Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

501. BB/9–2649

United States Delegation Position Paper¹

confidential

[New York,] September 24, 1949.

US/A/AC.31/8

United States Policy in the United Nations on the Regulation of Conventional Armaments

the problem

To determine the position to be adopted by the United States in the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations with respect to the regulation of conventional armaments.

facts bearing on the problem

See Appendix A²

discussion

See Appendix B²

conclusions

1. The ultimate objective of the United States continues to be the development of an effective system for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments through the medium of the United Nations.

2. The basic principles which should govern the formulation of practical proposals for the attainment of this objective are set forth in the findings on Item II of the Commission for Conventional Armament’s Plan of Work approved by the Commission for Conventional Armaments resolution of August 12, 1948 (Section 3, Tab i, Page 3). No compromise of these principles can be contemplated without seriously jeopardizing the effectiveness of a regulatory system and consequently the security interests of the participating states.

3. The proposals approved by the Commission for Conventional Armaments for the receipt, checking, and publication of information with regard to their effectives and conventional armaments to be supplied by United Nations Member states are fully responsive to the desire of the General Assembly as expressed in its resolution of November 19, 1948.

4. The intransigent Soviet opposition both to the Commission for Conventional Armaments approved principles governing the regulation and reduction of armaments and to the Commission for Conventional Armaments proposals, for census and verification indicates that there is no likelihood that the Soviet Union or its satellites will accept any plan for the regulation and reduction of armaments which rests on these principles so long as the USSR maintains its present motivation and methods.

5. The United Nations Charter and the public interest impose an obligation on all member states to seek agreement on an effective system for the regulation and reduction of armaments. However, so long as proven Soviet obstructionism successfully thwarts any constructive accomplishment by the Commission for Conventional Armaments, real progress toward the ultimate goal requires a fundamental alteration in Soviet policy. Despite the unlikelihood of substantial progress in the near future towards the objective of regulation and reduction of armaments, the United States should not assume responsibility for termination or suspension of consideration by the CCA of the problem in the light of the attitude of the United States Congress and popular feeling in the United States and among the people of the world.

6. In view of the foregoing the United States should take the following position:

(a) In the Security Council:

(1) To support the Proposals for Census and Verification of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments approved by the Commission for Conventional Armaments as being fully responsive to the General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1948 and to propose Security Council endorsement of the proposals of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

(2) To urge the approval of the Second Progress Report of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and specific approval of the Commission for Conventional Armaments resolutions of August 12, 1948 defining the competence of the Commission and setting forth the essential basic principles. In the likely event that the USSR vetoes such approval to emphasize the fact that this Soviet action effectively frustrates real progress in developing an effective plan for regulation and reduction of armaments by the resultant failure of the Security Council to endorse the recommended basic principles.

(3) To insure that both the Census and Verification Proposals and the Second Progress Report of the Commission for Conventional Armaments are forwarded to the General Assembly by the Security Council.

(b) In the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly:

(1) To continue to support and to amplify the position taken in the Security Council with respect to the Proposals for Census and Verification and the Second Progress Report of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and in so doing to make it absolutely clear that Soviet intransigence alone is responsible for the inability of the Security Council to recommend that they be put into effect.

(2) To oppose any resolution which would require the Commission for Conventional Armaments to reexamine its Plan of Work, and to resist any effort to reconsider the principles set forth in the Commission for Conventional Armaments resolution of August 12, 1948, emphasizing that events since their formulation have but served to attest their essential validity.

(3) To oppose any further resolutions dealing with census and verification in any way similar to the General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1948, and particularly to resist any proposal for census alone, pointing out the futility of such an exercise unless accompanied by adequate verification.

(4) The United States should support an affirmation by the General Assembly of the need for a fundamental change in the Soviet attitudes without which real progress toward the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments will not be possible.

(5) The United States should oppose any proposed General Assembly action tending to cast doubts upon or undermine the basic principles underlying the development of an effective system of regulation of armaments as set forth in the CCA resolution of August 12, 1948.

(6) In consultations with other delegations on the question whether the CCA should continue with its Plan of Work by going on to the consideration of Item III dealing with “system of minimum safeguards for conventional armaments”, the United States after fully stating its position that such a course of action is unlikely to realize substantial results should state that it nevertheless favors such continuation.

(7) The United States should be prepared to vote affirmatively on a General Assembly resolution to implement the position set forth in (6) above but only so long as the resolution itself or its legislative history makes it clear that it is the sense of the Assembly that this is being done despite the realization that real progress towards the goal of regulation and reduction of armaments cannot be made without a fundamental change in the Soviet attitude. The United States should if necessary be prepared to offer amendments to clarify the resolution in this respect and to abstain on the vote, if such amendments are defeated.

(8) The United States should in general oppose any proposals that CCA continue its activities except as set forth in (6) above:—for example, the CCA reexamine its Plan of Work or the principles underlying regulation of armaments, or that CCA consider immediately Part 4 of the Plan of Work (Formulation of Practical Proposals for the Regulation and Reduction of Armaments or Armed Forces). Pursuant to this policy, and in the absence of a changed attitude by the Soviet Union, the United States should likewise oppose action by the General Assembly recommending the drafting of an agreement to give effect to the CCA census and verification proposals.

7. At the earliest practicable date the United States should inform friendly governments of its position as set forth above as being in the common interest, and the United States Representative to the United Nations should be authorized to explain to other Delegations that this is the United States position and intention.

1. This paper represents the Department of State position contained in document RAC D–36/2, a “split” paper which included the views of both the Department of State and the Service Departments. The differences between the two positions (see Bancroft memorandum, September 6, p. 150) were not resolved in the Executive Committee. (Department of State Disarmament Files) On September 12, at the Secretary of State’s daily administrative meeting with certain operating officers of the Department, Rusk informed the Secretary of differences with military authorities regarding policy at the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The summary record of the meeting indicates that Secretary Acheson agreed with Rusk’s contention that the United States should not initiate a proposal to suspend CCA activities and authorized him to take that position in future discussions with the military on the subject. (Secretary’s Daily Meetings: Lot 58D609) Discussions between Deputy Under Secretary of State Rusk, and Major General J. H. Burns and Mr. Najeeb E. Halaby, Jr., of the Office of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson resulted in concurrence by the Secretary in the position of the Department of State.

   At the 105th Meeting of RAC, September 20, the Service Members objected to the procedure by which the split paper was being handled, since this procedure had not included the usual formal consideration of the matter by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had resulted in the Service Secretaries being bypassed. The Service Members questioned the further usefulness of the Executive Committee in view of the fact that its usual procedures had not been employed in this instance. RAC did not meet again in 1949. The present paper was transmitted to the United States Mission by the Executive Secretary of RAC on September 22 for distribution as a Delegation position paper. It was circulated in RAC as document RAC D–36/3, September 28. (Department of State Disarmament Files)

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