Department of State Disarmament Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. Donald M. Leith and Charles H. Russell
US/AEC/26
Subject: Work of the Atomic Energy Commission
| Participants: | General McNaughton and Mr. Starnes, Canadian Delegation |
| Dr. Wei,1 Chinese Delegation | |
| M. de Rose, French Delegation | |
| Sir Terence Shone, Mr. Lawford2 and Mr. Cole, United Kingdom Delegation | |
| Mr. Osborn and Mr. Russell, United States Mission | |
| Dr. Donald Leith, Division of International Security Affairs, Department of State |
At a meeting held today at the United States Mission, M. de Rose said that the Six Power consultations might or might not accomplish useful results. He did not regard it as improbable that they might not. He thought that if we could not expect useful results, we must at least achieve tactical results. He advocated submitting to the Six Power consultations a set of simple principles which would cover all the essentials required for a control plan, but which would simplify the discussion. The Commission in the past had worked upwards from technical details to principles; he suggested working from principles downwards in the hope of reaching agreement within the framework of the principles. If, for example, the Soviets agreed to adequate forms of inspection, then when the project for aerial surveys was raised the Soviet would be either bound to agree to such surveys or in rejecting them suffer a tactical defeat. Summarizing his viewpoint on the consultations, M. de Rose gave the following examples of what he called principles: (a) a control system must apply to all phases of production and new research, (b) even the peaceful applications of atomic energy cannot be freely developed by nations, but must be under the control of the agency.
He suggested asking the Soviet representatives whether they would cooperate in this approach; he thought that we would achieve substantial advantage if they would. If the Soviets refused to accept these principles we would so report and improve our tactical position.
[Page 18]M. de Rose stated his belief that this new approach would in no way weaken the plan, or the agreement of the majority on the plan. He added that if this suggestion did not coincide with the views of the majority, the French Government might in any event make proposals along these lines in the Six Power consultations.
M. de Rose stated that he had expressed these views in a private capacity but under his own name in an article in the January issue of the “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists”.3
On the question of the work of the Commission, M. de Rose felt that the Commission was more or less committed to the Third Report. The Third Report had stated that considerations of such matters as the topics listed as A.3(a) through A.3(e) in the Second Report should not be taken up until agreement had been reached on the previous topics on the list which dealt with the functions of the agency. However vague the mandate of the General Assembly was, the work of the Commission must go on. The General Assembly had taken note of the impasse which existed in the Commission, but had told the Commission to continue its work.
In view of this M. de Rose suggested that the Commission take up political matters: first quotas and then stages. Quotas was the only subject to which the U.S.S.R. had referred sympathetically. He asked why the Commission should not take up these two subjects, although he realized that to discuss stages raised a delicate question for the United States and led to the question of when the United States would give up its secrets and when the U.S.S.R. would permit inspection. We must be able to show the fourth General Assembly that the Soviet proposals for two simultaneous treaties or conventions, and by the same token their proposals on stages, were not in line with reality or did not make sense.
M. de Rose emphasized that the problem of stages was primarily one of security which would involve sacrifices, be a matter of give and take. It was clear that the Soviet proposals were over-simplified. He felt that the Commission should study this question and that the United States should see how far it could go. The study might reveal that the United States could not go very far. He stated, in conclusion, that it was important to take up quotas and stages if for no other reason than to be able to demonstrate clearly to the fourth General Assembly the real impossibility of going further in the negotiations at the Commission level. He felt that we had not demonstrated this clearly enough so far and that if we did not do so during the coming year, we faced the danger of having a new mandate from the Assembly to go back and again explore the problem, and this might be repeated year after year.
[Page 19]In connection with M. de Rose’s final remarks, Mr. Osborn said that if a discussion of stages were necessary or desirable it would still be possible to discuss the matter in general terms without involving ourselves in security questions. He pointed out, for example, that the Soviet statement on stages, namely that there could be prohibition before control, and their later statement that there might be two simultaneous conventions, made no sense in terms of the realities of the situation. The only reasonable interpretation on stages would be that “no prohibition would be effective until a corresponding control had come into force”. In other words, every step of control was a step toward prohibition.
When M. de Rose raised the question of whether a schedule of stages could be set up, Mr. Osborn replied that he considered this highly unlikely. He stated that he doubted very much if such information would be obtainable under present political conditions.
M. de Rose again raised the question of what the other delegations thought the Commission should do. He repeated, what he had said before, that he thought no useful purpose would be served in dealing with such matters as organization, staffing and financing, whereas quotas and stages would be “practical and useful”. The other subjects would not.
Sir Terence Shone stated that the United Kingdom Government considered that organization would be the best thing to discuss, even if nothing came of it.
