501.BB Palestine(E)/11–949
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Root)
Subject: The Interim Report of the Economic Survey Mission (ESM) to the Near East.
| Participants: | Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner, Department of State |
| Mr. John F. Root, American Embassy, London | |
| Mr. M. R. Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office | |
| Mr. Bernard Burrows, Head, Eastern Department, Foreign Office | |
| Mr. J. G. T. Sheringham, Eastern Department, Foreign Office | |
| Mr. Trefor Evans, Middle East Secretariat, Foreign Office | |
| Mr. E. B. Boothby, Head, Refugee Department, Foreign Office | |
| Mr. C. J. Edmonds, UK Representative, IRO | |
| Hon. H. A. A. Hankey, Assistant, Personnel Department, Foreign Office | |
| Miss Barbara Salt, Assistant, United Nations (Economic and Social) Department, Foreign Office |
Note: Second conversation of two between Mr. Gardiner and Foreign Office officials.1
Mr. Wright said he and his colleagues were glad for the opportunity to have this preliminary discussion with Mr. Gardiner and to learn of the ESM thinking at first hand. He noted that any decisions of conclusions with respect to the ESM proposals would await his forthcoming talks in Washington.2
Mr. Gardiner then offered to give the group some of the background to ESM’s work. He said there had been two particular sets of problems. The first was a question of engineering opinion. There had been a certain divergence between the views of the TVA engineers and the British experts. The British contemplated a series of headworks in the Jordan area which would distribute, but not increase, the supply [Page 1477] of water. Our experts felt that it would be more advantageous both from the point of view of costs and of results to undertake works which would increase the supply of water as well as bring it to the areas where it was most needed. They were sure that for a reasonable outlay a dam could be built at Wadi Zerqa and that in an integrated irrigation and development project at Wadi Zerqa some five thousand farm families, representing twenty-five to thirty thousand people, could be employed. The TVA experts have had extensive experience in the technique of building dams on limestone foundations and are convinced that one can be built satisfactorily at Wadi Zerqa so that no leakage will result. They were thinking in terms of a dam thirty-five meters high and so constructed as to allow for later expansion if necessary. These observations, Mr. Gardiner said, represented the best professional opinion available, and the TVA experts were ready to guarantee that the project outlined could be carried out successfully. Sir Desmond Morton himself was in accord with the American view. Mr. Gardiner added that in all probability TVA technicians could be obtained to assist in carrying out the Wadi Zerqa project.
Mr. Wright said that he would like to make his own position clear, in view of the fact that there seemed to have arisen some misunderstanding. He felt that the best advice should be taken and the best work decided upon. He wanted to emphasize this point and to repeat that the Foreign Office had no axes to grind. Mr. Gardiner replied that it seemed to be merely a case of doctors disagreeing.
The second big problem to which ESM had to apply itself had to do with the question of how to organize for the future. In deference to the views of the Department and the Foreign Office, ESM had cut a great deal out of the preliminary drafts of the interim report and had left the matter of long-term development in terms as general as possible. Clapp was determined not to recommend a nickel for relief or work relief under UNRPR or for that matter under any organization of the UN secretariat. It was simply too difficult to have a businesslike operation. The ESM itself had had sufficient difficulties on that score. Clapp wanted a group of thirty-five and got eighty-four, and it was difficult to keep track of just what this entire number was doing or what purpose they served. It was disconcerting to have a meeting one day and find a report on the meeting in the Palestine Post the next. Clapp had a phrase for the undesirables in the ESM secretariat: “incompetent saboteurs.”
ESM had in mind an agency composed of the principal contributing countries, responsive to the GA but independent and autonomous in carrying out the program of relief and work relief. ESM felt it could put to work large numbers of people within eight to ten months’ time. The two principal projects recommended (Wadi Zerqa and Wadi [Page 1478] Quilt) would account for some 8,000 man-hours of work spread over eighteen months. Altogether ESM hoped to provide employment for 60,000 to 70,000 “breadwinners” through the work-relief projects.
[Here follow two paragraphs of technical discussion on the refugee question.]
Mr. Wright remarked that the presentation in the report was first class. He thought it was extremely encouraging that the Foreign Office, the Department and ESM seemed to be in fairly close agreement on their ideas. There were, of course, certain points in connection with the report which would have to be explored at some length in Washington. It might be useful, however, at this time, to discuss one or two of these points.
Mr. Burrows expressed concern over the political impact the cut in rations might have on the refugees themselves and on the authorities in the Arab states. The interim report emphasized that the saving realized through the recommended cut in rations could be applied to the public works program. This was no doubt desirable but what consideration had ESM given to the political repercussions of the cut in rations? He felt that this was a danger point which might be seized upon by the Arabs and that the Arab leaders might be forced into a position where they were obliged to oppose the plan as a whole. Mr. Gardiner explained there were two considerations behind ESM thinking:
- (1)
- It was incumbent on ESM to point out that a certain number of destitute persons were receiving relief. If it was the intention to provide relief for these destitute persons as well as the refugees, then this fact should be clearly recognized by the UN.
- (2)
- The second point in ESM’s thinking was that the measure would tend to put a burden on the Arab governments, leading them to come to us with more specific proposals for work relief and development. The idea was to put the Arab states in a position of wanting to start trading with us, to take the initiative in requesting ideas and funds for development. The ESM had considered the point carefully and had decided on this particular proposal with the foregoing ideas in mind.
