Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

760H.61/10–1149: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, October 11, 1949—7 p. m.

4085. Rumbold¹ showed us today Foreign Office paper outlining consideration given by Foreign Office Russian committee at meeting September 27 to Soviet-Tito conflict and conclusions reached. Rumbold remarked that this “think piece” indicated present Foreign Office views on question.

Following is summary of committee’s conclusions set forth in paper:

(a) Though Soviet feels time on its side, it is increasingly impatient with continuance of Tito regime.

(b) Since economic and political pressure has failed to dislodge Tito, Soviets have had to make new plans.

(c) Soviets will attempt instigate armed rebellion against Tito but stop short direct Red Army action. Although forces in satellites continue to be increased, not sufficient for invasion of Yugoslavia but not known what preparations there may be inside Russia.

(d) If instigated rebellion not sufficient unseat Tito, direct action against Yugoslavia by Red Army not to be excluded at later stage unless Soviets feel invasion of Yugoslavia would start general war for which Soviets not believed prepared.

(e) While Yugoslav economic situation worse than previously thought, if Tito can last winter only direct Soviet military action can overthrow him.

Rumbold said above-mentioned paper will be sent British Embassy Washington with instruction that Hoyer Miller show it to Thompson.²

Sent Department 4085; repeated Belgrade 82; Department pass Moscow 158.

Holmes

1. Sir Anthony Rumbold, Head of the Southern Department, British Foreign Office.
2. Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer Millar, British Minister in the United States, called on Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thompson on October 18 and presented a copy of the Foreign Office paper under reference in this telegram. According to his memorandum of the conversation, not printed, Thompson expressed his appreciation and, after reading the paper, said that it seemed in general to be in line with the Department of State’s estimate (860H.00/10–1849). The Foreign Office paper was subsequently seen by the Secretary of State.