[Annex]
secret
[Washington, undated.]
Subject: Analysis and Comparison of United
States Policies with Regard to Aid to Greece, Turkey, Iran and
Afghanistan
Fundamentally, American policy with respect to all four countries
is the same. It is to support their independence and integrity,
which is presently threatened by the Soviet Union and its
satellites, and to further their economic and social
development. However, the situation of each country differs in
some respects from that of each of the others, and for this
reason the implementation of our fundamental policy is different
in each case. The following is an attempt to analyze the reasons
for extending aid to each country and for the differences in the
aid furnished to each.
Greece: During the period from 1944 to
February 1947, Greece was kept alive only by the very large
UNRRA supplies and the
direct logistic support of the Greek forces by the British
Government. On February 24, 1947 the British Government informed
the United States that it could no longer continue to support
the Greek forces.5 At
about the same time the end of UNRRA operations came in sight. Without some
substitute for these two supports, the Greek state would have
collapsed completely, and unquestionably would have fallen under
Communist control. The only possible source from which
assistance on the required scale could have come was the United
States.
The Department recognized this situation and further realized
that to allow Greece to fall behind the Iron Curtain would be a
political disaster of the first magnitude. The decision to
furnish aid was taken as an emergency measure for purely
political reasons.
Because of the dire economic straits into which Greece has fallen
and because of the magnitude and persistence of the
Communist-led guerrilla movement, it will be necessary to
continue large-scale aid to Greece for a considerable period of
time. This will be done on the economic side through the
European Recovery Program, in which Greece is a participant by
virtue of being a European state. Had it not been possible to
include Greece in the ERP, it
would have been necessary to continue the original special
economic aid program, since Greece simply could not borrow or
otherwise obtain the necessary funds from any other source.
Special military aid to Greece (outside ERP) is being continued because the military threat
to the economy of Greece and to the existence of a democratic
government in Greece has not been removed. However, there are no
plans for making Greece
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into a military bastion against Soviet aggression. It is our
understanding that American military authorities do not consider
it possible to strengthen Greece sufficiently to resist
full-scale attack, no matter how much assistance might be
provided. Consequently, direct military aid to Greece on any
substantial scale will probably be terminated as soon as
large-scale guerrilla activity is ended.
Turkey: The British decision to end aid
to Greece was accompanied by a decision that the British
Government could extend no assistance to Turkey. This did not
have the same significance as in the case of Greece, because
there had been little British aid extended to Turkey since the
end of the war and the British plans for future assistance to
Turkey were comparatively modest. The Turkish state could have
maintained itself without special foreign aid. However, during
the period preceding February, 1947 Turkey had been under severe
Russian pressure6
and its government and people were justly afraid of becoming the
object of even stronger pressures. They were therefore
maintaining a large and costly but inefficient army which the
nation could not afford if it were to progress economically and
socially.
The American program of aid to Turkey was designed to fulfill
three purposes:
- (1)
- To reassure the Turkish Government and people of the
concrete determination of the United States to support
Turkey against the Soviet Union and to prevent any
feeling on the part of the Turks that they were being
abandoned, such as might have been produced by the
knowledge that British aid was not to be forthcoming and
that there would be no substitute for it from another
source.
- (2)
- To improve the combat efficiency of the Turkish armed
forces in order to deter the Soviet Union or its
satellites from aggression against Turkey. At the same
time, the strengthening of the Turkish forces was
designed to increase the confidence of the Turkish
people in their ability to defend themselves and so to
increase their determination to resist the pressures
short of war being brought against them by the USSR and
its satellites.
- (3)
- To release badly needed man power from the armed
forces by increasing the mobility and fire power of
those forces, thus enabling a smaller number of men to
provide an equal or superior defense.
The objectives indicated have been achieved to a greater or less
degree in each case. It is improbable that large-scale military
aid to Turkey will be continued for very much longer. However,
to avoid losing the benefits already gained and adversely
affecting the morale of the Turkish people, it will probably be
necessary and desirable to continue to provide military
assistance on a small scale and to continue the military
missions in Turkey for an indefinite period.