Mr. Leith expressed the view that the tactics suggested by M. de Rose in one sense appeared to run counter to the Resolution of November 4 regarding the consultations and the meetings of the Commission. He added that whereas M. de Rose appeared to believe that the highly political questions of quotas and stages should be discussed in the Commission and only the simplified versions of principles discussed in the consultations (such discussions of the principles being bound to lead back once more to technical matters), the Resolution might more directly be interpreted as implying that the consultations should deal with the political aspects of the impasse, whereas the meetings of the Commission should deal with the program of work. The latter interpretation also gained strength from the fact that if any real agreement with the Soviets on the political level were at all possible, the best forum for bringing about such agreement would be in the closed meetings of the consultations rather than in the open meetings of the Commission.
Dr. Wei said that the General Assembly in approving the reports had altered the situation existing last summer and had left the Commission free to take up what seemed best. He thought that it was desirable to explore the subject of quotas but that stages was dangerous and presented particular difficulties for the United States. He [Page 20] suggested that it might be desirable to begin by preparing for the Six Power consultations; he felt that legally the Commission was in a position to do anything it wished.
General McNaughton agreed that quotas was the best subject to begin with and that the first step should be to ask the U.S.S.R. to give their views. The General Assembly clearly wanted the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission kept together and in being. General McNaughton had felt in Paris that the Commission was in duty bound to do the best it could. The work would be partly technical but would provide the background for the Six Power consultations later.
Mr. Osborn agreed with General McNaughton as to the obligation to continue the work of the Commission. He spoke of the Soviet attitude on all world questions and the fact that it was dividing the world, He felt that the time would come when the Soviet Union would have to reassess its whole situation and that we should keep in a good negotiating position for that time without at the same time placing the Soviets in such an unfavorable position that [we] would be unable to negotiate when the more favorable time arrived. He added that he personally thought well of the suggestion to ask the Soviet representatives what they meant and thought about quotas; he was not in favor of taking up stages.
M. de Rose again referred to his original statement and suggested taking up principles. If this was unsuccessful it was then immaterial what the Commission took up, but if the principles were accepted, the Commission could then try to “work down” in search of agreement.
After further discussion, Mr. Osborn proposed the following procedure:
- (a)
- to call a meeting of the UNAEC to discuss the question of the work which the Commission could do which would be both “practical and useful” before calling the Six Power consultations, and
- (b)
- to discuss in the UNAEC the misinterpretations of the plan expressed by the U.S.S.R. in the debates in the General Assembly.
He made the point that the Commission could thus attempt to clarify the situation and that such clarification might be expected to take as much as six weeks of the Commission’s time. Such a program would have the advantage, first of postponing the period when quotas would have to be discussed, and second of freeing the sponsoring powers of any charges that they were adopting delaying tactics.
General McNaughton agreed with Mr. Osborn that the Commission should meet soon. He felt that the first thing that the Commission should do would be to review the situation in the Commission as of the time of its last meeting and to clarify points of apparent misunderstanding in regard to the plan which not only the Soviets, but [Page 21] other delegations in the General Assembly, had evidenced. He thought that the simplified general principles proposed by M. de Rose might be most useful, and he suggested that M. de Rose prepare a paper on these general principles.
General McNaughton’s program might be summed up in the following terms:
- (a)
- the Commission must meet soon;
- (b)
- it must clarify such parts of the plan as are still generally misunderstood; and
- (c)
- it must set forth in simple terms the principles basic to the plan.
General McNaughton added that the question of the consultations should not be raised in the discussions in the Commission, that steps were being taken by the Secretary-General which would lead to a program for the consultations. Mr. Osborn agreed, and withdrew his earlier reference to the work of the Commission in relation to the Six Power consultations.
With reference to the consultations, the suggestion was made that the representatives of the various governments in the UNAEC have preliminary talks and advise their governments as to the general views expressed and, if possible, of any consensus of opinion arrived at. Some of those present felt that this was not a matter which the representatives at the UNAEC level could properly discuss in any detail, but rather that it was a matter on which high level decisions must be reached by the respective governments. The French delegate however reemphasized his view that whether or not the individual governments should attempt to arrive at a decision on this matter at a high political level, it would be useful to have an exchange of views between the representatives on the Commission. He again expressed doubt as to whether meetings of the Commission should precede the Six Power consultations.
On the question of calling an early meeting of the Commission, General McNaughton and Mr. Osborn were in favor. Sir Terence Shone stated that the United Kingdom Delegation were not ready, and M. de Rose stated that the French Delegation were opposed until the views of their own and other governments were clarified. General McNaughton stated that the Commission could not face world public opinion without calling a meeting soon and doing something. He felt it important that the Commission should proceed. M. de Rose agreed that the clarifying process previously suggested by General McNaughton could proceed in the Commission while the governments were determining their positions. There was no dissent from this view.
Charles H. Russell