Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/AC.31/187

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

secret

[New York,] November 4, 1949.

Subject: Atomic Energy Resolutions

Participants:	Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai—Secretary-General, Indian Ministry of External Affairs
	Mr. Joseph S. Sparks,1 United States Delegation

I told Sir Girja that I would like to discuss with him in all frankness and on a personal basis the situation with which we found ourselves confronted in dealing with the question of atomic energy. I said that for his confidential information the French and Canadians had evolved a resolution on this subject² with which we were well satisfied, and the success of which in the General Assembly we very much desired.

In this connection, I said that it seemed to us that one of the important questions was the tactical one of timing in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, and that it had seemed important to us that the French-Canadian Resolution should be presented to the Ad Hoc Committee immediately upon the Committee’s being seized of the problem, and that it would be of great value if the French and Canadian co-sponsors of the resolution could be the first speakers. I explained, however, that when the French had sought to register their application to be the first speaker they discovered that Sir B. N. Rau had asked a number of days previously to be the first speaker on this subject.

I referred Sir Girja to the statements which he had made to the Secretary of State in Washington to the effect that he would attempt to exercise a restraining influence upon Sir B. N.’s enthusiasm for his solution to the atomic energy problem.³ I said that, speaking very frankly, we had discussed this situation in our delegation and had come to the conclusion that we would not ask Sir B. N. to yield his priority in the Committee, but that we had also concluded that if he were voluntarily to offer to address the Committee “early in the debate” instead of at the very first, it would be a gesture which we would appreciate.

Sir Girja said that he well recalled his statement to the Secretary but that there had subsequently been a development which had weakened his hand as a restraining influence. He said that when he had asked Sir B. N. yesterday afternoon what the reaction of other delegations was to his resolution,⁴ Sir B. N. had said that he had not approached the United States for fear that such an approach would alienate Russia from the resolution and that he had not approached Russia for fear that such a step would alienate the United States. I interrupted at this point merely to observe that I was certain that Sir Girja did not believe that Sir B.N.’s talking to the Russians would “alienate” the United States. He replied that he was sure that it would not.

Sir Girja said that in his conversation with Sir B. N. yesterday afternoon he had told Sir B. N. that even if he thought it better not to approach the United States or the U.S.S.R., he should at least sound out certain countries, such as Canada, so as to discover their reactions. Sir B. N. agreed to this and called upon Sir Girja again this morning after having talked with the Canadians. It was Sir B. N.’s report to Sir Girja that the Canadians had told him that they found his resolution “very interesting.” In view of this reaction, which both Sir B. N. and Sir Girja interpreted as favorable, Sir Girja said that he did not see how he could act in as restraining a manner as he had contemplated at the time of his conversation with the Secretary.

In view of our concern over the timing, Sir Girja proposed that he would approach Prime Minister Nehru and Sir B. N., telling them of our discussion and suggesting that as a matter of courtesy, and in order to be in a position better to judge the trend of developments in the Committee and the potentialities for its own resolution, India should offer to give up its first place on the list of speakers in the Ad Hoc Committee. I said that we should be most grateful if Sir Girja did see his way clear to making such an approach, and only wished to stress once again that the United States did not contemplate “requesting or asking” Sir B. N. to give up his position on the speakers list. Sir Girja said that he appreciated this fact and wondered if my observation also applied to the presentation of the Indian resolution. I said that of course it did and that we would certainly not wish to interfere in any manner with India’s decision to take whatever step it felt to be genuinely constructive in the situation.

Sir Girja then asked me what the United States actually thought of Sir B. N.’s proposal. I said that in view of the personal and confidential basis upon which we were speaking, I should be happy to endeavor to answer Sir Girja’s question. I said that the United States had the highest esteem and appreciation of the constructive, idealistic, and fundamental objectives and motivations which had caused Sir B. N. to evolve the proposal which he had and which stimulated him to their formal presentation, but that despite these very genuine appreciations we were afraid that the proposal, no matter how pure in motive, was basically unrealistic. I added that in our considered judgment, if the International Law Commission were confronted with the problem in the manner which we understood Sir B. N.’s proposal to contemplate, it would of necessity either produce a definitive codification which would be unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., or a compilation of glittering generalities which, because of the danger of deluding the peoples of the world with a false sense of security based upon empty phrases, the United States would not be able to accept.

Sir Girja said that it might strengthen his hand if it were possible for him to know something of the contents of the French-Canadian Resolution and to know more definitely the exact time when we thought this problem would be arising before the Committee. I said that I would be happy to explore both of these questions and would attempt to contact him at his hotel prior to his meeting with Prime Minister Nehru at 4:30.

Upon returning to the Mission, I discussed the foregoing with General Osborn, who informed me that the atomic energy question is expected to come before the Ad Hoc Political Committee on Monday afternoon,⁵ and who gave me a draft copy of the French-Canadian Resolution which I propose to pass in confidence to Sir Girja at 4:15 at his hotel. It was Sir Girja’s opinion that whereas he could not assure us of his ability to convince the Prime Minister and Sir B. N., the chances that he would be able to do so were quite good.

1. Adviser, United States Delegation; Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs, Department of State.
2. For the text of Canadian-French resolution A/AC.31/L.27 introduced at the 30th Meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, November 7, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex to the Summary Records of Meetings, vol. i, p. 68 (hereafter cited as GA(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex, vol. i); for the resolution as subsequently approved by the Ad Hoc Political Committee and the General Assembly, see Resolution 299 (IV), November 24, p. 225.

3. The memorandum of Secretary Acheson’s conversation with Sir Girja on October 27 stated the following on this subject: “Sir Girja went on to say that he had been somewhat taken aback when Sir B. N. cabled the Ministry that he planned to propose that the atomic energy control problem be referred to the International Law Committee. Sir Girja had regarded this idea as quite impracticable and had instructed Sir B. N. to abandon it unless the US, UK and Canada favored the proposal. Unfortunately, before receiving these instructions Sir B. N. had made his position public in New York. Sir Girja implied that the Indian Delegation would not press this idea.” (Secretary’s Memoranda: Lot 53D444)

   Sir Girja accompanied Prime Minister Nehru on his visit to Washington, (October 11–14) and New York (October 15); documentation on Indian discussions with United States officials during this period is scheduled for publication in volume vi.

4. For the resolution (A/AC.31/L.26) presented by India at the 30th Meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, November 7, see GA(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex, vol. i, p. 68. The Indian proposal provided for calling upon the International Law Commission to draft and submit to the General Assembly before July 31, 1950, a declaration on the duties of states and individuals with respect to the development of atomic energy.
5. November 7.