Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/10–2949: Airgram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

secret

Jerusalem, October 29, 1949.

A–173. The Consulate General respectfully submits the following observations, admittedly general, regarding the future of Arab Palestine and the possibility of its annexation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as seen from Jerusalem.

1. King Abdullah has definitely set his heart on the annexation of Arab Palestine, the sooner the better. Arab Palestine would include the Arab held sections of Jerusalem. His determination probably has been strengthened by reports of negotiations for the union of Iraq and Syria, thus diminishing prospects for fulfilment of the “Greater Syria Plan.” He is also getting old and would like to see his kingdom augmented before his death.

2. The United Kingdom supports this project and is inclined to favor immediate implementation. Although giving lip service to the internationalization of Jerusalem, the British apparently feel that only partition of the city is “practical” with the Arab section becoming part of Jordan. The British Consulate General in Jerusalem, at least, has held reservations regarding the possibility of internationalization for some time.

3. The United States has given its blessings to annexation but at a future date and as part and parcel of a final settlement of the Palestine problem. In addition, it continues to support internationalization of the entire Jerusalem area.

4. The other Arab states, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are opposed to annexation both from traditional hostility to the Hashemites and the realization that such action would further diminish any remaining prospects of their obtaining territory in Palestine.

5. Israel is also strongly opposed. Her general objection to any increase in the size and therefore the potential power of an Arab state is augmented in this case by the ingrained conviction that Jordan is only Britain in disguise and annexation would mean the return of the British by the kitchen door. Furthermore, an independent Arab Palestine would be relatively easy to control and would in all probability quickly degenerate into a vassal state, if not an actual part of Israel.

6. Should incorporation take place, particularly with the open or camouflaged sanction of the United States and/or the United Kingdom, Israel might quickly seize the opportunity and formally proclaim her sovereignty over all the areas she now controls including the Jewish sections of Jerusalem.

7. The Arabs of Palestine have been the principal victims of the events since 1947. They are depressed, disillusioned and lack any strong leader to replace the discredited old ones. A uniform characteristic is their growing contempt for the United Nations at least in so far as its activities in Palestine are concerned. The refugees have been remarkably patient and have occasioned surprisingly few disturbances; it would be still more surprising if their endurance does not break into disorders on a growing scale. Indications that the breaking point may be near are the increasing numbers who attempt to infiltrate back into Israel and the up-surge of individually organized raids across the demarcation lines. Complaints against living conditions and paucity of food are also growing.

8. Better informed refugees now realize that repatriation in the sense contemplated by the December 11, 1949 resolution of the General Assembly is out of the question and they no longer think the United Nations will enforce the resolution. However, no one dares to say so openly for the great mass of the refugees has been nourished on this illusion and a frank statement of the extent of the deception might kindle an explosion. It would certainly eliminate the chances of leadership of the person making the first announcement.

9. No love for King Abdullah is expressed in private conversation or felt for Jordan despite the King’s recent “triumphal parade” through Palestine. The King is commonly considered a despotic tribesman, and the Jordan Government autocratic in the extreme—the antithesis of the type of regime for which the younger intellectuals in Palestine are allegedly striving. What Palestinians fear is complete subordination to Jordan. Imbued with contempt for the “Jordanian Bedouin”, and conscious of both the small resources of Jordan itself and the scarcity of persons qualified to direct a modern state, they believe that in any joint state Palestinians should play an equal if not leading part. Particularly alarming to them is the present political and economic discrimination. Furthermore, resentment over cession of the Triangle lands is still smouldering and has permanently shaken confidence in the trustworthiness of King Abdullah as a protector against Israel.

10. Nevertheless, a growing number of the moderate, better informed elements appear resigned to the fact that there is no alternative to union with Jordan. They recognize that a viable Arab Palestine is impossible and that such a Lilliputian state would quickly be swallowed by Israel. Under specific conditions in the formulation of which they had a prior voice, incorporation with Jordan would probably be accepted.

11. Talk of union with Israel or close economic bonds between an independent Arab Palestine and Israelis heard. But, the conditions mentioned for this are the product of wishful thinking and clearly unacceptable to Israel. On the whole there does not appear to be any genuine, widely held desire to cooperate with Israel in a realistic manner.

12. Israel’s treatment of its present Arab population; its security arguments against repatriation of Arab refugees; the drastic differences between the semi-socialist communal state of Israel and the Arabs’ traditional mode of existence; and the chauvinistic basically anti-“goy” atmosphere in Israel; indicate that the interests of Palestinian Arabs would be served best by incorporation into Jordan.

13. Careful consideration should be given to the manner of achieving this union to minimize initial resentment and future friction. A unilateral decree of annexation without specific protection for the rights and interests of Palestinians would provoke deep, widespread bitterness difficult to heal. It might even occasion disturbances.

14. In the present circumstances union might be approached by the selection, or preferably election, of a group of Palestinian Arabs (not mere Abdullah marionettes) to represent Palestine and draw up with Jordan representatives an agreement for union under specific and acceptable conditions. The selection might be entrusted to the various mukhtars, heads of families, municipal organizations and committees from the refugees camps. The union could take the form of a kingdom under one crown but with each side of the Jordan possessing local autonomy and controlling its internal affairs. Responsibility for defense; and foreign affairs could rest in a joint body. Such an arrangement would require reduction in the arbitrary power of the King in practice if not in form, and explicit provisions against discrimination in favor of either unit of the Kingdom. Particularly important is permitting the Palestinian Arabs a prior voice in working out the arrangements which would make them responsible for the type of government organized and, therefore, give them a greater responsibility for its successful functioning.

Burdett