Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/12–2049

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, December 20, 1949.

In the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, just concluded, the position of the United States in the Jerusalem question was to support the proposals for an international regime for the Jerusalem area presented by the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which the United States is a member. The Commission formulated these proposals in accordance with the instructions given to it by the General Assembly in 1948, which called for the establishment of a permanent international regime with maximum local autonomy.

With the exception of certain matters specifically reserved to the authority of the United Nations, the Commission’s proposals would have delegated all normal powers of Government in the Jerusalem area to the responsible authorities of the Arab and Jewish zones, i.e., the Governments of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The principal functions reserved to the international administration were the control of the Holy Places, the supervision of the demilitarization of the area, and the protection of human rights in Jerusalem. A joint Council was provided to facilitate the operation of the City as a whole and an international tribunal to determine disputes arising under the Statute.

The proposals of the Conciliation Commission represented a middle ground between the two extreme positions, which were:

1. That Jerusalem should be a corpus separatum under a special international regime, separate from the surrounding area, and under full United Nations administration. This was the solution previously adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947. This solution could not be implemented due to the outbreak of fighting in Palestine and to the fact that the General Assembly recommendation of 1947 that there should be a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine with economic union was never put into effect.

2. That the two sides of the city be under the sovereignty and authority respectively of Israel and Jordan. Israel favored an international regime limited to the Holy Places while Jordan was only prepared to give to the United Nations full guarantees for the protection of and free access to the Holy Places.

In the General Assembly this year Australia introduced a resolution incorporating the first of these extreme positions—i.e., the principle of full internationalization under complete United Nations control. This resolution immediately attracted the votes of the Catholic countries, (strongly urged by the Vatican), of the Arab States (except Jordan), and of the Soviet bloc. With minor modifications, it was adopted by 39 votes to 14, with 5 abstentions. The United States, United Kingdom and other states opposed the resolution on the grounds that it was unrealistic as it could not be implemented by the United Nations against the wishes of Israel and Jordan without the use of substantial forces. The United States delegation also pointed out that to set up a new City-State in Palestine would cost the United Nations large sums of money even on the assumption of willing cooperation by Israel and Jordan.

The United States delegation, while making clear its support of an international regime for Jerusalem, voted against the Australian resolution for reasons above stated and continued to support the proposal of the Palestine Conciliation Commission which in its view represented a sound basis for a solution, giving substantial recognition to the legitimate desires of Israel and Jordan and of the international community. We also emphasized that, although we would consider carefully any proposed amendments to the Palestine Conciliation Commission plan, we could not see our way clear to change our position except in favor of one which represented general agreement.

It seems certain that the Arab States supported the Australian resolution out of a desire to oppose Israel and that the Soviet group did so largely in order to block the extension to Arab Palestine of the control of King Abdullah of Jordan, regarded by the Russians as a tool of Great Britain, and to curry favor with the other Arab States. The Vatican, which has important religious interests in Jerusalem, doubtless realized that the Australian resolution could not be implemented, but probably supported it in order to achieve a better bargaining position in respect of Jerusalem.

The General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949 reaffirmed the principle of the 1947 resolution that Jerusalem should be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council was directed at its next meeting to complete the preparation of the draft Statute for the City, which it had drawn up in compliance with the 1947 resolution, to approve the Statute, and to proceed immediately with its implementation without permitting any actions taken by any Government to divert it from this task.

Israel has reacted to the General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949 by taking the following action in the direction of moving the Israeli capital to Jerusalem, while refraining from a formal proclamation to that effect:

1. A statement by the Prime Minister that Jerusalem always had been and always would be the capital of Israel;

2. A statement by the Prime Minister that the movement of the Government to Jerusalem was under way, and would be accelerated;

3. Decisions to move the Parliament and the Office of the Prime Minister to Jerusalem.

Jordan has made strong official statements opposing the December 9 resolution.

The United Nations Trusteeship Council has already begun to consider the task of carrying out the General Assembly resolution and will continue its work in Geneva on January 19, 1950. The United States representative, Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, has been instructed that although we opposed the resolution in the General Assembly, we believe that the Trusteeship Council should make a bona fide effort to comply with its instructions from the General Assembly, but that the United States should avoid for the present taking a position of leadership.

In connection with the Israeli action in respect of moving the Government to Jerusalem, the French and Belgian delegations have introduced a resolution expressing concern and stating that such action is likely to render more difficult the implementation of the Statute. Ambassador Sayre has been instructed to abstain unless the resolution is revised to delete the reference to “implementation” of the Statute.

Conclusions

1. Our underlying objective is to achieve a solution of the Jerusalem problem which will meet with a considerable degree of concurrence by the world community and be acceptable to the two nations which are most directly involved.

2. We do not believe that this objective can be achieved under the terms of the General Assembly resolution because neither Israel nor Jordan will ever willingly agree to the establishment of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum divorced from their respective control.

3. However, as a member of the Trusteeship Council the United States should not give the impression that it is obstructing the Council’s work in carrying forward a General Assembly resolution adopted by a majority of the United Nations, and we should be willing to make a bona fide effort in the first phase of the Trusteeship Council’s work, namely, the drafting of a statute for Jerusalem. But: the United States should not support action in the Trusteeship Council looking toward the imposed implementation of the Statute for Jerusalem against the wishes of the parties.

4. When the statute is completed there will then be an opportunity available to the Trusteeship Council, in light of the comments of the interested parties, to consider whether it should take steps to implement the statute. If at that stage the Governments of Israel and Jordan express strong opposition to the Statute as drafted, the United States should make it clear that on the basis of these reactions it would be impractical to attempt to enforce such a solution on the parties, and that to impose on unwilling parties a recommendation of the General Assembly would not contribute to a viable solution of the problem.

5. To assist affirmatively in the settlement of the problem, the United States should privately encourage informal conversations between Israel and Jordan and the Vatican, but the United States should not take any part in such conversations. We might suggest that a single individual, such as Dr. Ralph Bunche, but not a representative of the United States, conduct quiet consultations with the parties and with the Vatican with a view to exploring the possibilities of an agreed solution.

The Trusteeship Council has asked its President (Garreau of France) to prepare a first draft of a new statute for consideration by the Council on January 19; he will be assisted in this task by Dr. Ralph Bunche.

6. It may be necessary in accordance with United Nations procedures for the General Assembly to consider the Jerusalem question at a special session in the spring of 1950 either as a consequence of the Trusteeship Council’s inability to proceed with implementation of the statute or of agreement arrived at between the parties.

7. We continue to believe, as we did as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, that a reasonable solution should contain certain underlying principles, such as protection of and free access to the Holy Places under appropriate United Nations auspices, progressive demilitarization of the Jerusalem area, administration by Israel and Jordan of their respective parts of the City, and the maintenance of human rights and freedoms. However, it is our view that any solution agreed upon by the Christian world and by Israel and Jordan could be supported by us.¹

Dean Acheson

1. Mr. Rusk sent a copy of this memorandum to Senator Austin in New York with a letter of December 21. The letter noted that “The President indicated his approval of what we had done and were doing on this matter, but since he had not had an opportunity to study the memorandum carefully, we do not believe that we should conclude that he intended his approval as a specific instruction to you.” Mr. Rusk stated he was sure that the memorandum “will be the basis for more specific instructions as they become necessary.” (501.BB Palestine/12–2149)