890F.00/5–1049: Telegram
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State
159. At principal audience King today at which I received alone and interpreter dismissed, Fuad serving as such who said: General international situation and that in which Saudi Arabia involved serious both of which causing him serious concern. Because he did not wish his concern become known he had restricted audience.
There was first of all Communism. He had nothing to fear from his own people. They respected him as father and he treated them as such. Communists had been successful in gaining foothold other neighboring countries. He cites Egypt where although Moslem brotherhood banned Communists members still alive.
There was secondly innate Shereefian hostility. Yemen flirting with Transjordan and Iraq and SA might be encircled. From letter read to me previous evening by Fuad (Dhahran telegram 1541) Abdullah would never give up idea greater Syria. His Majesty said he had reliable information Abdullah had stated to Jews he would make concessions to them in Palestine if they would support him to regain Hejaz.
Thirdly, there had been cooling off in British attitude towards him. As US interests had increased in SA interest of UK had been deflected to Iraq and Transjordan. He had not heard so from high responsible UK officials but SA Ambassador in London had gained impression UK did not favor tripartite arrangements between UK, US and Arab States but wished bilateral pacts and US excluded.
There was time when SA could rely on splendid fighting qualities Saudi soldiers to defend itself. New modern weapons now meant SA defenseless against tanks and military aircraft. These in possession of/or available to his enemies while he possessed none.
He had in past approached US Government repeatedly for assistance but he had obtained no satisfaction. He was now coming to US for the last time to ask our help, adequate armaments and our advice. He did not wish US to treat this present approach casually but to give it the great importance he attached to it. He was very seriously concerned. He could send Crown Prince Saud or Prince Feisal to US to make known his views but their visit would advertise unduly his concern and he wished to avoid the disastrous consequences of failure of their mission.
[Page 1596]He proposed I advance date my departure on leave in order proceed Washington at once to expedite action.
I assured him as I had previously USG by no means indifferent to security SAG and I reemphasized this. It was easy for decisions to be reached in SA but USG was immensely complicated machine, which moved slowly. I added I had anticipated King’s request previous evening when I had dictated letter to Colonel O’Keefe my only military adviser in SA asking him to formulate recommendations which I might take back with me to Washington in connection with standing long term DAF agreement which would take into account SA security requirements. I suggested careful preparation of ground most important and with all due respect to His Majesty’s suggestion I thought more might be accomplished in long run through study contemplated than by taking subject up precipitately.
King said he had fullest confidence in me and for me to follow course I thought best but time was pressing. British had not responded to his overtures for tripartite pact after he had refused to give them air base facilities prior Ambassador visiting Riyadh next week but he would make no commitments to British until he had heard from US.
Strongly urge Department authorize interim reply to King stating my visit to US will be taken advantage of to examine whole field of USG–SAG relations. We cannot continue to give King brush off indefinitely. Believe long term DAF agreement offers excellent opportunity obtain rights we desire in exchange for training 10,000 mobile airborne Saudi troops for defense DAF.
Sent Department 159, repeated London, pouched Jidda, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad.
- Not printed.↩