711.9011/11–1449

Memorandum by the Politico-Military Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Robertson)1

top secret

U.S. Strategic Position in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East

Since the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 it has been a basic objective of foreign policy to maintain world peace in accordance with the Charter’s principles. The development of any situation which might lead to widespread armed conflict would accordingly be a matter of concern to this government. An area in which such situations exist is the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. For the purposes of this discussion this area is comprised of Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Arab states, Israel and Libya. The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is of critical importance to the security of the United States. The security of this area would be jeopardized if any potentially hostile power gained a foothold therein. It should be U.S. policy in accordance with the principles and in the spirit of the United Nations Charter to support the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. As a corollary of this policy the U.S. should assist in maintaining the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey and Iran. In implementing this policy the U.S. should be prepared to make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power in such manner as may be found most effective. Political and economic means should be exhausted, including recourse to the United Nations, before resorting to force. Any resort to force should be in consonance with the Charter of the United Nations and in cooperation with like-minded members of the United Nations in so far as possible.

In the case of Greece we have defined the strategic interests of the United States as favoring a Greek military establishment capable of maintaining internal security in order to avoid communistic domination of that country. To this end military equipment and training have been provided over the past few years with the result that the Greek National Armies have successfully destroyed the major elements of the communist supported guerrilla forces in Greece. We have expressed our interest in continuing our support of Greece in the face of any renewed communistic efforts to dominate or overthrow the duly constituted government.

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The United States has greater long-range strategic interests in the military establishments of Turkey than in those of Greece. Turkey is strategically more important since it dominates major air, land and sea routes from the U.S.S.R. to the Cairo-Suez area and to the Middle East oil fields. U.S. policy on military aid to Turkey should be based on the necessity of supporting and strengthening Turkish efforts to oppose communistic pressure and on possible utilization of Turkey for U.S. strategic purposes in the event of conflict with the U.S.S.R.

The long-range security objectives of the U.S. in Iran should be to supply the Iranian Army with sufficient equipment and support as would reasonably ensure maintenance of internal security, a stabilized government, and prevention of interference from outside forces, other than direct invasion. If Iran fell under communistic influence its independence would cease, and its strategic oil supply could no longer be counted on and security of the Middle East as a whole would be jeopardized.

Our policy toward Israel and the Arab states will be an important factor in determining whether they can be stimulated to constructive action in their own behalf to provide the basis for a stable and progressive political structure and a balanced and viable economy. If either Israel or the Arab states fail to take such action, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and U.S. national interests therein will be jeopardized. If Israeli policy develops along expansionist and aggressive lines, the security of the area and the United States national interests therein will be endangered. In view of the strong passions which have been aroused, it will be many years before relations between; Israel and neighboring countries can become sufficiently stable as to be proof against sudden and violent eruption. Accordingly our policy toward Israel and the Arab states should be based on the fundamental propositions that (a) The political and economic stability and security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East are of critical importance to the security of the United States (b) It is in the U.S. national interest to have the respect and good will of all the peoples of the area, Jews and Arabs alike, and their orientation away from the Soviet Union (c) The differences between the new Israeli state and the neighboring Arab states should be reconciled at least to the extent that Israel and Arab states would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression (d) The foregoing can best be achieved by asserting leadership in the solution of the economic, social and political problems of the area, and on an impartial basis (e) There should be close United States-United Kingdom collaboration wherever possible to achieve the basic objectives. In light of the Security Council Resolution of August 11, 1949 [Page 58] removing the embargo on export of war material to these countries and in order to promote internal security as a basis for general security in the area, we should permit the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states limited to such arms as are within the scope of legitimate security requirements.

In a study concerning the Persian Gulf it has been pointed out that in the event of hostilities the oil resources and facilities must be denied to the enemy. Accordingly plans must be developed for the neutralization of the facilities. It is emphasized that these plans are to be implemented only as a last resort and after it is determined that there is no reasonable probability of keeping any particular field out of the possession of the enemy. It is concluded in this study that (a) Plans for neutralization of Middle Eastern oil facilities are in no way to be construed as lessening the importance of holding the Middle Eastern oil areas if such action be feasible and in accordance with accepted strategic concepts, and (b) In view of the essential nature of Middle Eastern oil to the United States, neutralization plans for the Middle Eastern oil fields shall be implemented only as a last resort. (Comment: As a precautionary measure it might be ad visible that Ambassador Childs2 be requested not to enlarge on any discussion of this subject on the occasion of your presentation.)

An appraisal of U.S. security interests in the entire area of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean indicates the following strategic requirements. We should deny any foothold in this area to any potentially hostile power. We should maintain friendly relationships with the countries concerned promoting such relationships by social and economic assistance, together with such military assistance as may be practicable, to ensure collaboration by the indigenous peoples in the common defense of the area. The oil resources of the area should be developed by the U.S. and such other countries as have and can be expected to have a friendly attitude toward the U.S. We should take such proper steps as would assure the right for U.S. military forces to enter militarily essential areas upon a threat of war.

In accordance with these strategic requirements we should be in a position to secure air base facilities in the Dhahran area sufficient for the operational use of all types of modern military aircraft and for a U.S. military mission so expanded that it, in conjunction with Saudi nationals, could defend U.S. military installations in the Dhahran area. The U.S. Air Force has in the course of nearly four years become increasingly dependent on this base for its Near Eastern operations and for the maintenance of transport and communications between the occupational forces in Europe and the Far East. Our [Page 59] world-wide strategic position would be greatly improved, if in the event of war the means could be developed to defend successfully and to conduct sustained air operations from the Dhahran airport. A similar observation might be made regarding the U.S. Air Force facility at Tripoli, Libya. It is highly important that we be able to work out satisfactory arrangements for continuing our rights to use this important airbase when a solution in the UN has been attained as regards disposition of the Italian Colonies.

We have already undertaken and should continue to coordinate the handling of our common strategic interests in the area with the British as it would be unrealistic for the United States to undertake to carry out its policies unless the British maintained their strong strategic, political and economic position in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and they and we follow parallel policies in that area. The desirability for a common approach to problems and collaboration wherever possible has been clearly demonstrated by the useful results of our cooperation to date particularly since the outbreak of World War II.

  1. Prepared, presumably, for the use of Mr. McGhee in connection with his talks with Mr. Wright.
  2. J. Rives Childs, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.