Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

760H.61/10–749: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

secret

Moscow, October 7, 1949—1 p. m.

2537. We concur with UN sources and others that elimination of Tito has acquired front-line position in Soviet political objectives partly because Yugoslav intransigeance corrupts other faithful adherents and partly upon basis personal challenge leadership J. V. Stalin. We still feel more subtle means than armed invasion will be found to endeavor execute whatever design may have been concocted, such as murder, insurrection or revolt. It seems hard to reconcile “peaceful objectives” USSR with direct military action which would cause severe shock tremors among populations this and other peoples democracies and among Western left circles. Even cynical Kremlin would probably flinch from such spectacle displayed before eyes world.

However, military action in Yugoslavia could be initiated in response to special situations arising from outside factors or by inspired internal episodes. Red Army deliverance might be strong medicine for whatever stood in its path but of its efficacy there can be little doubt in minds of all whose memories remain fresh in Balkans. Present locations Red Army units abreast frontiers are useful for such an advance, meanwhile rehearsing and planning for eventualities.

Ominous aspect any such “deliverance” and initiated by whatever means plausible or not, lies in suddenness of its impact upon an unready world plus danger any such operational ways carries of spilling over into adjacent areas. What reaction of Western world would be to such an event is worthy of estimation.

While continue to feel that UN airing this dispute should await further material developments (Deptel 3102 to London August 29¹), we believe we should now appreciate that likelihood of such action is probably increasing and plan accordingly. In that event we hope tempered firmness would be the line taken. Nevertheless such firmness should be appreciated as carrying the idea of sanctions. Consequently, some assessment of possible sanctions is advisable prior to letting events travel too far and too fast, and with full deference to state of public opinion.

I am in accord with Cannon’s views (Belgrade’s 1030, October 3²) that next step will be expulsion diplomatic staffs rather than formal rupture relations. Such pressures will be well advertised and it seems to me some Yugoslav personalities are now definitely scared (Usun telegram 1215, October 3³). Am also aware certain British observers feel Tito not so firmly in saddle after all, and that seeds of dissension have already been sown. Continued propaganda and subversive activities will undoubtedly play further part.

Immediate effect this situation seems to be to force US help Yugoslavia economically at a faster rate than originally contemplated now that the cordon sanitaire has been stretched on northern and eastern borders, although monies granted on this calculated risk should continue to be nicely controlled as to amounts, timing and uses.

Sent Department 2537. Department pass Belgrade 139, Paris 359, London 277.

Kirk

1. Ante, p. 937.
2. Ante, p. 966.
3. Not printed. It reported that the Yugoslav Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly had let it be known to British newsmen that Yugoslav authorities were increasingly worried about the dispute with the Soviet Union. Particular reference was made to reports of Soviet aircraft movements. The Yugoslav Delegation indicated to newsmen that instructions were expected soon from the Yugoslav Government to bring the dispute with the Soviet Union before the United Nations (501.BB/10–349).