890F.7962/4–249
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State
No. 84
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams sent from Dhahran numbers 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105 and 106 of March 23, 1949, 107 of March 24, 1949 and 109, 110, 111 and 112 of March 26, 19491 and to transmit with this despatch the following memoranda of conversations held at Riyadh regarding the Dhahran Airfield negotiations and to give at the same time a brief summary of those negotiations:2
[Here follows a listing of the enclosed memoranda of conversations.]
Due to the pressure of work at the end, no time could be spared for the preparation of extensive records of our extended conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza on the details of the agreement but Colonel O’Keefe and Captain Elkins are preparing an annotated text of the agreement which will include all relevant observations on the details.
No opportunity was had either for an extended account of our final audience with His Majesty on March 25, 1949 but an account of this final audience was reported in my telegram No. 229 of March 26, 1949.3
[Page 1590]I shall, in this despatch, endeavor to outline as succinctly but as inclusively as possible some of the principal highlights in our negotiations.
The Department will recall from my telegram No. 190 of March 14, 19494 that I was somewhat disturbed by the Saudi Arabian Government’s decision to take the negotiations out of the hands of Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, Acting Foreign Minister who had, for reasons unknown to me, been sent to Cairo, and to transfer the negotiations to Riyadh for their termination by Fuad Bey Hamza, a principal rival of Shaikh Yusuf. I have no means of knowing what was behind the Saudi Arabian Government’s decision in this regard and whether it had any significance. I do know that in 1946 Fuad Bey had criticized Shaikh Yusuf for what he regarded as undue concessions in the Dhahran Airfield Agreement concluded in the exchange of notes of 1945 and 1946 and it is reasonable to suppose that Fuad Bey was determined to prove to the King that he was capable of driving with us a harder bargain than his rival.
It was immediately apparent upon my arrival in Riyadh on March 18, 1949 that the Saudi Arabian Government was not disposed to accept our text of the proposed agreement in its actual form as a basis for negotiations. Fuad Bey Hamza was, at first, most conciliatory and sought to give the impression that whatever form the agreement might take there would be no essential change in the administration of the airfield. However, during my conversations with him on the evening of March 21st, I was much disturbed by his hardened attitude and the inferences left that there might be fundamental changes introduced. It was on that date that Colonel Richard J. O’Keefe, Commanding Officer at Dhahran, and his legal adviser, Captain Elkins, arrived from Dhahran at my request to assist me in the negotiations.
The Department will no doubt appreciate that our policy with regard to Palestine was a heavy handicap in obtaining the continuance of the privileges which we had previously enjoyed at Dhahran. Moreover, the difficulties which we had experienced in formulating replies to the several requests and inquiries made by His Majesty of us regarding our position and attitude toward Saudi Arabia were a further considerable handicap. Fuad Bey pertinently expressed what was in the mind of His Majesty when he said Saudi Arabia was in the position of a woman waiting vainly for the United States to consummate its marriage with Saudi Arabia.
In view of our previous Palestine policy, the King found it particularly difficult to renew to us openly privileges at Dhahran which might have been interpreted by other Arab states as an indifference on the part of His Majesty to the Arab cause. The position of the [Page 1591] Saudi Arabian Government was represented to us that they were desirous of continuing to grant us in effect the same privileges but of making it appear to the world in the written instrument that Saudi Arabia was in fact the master at Dhahran.
The Department will doubtless appreciate that we were confronted with some very difficult decisions. First of all, time was running short; secondly, it would have been awkward to have hesitated and to have asked time for consultation with the Department. After deep reflection, it appeared to me that the most desirable course was to trust the sincerity of the Saudi Arabian position by endeavoring to work out the terms of an agreement with them which would give us the privileges which we desire while preserving the amour propre of the Saudi Arabian Government of which it is justifiably jealous. I sought Colonel O’Keefe’s counsel and he concurred wholeheartedly in this proposal. We therefore threw ourselves into the task of reformulating the Saudi Arabian counter proposals in a manner which would be acceptable to us as affording a practical working basis for our air forces at Dhahran while preserving the necessary appearances to the world for the Saudi Arabian Government. I cannot omit at this time to record the invaluable services rendered by Colonel O’Keefe and Captain Elkins in the extremely difficult and delicate task which we set ourselves. It was Colonel O’Keefe and Captain Elkins, assisted from time to time by me, who were principally responsible for the skillful manner in which the Saudi Arabian counter proposals were transformed and made into an instrument which would give Colonel O’Keefe and the United States Airforce the necessary operative working control at Dhahran. I cannot speak too highly in praise of the work in this regard of Colonel O’Keefe and Captain Elkins. I know the Department will be gratified, as well as the Department of Air, that we worked together as a closely knit team with such results as I believe may be described as successful in our common view.
I have already reported to the Department the fact that the evening of March 21st was a crisis point in our negotiations. I find it difficult to determine the purpose of Fuad Bey’s obduracy and lack of helpfulness as evidenced in our discussions with him that evening. I was, in fact, so confused by his change of attitude that at one time I even entertained what I regarded as a reasonable suspicion that the Saudi Arabian Government was endeavoring to compel us to take the initiative in retiring from the negotiations by raising impossible demands. I am still at a loss to account for Fuad Bey’s attitude in view of the completely changed and completely conciliatory position which he subsequently assumed when I threatened to take my difficulties directly to the King. I can only assume that he had overstepped himself in his personal jockeying for position.
