860H.5151/6–2449: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Reams)1 to the Secretary of State

secret

618. London 2273, June 13, repeated Belgrade 50 and Deptel 313, June 182 British decision offer Yugoslavia credits connection trade and payments agreement foreshadowed early May (Embtel 499, May 123) prior Peake’s departure London. Deptel 266, May 2654 informed Embassy Department perceived no objections possible UK credits Yugoslavia reported Embtel 499 and authorized Embassy so inform British if again approached. Size of credit mentioned London’s 2273 about that expected from British delegation’s recommendation reported Embtel 499. Although five-year plan of 7 million credit for purchase capital equipment only, grant such credit should ease pressure on limited Yugoslav resources and encourage more imports consumer goods than otherwise possible. Talks with British here have indicated no desire to insure achievement all phases five-year plan including industrialization on schedule but as in our case simply to keep Tito afloat. Since May Czechs and Hungarians have shut off trade Yugoslavia hence Tito’s difficulties keeping afloat have increased. Embassy believes regime probably will need considerably more credits from west than British offering to keep going. Substantial dollar credits including possible IBRD loans probably needed this purpose.

Embassy has no objection to British use of occasion offer of credits to reiterate concern over question Yugoslav policy toward Greece however it would be useful to Embassy to have some definition of assurance re Greece desired by Department. While we can hardly require Yugoslav’s refuse receive refugees we can ask that they not be permitted rejoin guerrillas. Peake feels Tito’s statement this point to Fitzroy McClean satisfactory.5

Embassy is not aware of any proof prior cooperative aid guerrillas. Drew’s statement Combal 4286 that in one area geography proves aid [Page 904] hardly acceptable since same logic could be used prove that Germans aided partisans and Maquis.

On assumption that aid now being extended it seems that simple assurances, no matter how specific, could have little value unless backed by acceptance UN inspection. Consider such acceptance still politically impossible for Yugoslavia.

On assumption aid not now being extended too much present insistence upon specific assurances would seem undesirable since it would cast doubt upon our intentions in this area particularly in view of Yugoslav suspicions.

On balance most qualified observers here do not believe that Yugoslavs are assisting guerrillas. Latter are strongly pro-Cominform and their radio has joined in attacks on Tito. For Yugoslavia situation is already grave enough without diverting supplies they need themselves to people whose success could only mean completion of Moscow curtain around them.

Reams
  1. Robert B. Reams, Counselor of the Embassy in Yugoslavia.
  2. Telegram 2273, June 13, from London, not printed, but see paragraph 1 of telegram 2715, June 18, to Paris, repeated to Belgrade as 313, p. 900.
  3. Ante, p. 889.
  4. Ante, p. 892.
  5. Brig. Fitzroy MacLean, member of the House of Commons and chief of the British Military Mission in Yugoslavia, 1943–1945, conferred with Marshal Tito in early June 1949. The principal points made during that conversation were reported upon in the British Embassy note of June 30 to the Department of State included in the documentation on the Greek civil war which is scheduled for publication in volume vi.
  6. In his telegram 1021, Combal 428, May 25, from Athens, not printed, Gerald Drew, the United States Representative to the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, reported on an inspection trip made by members of the Special Committee through Greece’s northern provinces. Drew was convinced that Yugoslav assistance to the Greek rebels had not been stopped. Documentation on Drew’s inspection trip is scheduled for publication in volume vi.