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No program of direct economic aid to Turkey has been undertaken,
because the Turkish economy has been in reasonably good shape
and is in no danger of collapse. However, the need for economic
development is plain, both to improve the standard of living of
the people and to increase Turkey’s powers of resistance in the
event of war. Any reduction in the present low standard of
living of the Turkish people might create internal political
stresses which would weaken the hitherto firm structure of the
government and open the way to Communist penetration of the sort
which has proven so dangerous in Greece. Turkey has been
included in the ERP and will
receive modest credits from that source. It can probably also
obtain credits from the International Bank, as it has in the
past from the Export-Import Bank, and the United States will
support its requests for credits in all cases where the projects
involved seem economically sound. It is not considered that the
economic needs of Turkey are sufficiently serious to warrant
outright grants for economic purposes.
Iran: American aid to Iran to date has
consisted entirely of relatively small credits for the purchase
of surplus military equipment, surplus merchant vessels, and
similar items, plus technical advice furnished by military
missions and civilian advisers. The Iranian Government has never
requested aid of any other type, although the Shah and certain
other individuals in the Government and outside it have
expressed a desire to obtain military assistance of the same
type as that being furnished to Turkey. The Iranian Ambassador
has recently indicated that the Iranian Government may make a
direct request in the near future for special assistance on the
Turkish model.
The Iranian economy is extremely backward and needs improvement
in virtually every direction. However, it is not in a state of
crisis, being probably about as stable as at any period in
recent years. There is, therefore, no need for urgent economic
assistance of the type being provided to Greece. Furthermore,
the Iranian trade situation and the financial resources of the
Iranian Government are such that the country should be able to
borrow from the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank as
much capital as it could effectively utilize for economic
development during the next few years. We are encouraging the
Iranian Government to approach those sources and have assured it
of our support for any properly justified requests it may make
for credits.
At the present time, Iran is probably even more seriously menaced
by the USSR than is Turkey. It has shown commendable firmness in
the face of this menace. The Iranians who advocate direct
military assistance to Iran by the United States point to these
political facts in support of their argument. Superficially, an
excellent case could be made for building up the Iranian armed
forces through a program
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of American military assistance. There is no doubt that if Iran
were to fall under Soviet control, the consequences would be
nearly as serious as those which would be produced by the fall
of Turkey. The whole of the Middle East and India would be
exposed to Soviet attack while the greatest oil reserves in the
world would either be in Soviet hands or very gravely
exposed.
Nevertheless, there are reasons for refraining from any attempt
to build up large-scale military forces in Iran. These reasons
include:
- (1)
- The poverty of the country, which would make it
economically impossible for the Government to support an
army resembling that of Turkey, even if the external
costs of equipment were borne entirely by the United
States.
- (2)
- The unstable character of the political situation in
Iran. Even though most Iranian political leaders are
favorable to the western powers and opposed to the
policies of the Soviet Union, the determination of the
Government to resist the USSR in a crisis could not be
taken for granted.
- (3)
- The relative remoteness of Iran from the United States
would make it very difficult to support the Iranian Army
in time of war. This being the case it would probably be
a waste of our resources to make a heavy investment of
them in time of peace and in an armed force which would
have to be abandoned to its fate in time of war.
- (4)
- It is understood that the greater part of our military
resources will have to be concentrated on the
strengthening of the western European countries, whose
fall would be an even more serious blow to our security
than the fall of Iran. It is more than doubtful that any
large quantity of military supplies could be spared for
Iran during the next two or three years.
- (5)
- The relatively backward state of technical knowledge
in the Iranian armed forces means that an enormous
expenditure of time and effort, including the services
of a large number of American military personnel, would
have to be expended to train the Iranian forces in the
use of modern weapons and equipment such as jet planes
and radar.
- (6)
- There is some reason to fear that a greatly
strengthened army would be used by the Shah or ambitious
military leaders as a means of imposing a dictatorship
on the country. This fear is strong in some Iranian
circles and contributes to the unfortunate political
instability.
Consequently, it is our present belief that the best measures to
assist Iran are to provide only sufficient military aid to
insure the maintenance of internal security together with
encouragement and assistance in sound projects of economic
development which will improve the condition of the people and
consequently the stability of the government. Our objective is a
limited one: to make Iran sufficiently strong to prevent its
collapse through Soviet penetration or pressures short of war.
