741.61/7–2149: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

top secret

1804. In strictest confidence and with obvious concern lest we leak to press in Washington or here, British Ambassador1 has given me following resume his conversation with Stalin. Kelly had previously told me of decidedly cool response of Vishinsky to his tentative suggestion such visit of courtesy made when first visiting Foreign Minister and before presenting letter of credence. Late Sunday Kelly told me that to his surprise he had been informed late Saturday that appointment to see Stalin had been made for 10 p. m. Monday July 18. Meanwhile [Page 633] Bevin2 had sent instructions to guide Kelly in case Stalin received him.

After usual polite opening British Ambassador covered following points:

(1)
Both UK and Russia suffered serious material damage during war, had similar problems reconstruction, and were now in position to help each other in restoring and replacing devastation by exchange basic materials and goods. Stalin assented. However no elaboration concerning east west trade occurred.
(2)
Having fought side by side in two wars against Germany and made common cause against despotism British Government felt two nations could live together in concord even if political philosophies-were different, reminding Stalin he himself had said two systems Communism and capitalism could exist side by side. To this Stalin assented, but when Kelly went on to say therefore unreasonable to suppose UK held any aggressive intentions directed at Soviet Union, Stalin at once interjected, “How about Atlantic Pact?”
(3)
Pact entirely for mutual support and aid, character purely defensive said Kelly and not directed against anyone or any nation especially Soviet Union. Stalin asked then why are American forces in England?
(4)
Kelly speaks of community of interests between US and UK and their pacific intentions, continuing NAT really no different than Soviet treaties with neighbors. Stalin quickly says, “No, our treaties are directed solely against Germany”.
(5)
Kelly then shifts to express hope he may more often be allowed explain British Government’s position on matters of mutual interest saying Bevin felt more thorough diplomatic preparation should precede meetings CFM and other conferences, and that British delegations never knew in advance what Soviets had in mind thus losing valuable time Foreign Ministers and issues sometimes got confused. Kelly said in other posts he always was accustomed to have such exploratory talks with Foreign Minister. Stalin replied, “You will be given every facility”, but Vishinsky looked sour.
(6)
Kelly continued so far his time here rather more consumed as was that of predecessor in minor administrative matters affecting his Embassy personnel, including girl troubles. Stalin laughed heartily at last remark and after some further banter reception was over.

Meeting lasted about 35 minutes, participants Kelly and Harrison,3 then Stalin, Pavlov4 (who interpreted) Vishinsky and aide. Generalissimo appeared to be in good health but showed his age, was vigorous mentally and was keen and alert.

In event your information from British sources regarding this conversation [Page 634] shows discrepancies or elaborations,5 please inform me thereof, but my impression of British Ambassador is one of complete and confident collaboration.

It had been my intention to ask for interview some time this summer prior Stalin departure for south which apparently usually occurs later August. This will be discussed in following telegram.6

Repeated London 182.

Kirk
  1. Sir David Kelly had arrived in Moscow on June 24 and had presented his letter of credence to Shvernik on June 30. His description of this interview with Stalin is in his book The Ruling Few, or the Human Background to Diplomacy (London, Hollis & Carter, 1952), pp. 429–431.
  2. Ernest Bevin was British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
  3. Geoffrey Wedgwood Harrison was in the British Embassy in the Soviet Union, with local rank of Minister; at times he was Chargé d’Affaires.
  4. Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov was an interpreter and translator in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, frequently the personal interpreter for Stalin and Molotov, who became Chief of the Second European Division (for United Kingdom Affairs) in 1949.
  5. Lewis W. Douglas, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, verified in telegram 2885 from London on July 22, not printed, that the Foreign Office had shown him, the full text of this interview on the day before and that the summary account by Ambassador Kelly was accurate. Ambassador Douglas continued: “Foreign Office had cautioned Kelly against furnishing Stalin any opening which he might seek to exploit in furtherance ‘peace’ offensive and to avoid being drawn: out on controversial issues. This presumably accounts for manner in which he handled Stalin’s observations regarding NAT and presence US Forces in UK and fact that balance of conversation consisted largely of generalities interspersed with ‘bromides’ on part Stalin. Foreign Office feels Stalin agreed to receive Kelly principally out of curiosity to see ‘what kind of animal’ HMG had sent to represent it in Moscow.” (741.61/7–2249)
  6. Telegram 1813 from Moscow on July 21; infra.