Office of the Historian

660H.119/7–2949

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)1

secret
[Washington,] August 8, 1949.

Blooming Mill for Yugoslavia

Please read this memorandum so that you may take the necessary action but do not circulate it.

This afternoon Secretary Johnson, Secretary Sawyer, and I met alone to discuss the blooming mill. After a good deal of talk Secretary Johnson read us a proposed letter. The upshot of it was that he wished to state his opposition to the granting of the license but would acquiesce in it provided: (1) the matter was reviewed at the end of a year, when the mill would be ready to be delivered; (2) the mill was redesigned so that its capacity would be equal only to the present ingot producing capacity of Yugoslavia; and (3) he objected to Secretary Sawyer’s interpretation of the NSC paper2 contained in the following words of his letter:

“It is true that I am required in connection with 1–A items to consult with the Secretary of Defense, which of course I am not only willing [Page 921] but glad to do. However, my interpretation of the language referred to is that foreign policy considerations as set forth by the Secretary of State will be paramount in my determination of ‘U.S. national interest.’”

Mr. Johnson’s contention was that Secretary Sawyer was subordinating security interests to foreign policy and was announcing that he would follow the advice of the Secretary of State at all times.

We had a long talk about this, in which Secretary Sawyer and I said that that was not what Secretary Sawyer was saying but that the NSC paper itself stated the policy, which was that even important material capable of munition production was to be given Yugoslavia in the event that the present breach between Tito and the Kremlin continued. Secretary Sawyer was, therefore, getting from me instruction only as to whether a particular action continued to be regarded as proper.

Further discussion indicated the futility of attempting to redesign the mill.

The upshot of the matter finally was that Secretary Sawyer announced that he proposed to take the following series of actions, which was acquiesced in by Secretary Johnson and me;

1.
He would issue the license for the mill. In this connection he would make no statement, and no publicity in the normal course of events would occur until the mill had been exported, which would be a year or more from now. We all thought it important that everybody should refrain from talking and, therefore, knowledge about the blooming mill should be held as closely as possible. (Please talk with me about who is told, what telegrams are sent, and how they are circulated. I do not want any leaks from the State Department.)
2.
Before the mill is exported, we will review the matter, and, if the breach between Tito and the Kremlin has continued or been widened, the export will be made; if, on the other hand, the situation has worsened from our point of view, the mill will not be exported.
3.
Secretary Johnson’s staff and ours will get together and rewrite Paragraph 3 of the recommendations of NSC 18/2. After this agreement has been reached, Secretary Johnson will then propose the rewrite to Secretary Sawyer and me, and we will agree with it. (I can talk with you in more detail about how this might be rewritten.)
4.
In the event that articles are proposed for export which affect, say, biological warfare, but the manner in which they affect it cannot be disclosed, Secretary Johnson will raise the matter personally with Secretary Sawyer and me, and the matter will be worked out between us.

I think this is a highly satisfactory solution. I hope that we can carry it on without having the matter get into the press, as that will only create more difficulties between the Departments.

Dean Acheson
  1. Attached to the source text, which is headed “Personal for Mr. Webb”, is the following paper by the Secretary of State, dated August 11 and headed “Memorandum of Conversation With the President”:

    “Item No. 3. Blooming Mill.

    I informed the President of the solution reached here. He expressed himself as pleased with this solution as he thought it was the right one.”

    ↩
  2. NSC 18/2, February 17, not printed; see editorial note, p. 868.↩