Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

[Enclosure—Extract]

Report on “Soviet Intentions” Prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee, American Embassy, U.S.S.R., April 5, 1949

April 5, 1949

General Estimate and Conclusions

After study and analysis of information presently available, the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Embassy comes to the following conclusion with regard to the intentions of the Soviet Union:

The Soviet Union will not resort to direct military action against the West in the near future and expects and counts on a period of several years of peace.

On April 1, 1948, the Committee concluded that “the Soviet Union will not deliberately resort to military action in the immediate future but will continue to attempt to secure its objectives by other means.” The Committee further concluded that if the United States and Western Europe, particularly during 1948, grew sufficiently in strength to convince the Soviet Union that the outcome of war would be doubtful, Soviet policy would be directed toward the postponement of war for an indefinite period.

Events during the past year support the above conclusions. The United States has strengthened itself. Communism has failed to make the advances in Western Europe, particularly in France and Italy, which were considered quite possible a year ago. Western Europe has made substantial economic recovery and the Atlantic Pact has drawn the United States and Western Europe into political and military cooperation of an unprecedented closeness. Therefore, in spite of Communist successes in China and generally favorable developments in the Near East and Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union now faces the situation envisaged in the Embassy’s 1948 estimate.

The conclusion that the Kremlin will not initiate war in the next several years does not mean any alteration in the springs of action of the Soviet state nor change in Communist belief in the inevitability of war between the Soviet Union and the capitalist West. In fact this belief must be considered the basis of Soviet plans and policies. The mechanism of the state is being canalized toward preparation for war expected to eventuate some years hence.

This situation demands alert, long range planning on the part of the Western democracies of a nature even more complex than if war were immediately imminent.

Specifically:

1) The present “war scare” must be replaced by an educated public opinion, aware of the nature and realities of Soviet policy and prepared to maintain over an indefinite period the calm and increasing strength, moral, physical and political, which will deter Soviet direct military action.

2) The United States must look carefully to the order of its own economy and the conservation of its natural resources so that optimum distribution of the American national product may be achieved among domestic economy, European reconstruction, aid to underdeveloped areas, and military preparations.

3) Western unity must be maintained and European reconstruction carried through to completion.

4) At the same time the United States must persist in and further develop an economic policy which will limit the ability of the Soviet Union and satellites to increase their economic and military potential. This should not only cover progressive development of export controls, but its counterpart, i.e. reducing Soviet ability to obtain foreign exchange through the sale of luxury items, such as furs and fisheries products, by sales to the United States.

5) The United States must be prepared for tempting “peace” offers by the Soviet Union, must continue to keep the issues clearly denned before the public and to state what preliminary actions the Soviet Union must take before serious negotiations on outstanding issues can be undertaken.

6) On the basis of the present analysis of Soviet intentions the United States must take advantage of the present situation, not only to “contain” the Soviet sphere but to reduce it, seizing and maintaining the initiative in all fields. Such positive policy may take various forms, should include the continued pursuit of policies already initiated, such as the encouragement and support of “Titoism” in general and of Tito’s Yugoslavia vs. the Cominform in particular, defense of human rights in the satellite states, and assurances of United States vital concern not only in the Atlantic Pact countries, but in Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Far East.

7) The spiritual initiative won by the President’s inaugural must be developed by word and deed, to prove to the world that the philosophy of freedom, not communism, holds the finest promise for the future of mankind.

The factors which have led to this conclusion are analyzed in separate sections.

To summarize:

Political

The European political situation is less favorable to Soviet policy now than a year ago. Paced with the Atlantic Pact, Western Union, the Berlin airlift, and the Tito defection, the Kremlin must realize that it has lost ground in Europe. If early war had been intended, it should have been initiated before these developments occurred. In the Ear East, Communism has made dramatic gains. The Soviet Union may view with satisfaction the progress of events in China, in the Near East and in Southeast Asia, No war is needed to carry on this progress which the Kremlin expects to continue.

On balance the political factors do not favor a Soviet-initiated war at the present time. Soviet policy will rather be directed toward the hardening of Communist apparatuses everywhere, toward continuing and intensifying the “peace offensive/war scare”—directed outward to hamper recovery and further the Soviet “peace” myth abroad, and inward to urge the Soviet population to greater productive efforts. The possibility of direct military action against Tito, Iran or Finland cannot of course be entirely excluded, though even in these cases indirect pressures are more likely.

Military

1. While the Soviet Army is probably capable of overrunning continental Europe with the exception of Spain and Portugal and of occupying strategic areas of the Near East, the Kremlin is presumably aware of the difficult transport, logistical and other problems which would result from such an attempt and doubtless realizes it would be military folly.

2. Western political and military strength, including advancement made during the past year, is deterring the Soviets from any major military action as such action would develop into a world conflict for which the Soviets are inadequately prepared.

3. It is believed that the Soviets will not deliberately resort to war until they have in production advanced weapons of mass destruction and until they have enough long range aircraft and naval power plus adequate logistical capabilities for supporting a global war. They will utilize the intervening time for intensification of scientific development and the production of effective weapons. Threats of military action however will be continued as a political weapon in the present cold war. In the meantime the United States should not lose sight of the fact that the Soviets consider that war with the United States is inevitable.