[Here follow two paragraphs of technical discussion on the relief and work questions involving the refugees.]
Reverting to the cut in rations, Mr. Burrows asked whether the Arab governments were aware of this proposal. Mr. Gardiner replied he thought it would be news, to them. Mr. Burrows asked whether it wouldn’t be desirable to prepare the Arab governments in advance. There was a danger that comment following announcement of the cut might develop in such an unfavorable way as to put the governments in an extremely difficult position and prevent them from dealing rationally with the whole report. Mr. Gardiner reminded the group that [Page 1479] the proposals primarily concerned only three countries—Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Mr. Gardiner thought there would be no particular trouble with Jordan and the Lebanon. Syria would be a somewhat uncertain factor until after the elections. Our Embassy in Egypt was concerned about Egypt’s reception of the proposals and Mr. Gardiner agreed that the report had little to offer in the Gaza strip.
There was a general discussion of the means by which the Arab countries might be forewarned of the ESM proposals, whether through the ESM, the PCC or our diplomatic missions. It was recognized that the report contained a certain amount of unpalatable medicine for all parties concerned, not only the Arabs, but that there was no way to avoid this entirely. It was agreed that the preparatory work which might be done among the Arab governments to avoid adverse reaction and insure a proper reception for the proposals should be carefully considered and that it was definitely a point to be taken up in the Washington talks. Mr. Burrows suggested that possibly our governments might refer in general terms to the fact that the report would soon be taken up by the GA, that while we were not familiar with the contents of the report, it was likely to contain certain unpalatable things for the respective countries concerned and that we hoped the governments as well as the press of these countries would weigh very carefully the ESM proposals in the light of the objectives we all desired. Mr. Sheringham brought up the threat to public security in the camps and elsewhere among the refugees that might result from the announcement of the cut in rations. He feared there might be riots and demonstrations and thought it might be only fair to warn the countries concerned in advance of these dangers. Mr. Boothby mentioned the possibility that the Arabs might marshal a move against the whole report in the GA.
In answer to a question about the future plans of Clapp and Morton, Mr. Gardiner explained that when the final touches had been put on the interim report, they planned to go to Tel Aviv. They intended subsequently to go to Syria but were postponing their visit until after the elections. Eventually they will make another complete circle of the Near East countries involved and will draw up another report, which will place the emphasis on future economic development. For this report they will draw heavily on the advice of their financial and economic experts.
Mr. Burrows noted the absence in the report of any statement on the numbers of refugees to be repatriated to Israel. Mr. Gardiner replied that ESM had purposely avoided this subject. He said there would be plenty of opportunity at the GA to refer to the December 11 Resolution. The facts seemed to be that Israel was going to take back very few refugees, but there was no point in saying so now or to give [Page 1480] the Arabs’ hand away. It was, however, hard for him to see how Israel was going to take care of its own immigrants, let alone receive any large number of Arabs.
There was a general discussion on how the agency administering relief and work relief might be related to the UN. The British felt this point was especially important in view of the fact that the short-term agency might eventually develop into the group coordinating long-term developments. The British feeling was that the agency should be independent of the UN. It might be authorized and blessed by the UN and it might, as do other autonomous international organizations, report on its activities and submit its accounts to the GA. But it should not be controlled by the UN.
Mr. Gardiner said the State Department was determined that the agency would somehow have to be established within the “UN framework”—in other words, sponsored by and responsive to the GA. At the same time we were determined that it should be a business-like operation. He said the formula for its relationship to the UN remains to be worked out.
Mr. Gardiner remarked that the State Department will do its best to get our share of funds from Congress, but we certainly were not going to carry the burden alone. To get funds from Congress, there would have to be some assurances of substantial contributions from other countries. He did not know what these would be. Possibly if we subscribed half, we might expect a fifth or more from the UK. Mr. Burrows noted that this would mean a British contribution for the eighteen months at a yearly rate of $6,000,000. Mr. Gardiner said that we also expected to get something from the French and of course something in the way of local contributions from the countries where the projects were being carried out. There would also be certain amounts available from such international organizations as UNICEF.
Mr. Burrows noted that the view seemed to be gaining ground that the agency would not be a body possessing funds for development but a group of advisers engaged in drawing up and recommending projects and in seeking money for their implementation. Mr. Gardiner said that that was our view. We were certainly not going to turn over our check book to anybody. We had in mind that the agency would have full access to such lending organizations as the Export-Import Bank, and we expected the contributors of funds to examine the record of the agency’s deliberations before advancing money for a project. He reiterated that while we were concerned with somehow working “within the framework of the UN,” we certainly wanted a businesslike operation. We intended to “sit across the table” from the beneficiary countries, as it were.
[Page 1481]Mr. Boothby remarked that the agency would gain no prestige for being tied to the UN, and Mr. Wright added that from their point of view any connection with the UN did not facilitate getting funds from the British Government. Mr. Gardiner said the answer remained to be seen. He emphasized Clapp’s statement that he cannot and will not recommend any US contributions to relief or public works if UNRPR or any organization under the UN secretariat is to handle the program.
Mr. Wright remarked that it was important that the UK contribution be in sterling and not in a hard currency and asked Mr. Gardiner what he thought the feeling in that respect would be. Mr. Gardiner felt that a sterling contribution would be possible, for there were relief and relief-work items, cement for example, that could be bought in the sterling area. He emphasized again that a UK contribution would help to sell the idea at home.