890F.7962/5–2349
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State
No. 137
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 159 (Dhahran) of May 10, 1949 reporting my audience with His Majesty in which he again brought up the question of military aid to Saudi Arabia and to transmit herewith the following enclosures:1
[Here follows a listing of the enclosures.]
The Department will appreciate from Enclosure No. 22 that one of my principal preoccupations over the past 18 months has been conjuring up fresh excuses and explanations as to why we were unable to respond to the King’s overtures for closer political relations. I have reached practically the limit of my resources and the fact that His Majesty emphasized in his audience with me on May 10th that he was approaching us for the last time on this subject indicates that he has just about reached the limit of his patience. To use a colloquial expression, “We must make up our minds to fish or cut bait.”
I, of course, appreciate the many valid factors which have stood in the way of a more positive response from the Department to the King’s repeated overtures. I believe also that there is some recognition on the part of His Majesty and of his Ministers of certain very sound reasons which have mitigated against the giving by us of more satisfactory replies or commitments than we have been able to do.
I would suggest that compliance by us with the King’s request for closer relations may well be in accord with our own strategic interests, not only in view of our important economic interests in this country but likewise in view of what Saudi Arabia has to offer us at Dhahran in the way of military airforce facilities.
The King is prepared to grant us a long term agreement at Dhahran provided we are able and willing to meet his own security requirements in part or in whole. The King has spoken in the past of arms and training for a force of 70,000 men and more recently he has spoken of the need of tanks and airplanes. I am not competent to say what the King needs for the maintenance by him of internal security and security against his most likely enemies. It has occurred to me however that we might well combine the consideration of the King’s own needs with those which we ourselves might need for the defense of the Dhahran Airfield. I believe the King would be inclined to [Page 1599] listen to practical considerations which might be presented to him establishing what his actual needs might be in terms of modern warfare and local exigencies.
I note that Colonel O’Keefe has recommended the sending of a survey team to Saudi Arabia to consider Saudi Arabian’s security requirements. He suggests consideration be given to the equipping and training of some 10,000 Saudi troops. It is my understanding and that of Colonel O’Keefe that the armaments for these troops would be made available to Saudi Arabia on a reimbursable basis and that our principal obligation would be the training of these forces.
I concur in these recommendations and hope that the work of such a survey team may be so expedited as to permit its findings to be approved by the National Military Establishment and the Department of State and made known to the Saudi Arabian Government in time for us to initiate negotiations for a long term Dhahran Airfield Agreement long before March 1, 1950.
Respectfully yours,