Economic

The present economic situation of the Soviet Union is unfavorable to immediate war. Among the most vital deficiencies are oil and transportation facilities. Several years are needed for economic development within the Soviet Union and satellites and for consolidation of the economies of the Eastern European communist countries with that of the Soviet Union. Economic policies and programs of the USSR pursued during the past year seem directed to a long term development rather than preparation for an emergency. Soviet planners seem to be accepting changes, reorganizations and readjustments, which cannot help causing immediate complications but which are justified by expected long term results.

Agricultural

While current agricultural production potential could sustain an immediate war for a period of two years, draft power limitations and inadequate stockpiles would favor postponement until these defects can be remedied.

Recent agricultural policy of the Soviet Union seems to be directed toward long range results rather than toward an immediate emergency, toward a peace rather than a war economy. The government has undertaken plans and programs which will sacrifice immediate results for long term benefits.

Consequently the present agricultural situation and agricultural policy favor the postponement of hostilities for several years.

Morale and Propaganda

Although it is doubtful that the status of morale or the efficacy of propaganda at any given moment would decide the question of war or peace for the Soviet Union, consideration of these problems lead to the conclusion that war for the Kremlin would be preferable some years hence rather than now.

Fundamental Considerations

Nothing has occurred during the past year to alter in any respect the fundamental conclusion that the Soviet Government is committed to eventual conflict between the Communist and capitalist powers. Guided by the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, the supreme goal remains world communism and Soviet power the major instrument by which it will be achieved.

While the Kremlin under Stalin is tactically cautious in approaching any immediate situation and evaluates carefully the risks involved, it must be recognized that the whole Soviet Government apparatus is inexorably driven in its long-range strategical course by the conceptions of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma. Stalin’s formulation of the basic international concept, in his interview given to the First American Labor Delegation, September 9, 1927 (Pravda, September 15, 1927), is apt and authoritative:

“… in the further progress of development of the international revolution, two world centres will be formed: the Socialist centre, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards Socialism, and the capitalist centre, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards capitalism. The fight between these two centres for the conquest of world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and Communism throughout the whole world …”

Since the foregoing was written there have been countless minor and three major tactical deviations from this concept of the course of Soviet-Communist history. These latter were 1) the period of the theory of capitalist encirclement, during which the USSR lived in relative isolation, seeking no trouble from its neighbors and building “Socialism in one country” (i.e. developing its industrial strength); 2) the period of the “Popular Front” (1935–1939), and 3) the period of the idea of the Great Patriotic War, during which the USSR was actually allied with two major capitalistic powers against Germany and Japan. These ideas are now being explained away and history rewritten in the Soviet history books. The shift of the Communist apparatus back from the switches to the main track, which began in 1945, is continuing at full pace.

At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union stood at a crossroads. The USSR had gained not only awed respect as a major power but also legitimacy and acceptability and a great reservoir of good will among practically all the peoples of the world. She might well have lived in peaceful possession of her wartime conquests and gains, to a great extent the gift of her grateful and trusting Allies. Had she chosen to play the international game cooperatively, these would today-be essentially little less than what she now possesses and they could have been securely held in a calm and peaceful world.

Instead the Soviet Government chose the opposite course—that of doubly ensuring and heavily exploiting its gains, of rejecting and antagonising its war-time Allies, of preparing the Soviet peoples for further conflict and of redoubling efforts to increase the scientific and industrial war potential of the USSR. Wartime cooperation with the capitalist West now receives no mention, efforts of Soviet propaganda writers on this period being devoted entirely to painting a war-history picture in which the Western Allies, in particular the United States, were utilizing every opportunity to prepare positions for a Third World War against the Soviet Union and the countries of the people’s democracies. While the continued existence of capitalist states is cited as a danger requiring the maintenance of the Soviet State apparatus, the old concept of capitalist encirclement, no longer worthy of the Soviet giant, has been gradually allowed to lapse. It has been replaced by the Communist concept of the development of “two world centers” as described by Stalin and the theme of “time is on our side” is frequently mentioned. In other words the picture of a world divided into “two camps”, which Stalin in 1927 drew for the future, he today considers to have arrived.

The deliberate choice which the Soviet leaders made after the end of World War II has in fact resulted in the creation of the two hostile centers predicated by Lenin and Stalin. It can only mean that the Kremlin has chosen to launch “the struggle between these two centers” which is “to decide the fate of capitalism and Communism throughout the whole world”.

However, the fact that the struggle has been joined by the deliberate choice of the Kremlin does not necessarily mean that the achievement of World Communism is to be expected in the near future or to be sought primarily through use of Soviet armed might. Communist dogma provides no rigid time-schedule for the millenium to be reached; on the contrary it is the “inevitable” outcome of historical forces which are currently at work and which, according to Marxist science, will result in a communist world. “In the 20th century all roads lead to Communism,” as Mr. Molotov has expressed it. Nevertheless careful preparations must be made and the “correct line” followed to bring to pass the “inevitable” triumph of communism.

Although Leninist-Stalinist doctrine holds, to the theory that the Soviet Union as the one Socialist state in the world can never be secure as long as there exist powerful capitalist nations, the Kremlin probably believes (despite its contrary propaganda) that at this moment and for a few years the USSR will not be attacked by the Western powers. If this be true, it would account for certain actions and policies—discussed below⁵—of the Soviet Government over the past year which indicate a deliberate choice to weaken itself to a certain extent during the next few years in order to gain greater strength for the future inevitable conflict in which it continues to believe.

5. The remaining 45 pages of the report are not printed. Here the fundamental considerations are treated in separate sections under these main headings: Political; Military; Economic; Agriculture; and Morale and Propaganda.