We do not believe that Iran could be made sufficiently strong to
protect itself against open attack nor that the benefit to be
realized from any delay which the Iranian forces might impose on
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a Soviet march through
Iran would compensate for the diversion of American resources
from other needs.
Afghanistan:7 To date the United States has extended no
direct aid to Afghanistan, on either a loan or a grant
basis.* The
Afghan Government, long desirous of receiving financial
assistance from the United States, is only now preparing its
request for a loan of something like forty-one million dollars
from the Export-Import Bank for construction and development
work.
A preliminary request for limited military assistance has
recently been made. Action on this request must await the
receipt of additional specific information concerning
Afghanistan’s present military resources and future needs.
Afghanistan’s military requirements were formerly supplied by
the UK and the Government of India. Since partition, the Indian
Government, while ostensibly honoring the prepartition
arrangement, has furnished only a fraction of the normal annual
quota of military supplies to Afghanistan.
The Afghan economy is undeveloped, almost totally lacking in
industrial plant, with no railroads whatsoever and only rough
roadways connecting the major cities and towns. The country is
very mountainous and largely arid; development opportunities,
while they indeed exist, are limited to improvement of transport
and communications facilities, agricultural development
(including irrigation), mineral exploitation and relatively
small industrial plants.
Any extensive program of economic and military assistance to
Afghanistan at this time is considered inadvisable for the
following reasons:
- (1)
- Owing to limitations in man power and productive
potential in the event of war, it is only on the basis
of regional cooperation between Afghanistan, Iran,
Pakistan and India that Afghanistan would be able to
offer more than a token resistance to invasion from the
North. The prospects for cooperation among these four
countries at the present time are not promising.
- (2)
- The undeveloped condition of the country and the lack
of general education would make the equipping and
training of a truly effective army, even a small one,
for defense against external aggression expensive and
difficult beyond the utility it would have as a delaying
force, and beyond the Afghan Government’s ability to
maintain it.
- (3)
- The need for allocating our not unlimited resources to
the first line of defense, i.e., Western Europe.
- (4)
- Unlike Iran, Afghanistan is not now being subjected to
overt political pressure from the USSR. The Soviet
position seems to spring from a not unjustified
confidence that Afghanistan could be occupied by Soviet
troops within two weeks, and the preliminary “softening
up” would be an unnecessary expense and
provocation.
- (5)
- The present government has maintained its stability
for seventeen years. Although the country is faced with
problems of inflation and great poverty, the economy is
not in a critical condition and there is not yet a grave
internal threat to the stability of the
government.
For these reasons it is considered that assistance beyond a small
loan for development purposes and assistance in buying military
equipment to assure the Government’s ability to maintain
internal order is not advisable at this time. Limited financial
assistance through the Export-Import or World Bank would have
the Department’s support.
In connection with assistance to Afghanistan in buying military
equipment in the United States, the training of Afghan personnel
to operate any equipment so acquired could most advantageously
be given by the American firms supplying it. The Department
should recommend that provisions for training be made a part of
the purchase agreement.
A U.S. military mission to Afghanistan is considered inadvisable.
The presence of such a mission would proclaim Afghanistan’s
alliance with the West and its latent antagonism to the USSR to
a degree which might well provoke overt action by the latter,
and which would jeopardize present correct relations between the
two countries.
To attempt to train Afghan personnel in U.S. service training
schools is considered impracticable owing to the considerable
lag between the Afghan’s general knowledge of motorized
equipment and that of the average American trainee.
Afghan officials repeatedly stress the thought that stability and
national morale require some recognizable indication that
Afghanistan is not isolated from United States interest in the
area; they point out that with changed conditions on their
eastern and southern borders the government is less than ever
able to cope with internal disorders on two or more fronts. They
assert that they have definite proof that their integrity and
independence are threatened.
The evidence and the views of Afghan leaders indicate that arms
supply sufficient for the assurance of internal order would go
far to meet a definite hazard to security and to offset the
persistent feeling among Afghans that United States strategic
interest stops at their
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frontiers. Deterioration in economic conditions which might
enhance the opportunities for Soviet penetration may be cheeked
by relatively modest financial assistance.
