Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

760H.61/6–2449: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

secret

Moscow, June 24, 1949—6 p. m.

1606. Paris CFM withdrawal Soviet support Yugoslav territorial and reparations claims on Austria¹ suggests to us further intensification Cominform campaign against Tito (mytel 829, April 4²) and also represents as far as Embassy has observed, first break in united front which Soviet Union, satellites states and Yugoslavia had thus far maintained towards western world despite Tito’s rebellion against Moscow’s authority.

Though this Soviet decision may well have been based other considerations in addition campaign against Tito, it coincides with stepped-up economic measures by Cominform states such as Hungarian denunciation trade agreement with Yugoslavia,³ increasing propaganda campaign including recent crop new anti-Tito newspapers, and rumored Cominform meeting aimed primarily Tito’s liquidations (Warsaw’s 903 to Department June 17⁴), In abandoning Yugoslav claims Soviets clearly risk further alienation Yugoslav people, leaving Tito undisputed defender national interests (mytels 2216, October 1 and 419, February 19⁵). At same time this Soviet decision may be intended serve as additional warning object lesson to remaining satellites of fate in store for waverers.

Whatever motives involved and although development ostensibly puts Tito in sharp conflict with west as well as Soviet Union, we think it must inevitably push him further towards west, improving chances eventual political concessions Yugoslavia’s foreign policy for which we hope, especially in form discontinuing collaboration in support Greek guerrillas. Belgrade’s anxiety indicated, for example, by recent inquiries re Cominform meeting and Trieste (Belgrade’s 598 to Department June 18⁶ and 602, June 21⁷).

While Cominform successes Zone A Trieste elections suggest Moscow may still prefer continue SC advocacy appointment Flueckiger as governor for reasons suggested mytel 419, we are impressed by reasoning last paragraph Belgrade’s 602 re necessity careful consideration US policy Trieste with aim facilitating any reasonable settlement between Italy and Yugoslavia and avoiding block to western policy keeping Tito afloat were Soviets suddenly agree our March 20 position.⁸

Sent Department 1606; repeated Vienna 30, Belgrade 47, Rome 38.

Kohler

1. For documentation on the attitude and actions of the Soviet Delegation to the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris, May 23–June 20, 1949, with respect to Yugoslav territorial and reparations claims against Austria, see vol. iii, pp. 856 ff.
2. Ante, p. 880.
3. Hungary denounced its long-term economic agreement with Yugoslavia on June 18. An exchange of notes between Hungary and Yugoslavia on this matter is included in Yugoslavia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book, pp. 315–320.
4. Not printed; in it the Embassy in Warsaw reported its inability to confirm rumors of an alleged Cominform session in Warsaw devoted primarily to concerting economic actions against Yugoslavia. Embassy Warsaw concluded that it was unlikely that such a session had or was taking place in Warsaw (800.00B Communist International/6–1749).
5. Neither printed.
6. Not printed; it reported that a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official had inquired of the Embassy in Belgrade regarding the alleged Cominform meeting in Warsaw and had remarked upon the intensification of Cominform economic and propaganda pressure against Yugoslavia (800.00B Communist International/6–1849).
7. Vol. iv, p. 508.
8. Telegram 1631, June 27, from Moscow, not printed, reported that Yves Chatigneau, the French Ambassador in the Soviet Union, agreed with the analysis set forth in this telegram (760H.61/6–2749).