which the Saudi Arabian Government would ordinarily administer itself. Colonel O’Keefe in consequence will be responsible for and authorized to conduct on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government all necessary civil aviation operations and activities including the following:
  • a. Safe and efficient operation of aircraft.
  • b. Operation of fire and crash equipment.
  • c. Operation and control of technical equipment.
  • d. Reception and distribution of weather services.
  • e. Airway traffic control.
  • f. Traffic control within the twenty-five mile zone.
  • g. Tower control.
  • h. Air-to-ground airways communications services, including the use of Arabic.
  • i. Ground control of aircraft.
  • j. Clearance of aircraft.
• 3. It is understood that in accordance with the laws of the United States, Colonel O’Keefe will not hold any rank or title or receive any financial remuneration or emolument from the Saudi Arabian Government.
• 4. The Saudi Arabian Government hopes that the United States Government will find this agreeable and will notify the Saudi Arabian Government of its agreement.”

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have been authorized to convey my Government’s agreement with the foregoing.

I avail [etc.]

J. Rives Childs

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2. Ante, p. 1589.
3. Aide-mémoire, May 30, supra.
4. Telegram 377, May 31, from Jidda (890F.7962/5–3149); not printed. The Department had already instructed Ambassador Childs that as a last resort the Department and the National Military Establishment were prepared to accede to the Saudi Arabian Government’s request that Colonel, O’Keefe be delegated to act in a joint capacity for the United States and Saudi Arabia provided he did not accept any rank, title, office, pay, or emolument from the Saudi Arabian Government (telegram 201, May 27, to Jidda, 890F.7962/5–2649; not printed).
5. The proposals were presented in the form of a suggested letter prepared by the Department of the Air Force so that it would read from the Saudi Arabian Government to the United States Government (telegram 209, June 3, to Jidda, 890F.7962/6–349; not printed).
6. Telegram 400, June 14, from Jidda (890F.7962/6–1449); not printed.
7. Telegram 402, June 15, from Jidda (890F.7962/6–1549): not printed.
8. Telegram 215, June 15, to Jidda (890F.7962/6–1449): not printed.
9. Telegram 409, June 18, from Jidda (890F.7962/6–1849); not printed.
10. Telegram 412, June 20, from Jidda (890F.7962/6–2049); not printed.
11. Telegram 217, June 20, to Jidda (890F.7962/6–2049); not printed.
12. Telegram 419, June 23, from Jidda (890F.7962/6–2349); not printed.