760H.61/8–1349: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk)1 to the Secretary of State

secret

2042. Latest Soviet note supplemented by strong August 13 front page Pravda editorial rejecting Yugoslav protests re CFM sell-out (mytels 2023 August 12 and 2036 August 132) and concluding Yugoslav Government no longer regarded as ally but adversary, represents new high point decided intensification of campaign against Tito since CFM. This strikes us as aimed at bringing Yugoslav matter to a head with hope Tito may be goaded into denouncing treaty with Soviet Union and breaking off diplomatic relations. We trust he will restrain himself and not fall for this bait.

Previous developments in intensification Moscow’s campaign have included: severance remaining economic relations by satellite states one by one; greatly increased anti-Tito propaganda including Soviet broadcasts aimed Yugoslavia, Soviet press and papers now published Yugoslav “emigres” throughout Soviet-satellite area; charges that Tito actively helping Greek Monarcho-Fascists while persecuting “democratic” Greeks (mytels 1797 July 20, 1816 July 22, 1930 August 4 and 1961 August 63); insinuations Tito even negotiating USJCS (mytel 1930); petulant Soviet gesture in withdrawing Zagreb fair (mytel 1909 August 24); first Soviet note re Austrian claims (mytel 1839 [Page 923] July 245); and July 25 note charging unjustified arrest and mistreatment Soviet citizens (mytel 1862 July 276).

Kremlin is evidently particularly provoked by: Tito’s closing of Greek frontier; hostile encirclement now confronting weak satellite Albania (mytel 1853 July 26); and quickly-signed Yugoslav-Italian trade agreement and possibility even bilateral solution Trieste question (mytel 1949 August 5 and 1976 August 87).

While we would not expect any formal break of Soviet-satellite bloc’s diplomatic relations with Belgrade at this time, ground appears to be fully prepared for Moscow to follow satellites recent example in terminating trade relations now based meager agreement December 1948 (mytel 3067 December 318).

Despite above developments we see no reason alter Embassy’s basic estimate (mytel 829 April 49) that efforts liquidate Belgrade rebel will for present at least continue be confined indirect methods of propaganda warfare, economic pressure, infiltration of agents and efforts develop guerrilla activities and subvert regime.

Kremlin is doubtless fully aware of both Tito’s serious economic situation and increasing military weakness due dependence hitherto on Soviet supplies and equipment which now cut off. We suggest time has come when US and Britain must seriously consider this latter aspect of keeping Tito afloat. Soviets also undoubtedly hoping Western powers will not move fast or far enough help Yugoslavia overcome grave present economic problems. While gratified over speed with which Italo-Yugoslav trade agreement signed, we must trust all possible attention is being given Belgrade’s pressing financial and economic needs both in Washington and London.

In light events, we feel our policy towards Tito-Cominform situation has been well conceived and executed. Developments in other satellite countries, together with possible long range possibilities China, lead to conclusion that every effort should continue be made to keep Titoism alive. And while we strongly favor pressing rapprochement [Page 924] Yugoslavia with Italians and Greeks, as suggested for example Deptel 450 to Belgrade August 11,10 believe increasing hardening Soviet-Tito conflict does not obviate need continued caution not to make haste too fast this aspect matter.

Sent Department 2042, repeated Belgrade 79, Athens 64, Rome 61, London 207.

Kirk
  1. Alan G. Kirk, Ambassador in the Soviet Union. Kirk was appointed Ambassador on May 15, 1949, and he presented his credentials in Moscow on July 4.
  2. Neither printed. Telegram 2023 reported that the Soviet press on August 12 printed the text of a Soviet note of August 11 to the Yugoslav Government answering an earlier Yugoslav note (861.9111RR/8–1249). Telegram 2036, reported that Pravda, the newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, carried a front page editorial on August 13 entitled “The Mask Torn Off” which reviewed the Soviet note of August 11 (760H.61/1349).

    The August 11 note was the latest in a series of exchanges between the USSR and Yugoslavia regarding the disposal of the Austrian question by the Council of Foreign Ministers at its session in Paris. On June 22 the Yugoslav Government addressed notes to the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States reasserting Yugoslavia’s claims to Slovenian Carinthia and to reparations from Austria. The Soviet Union replied on July 19 with a note that accused Yugoslavia of collusion with the United Kingdom during the Austrian negotiations. Further Yugoslav notes of August 3 and August 20 and Soviet notes of August 11 and August 29 presented in detail the arguments and accusations of the two sides. The Yugoslav and Soviet press published the texts of the notes of their respective governments. French translations of the Yugoslav note of June 22 and the Soviet note of July 19 and English extracts of the Yugoslav note of August 3 are printed in Carlyle, Documents on International Affairs 1949–1950, pp. 453–459. The Russian texts of the three Soviet notes appear in Vneshnyaya politika sovetskogo soyuza 1949 god (Moscow: 1953), pp. 115–117, 125–134, and 144–159.

  3. None printed; they all reported on anti-Yugoslav articles appearing in the Soviet press.
  4. Not printed.
  5. Not printed.
  6. Not printed; it transmitted the summary of a Soviet note of July 25 to the Yugoslav Government, published in the Soviet press on July 27, protesting the arrest of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia (760H.61/7–2749). The note was the first in a series of exchanges between the Soviet and Yugoslav Governments regarding the conduct and treatment of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia. For the Soviet note of July 25, an extract of the Yugoslav reply of July 30, an extract of a further Soviet note of August 18, and the text of the Yugoslav reply of August 23, see Carlyle, Documents on International Affairs 1949–1950, pp. 460–467.
  7. None of the telegrams under reference in this paragraph are printed. They reported on propaganda articles appearing in the Soviet press.
  8. Not printed; regarding the Yugoslav-Soviet trade agreement signed in Moscow on December 27, 1948, see footnote 2 to telegram 28, January 10, from Belgrade, p. 854.
  9. Ante, p. 880.
  10. This telegram informed Ambassador Cannon that the Department of State appreciated that Yugoslavia had to act with caution in moving toward closer relations with Greece. It was left to the Ambassador’s judgment to determine the timing of attempts and the application of pressure to encourage such an evolution (760H.68/8–1149). The telegram, included with other documentation regarding the Greek civil war, is scheduled for publication in volume vi.