[Page 1592]I may add that I was so deeply concerned with the turn the negotiations took on the evening of March 21st that I drafted a proposed communication to the King which I contemplated getting into the hands of Prince Saud. This communication, after draft, read in part as follows:
“As Your Majesty is aware, I have striven, during the two and one-half years in which I have been privileged to be the representative of my Government in Saudi Arabia, to develop an appreciation on the part of those interested officials of the United States Government in meeting Your Majesty’s wishes for more extended and closer ties between our two countries. It is my opinion that the Dhahran Air Operation has afforded a striking testimonial to what our two countries can accomplish as partners. I believe all signs point to a growing interest on the part of our National Military Establishment in meeting as far as may be practical the wishes of the Saudi Arabian Government in respect of binding closer our mutual defense. It was, therefore, because of my feeling that harm might be done the work which we have so patiently endeavored to accomplish in fostering increasing interest in Saudi Arabia on the part of the National Military Establishment that I have been reluctant to forward to my Government the counter proposals made to our proposed Dhahran Agreement until Colonel O’Keefe and I had sought by all possible means to convince the Saudi Arabian Government of the desirability in our common interests of drafting an agreement which we considered to offer a basis of agreement.
Your Majesty has always invited the utmost candor on my part and it is responsive to the convictions that Your Majesty has inculcated in me of the desirability of such frankness that I am constrained to express my observations thus frankly to Your Majesty on this occasion.
It has been said that the privileges exercised by us at Dhahran under the present agreement are contrary in times of peace to Saudi Arabian sovereignty and honor. May I be permitted to remark to Your Majesty that the United States enjoys privileges in British and Portuguese sovereign territory which do not go beyond those which we are seeking in a new agreement.
I am decidedly concerned at not only the maintenance of the strong ties which we have already so happily and constructively formed through the wisdom of Your Majesty but my concern extends to also the fear that the absence in the agreement on which we have been working of the minimum privileges we are seeking might conceivably prejudice the view of the National Military Establishment as to the consummation of the more extended forms of mutual aid and might force the Department of Air to turn to the development of bases where the conditions of operation were more favorable.
As it may take some days to obtain an answer from Washington, I would request of Your Majesty permission for me to inform my Government that the existing agreement which now expires on March 31, 1949 has been graciously extended for 15 days in order that a sufficient period may be allowed for a decision to be reached without possible disruption of the present airport administration.”
I discussed this with my extremely helpful Arab Secretary, Mohamed Masoud, in the thought that the contents would undoubtedly be conveyed by him to the King or Prince Saud whatever the decision I might take with regard to its presentation. Mohamed suggested that I hold it in suspense. In the meantime, he must have seen Prince Saud as he informed me the next day Prince Saud had inquired how the negotiations were going in order to assure me that if he could be of help he would be glad to throw his weight with the King in behalf of an agreement mutually satisfactory to us both. I feel that it was undoubtedly due to the deep apprehensions expressed by me concerning the progress of the negotiations and to the intervention of Prince Saud that a turn was taken the next day for the better and from that time forward the most conciliatory disposition was shown by Fuad Bey Hamza.
In consideration of all that I have reported, I hope the Department will agree that no other course was left open to us than to endeavor to deal with the problem as was done. An important factor in the decision taken was the goodwill we had opened to us in our endeavor to meet the Saudi Arabian desires halfway. I felt very strongly that hesitation on our part might well have produced suspicion as to our motives and I feel that the results achieved by our own spirit of accommodation exceeded even the most optimistic hopes of Colonel O’Keefe and me when we entered the negotiations at Riyadh.
It is hoped that the Department and the National Military Establishment will give immediate consideration to the character of the long term agreement which is desired for the future which must be negotiated before April 1, 1950. A good deal of experience will be gained by Colonel O’Keefe, of course, from the practical operation of the new agreement. I think one of the first considerations should be the determination of what we are probably prepared to offer Saudi Arabia for a long term agreement and when I speak of a long term agreement, I mean one from ten to twenty-five years. It might be helpful for us to have as soon as possible from the National Military Establishment an indication of what might be offered in a ten year agreement, in a fifteen year agreement and in a twenty-five year agreement. I believe the presence of Prince Saud in Washington in the course of the next six months will offer an excellent opportunity to work out the final details of a long term agreement and I strongly urge that the fullest advantage be taken of his presence in Washington by the National Military Establishment to that end. It is entirely possible that my statutory leave may co-incide with his visit and I think this would be useful. At the same time, I would suggest that if there is such a coincidence in our visits, Colonel O’Keefe be [Page 1594] brought back to Washington at the same time for consultation to assist in the negotiations. I expect to be in Washington beginning about August 15th. It is wholly possible that our negotiations for a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation may be so far advanced by that time that signature will be possible by the end of summer or the beginning of autumn (see despatch No. 83, April 2, 1949).
Respectfully yours,
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- Negotiations on the extension of the Dhahran Air Field Agreement were held at Riyadh from March 18 to 25. A tentative revised agreement was reached on March 25, with some points remaining to be worked out, particularly concerning the operational authority at the field (Article 5). The annotated text of the tentative agreement was transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch 110, April 20, from Jidda (890F.7962/4–2049); not printed. Notes regarding Civil Air Rights were exchanged April 20, and April 23, renewing the January 2, 1946, note until March 31, 1950. The notes were transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch 115, April 23, from Jidda (711.90F27/4–2349); not printed.↩
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