Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Notes on the Seventh Meeting of the Sponsoring Powers, Lake Success, New York, September 14, 1949
secret
Representatives:
- McNaughton—Canada
- Tsiang—China
- De Rose—France
- Hickerson—United States
- Cadogan—United Kingdom
- Tsarapkin—USSR
(The five friendly Delegates met at 11 a. m. at Sir Alexander Cadogan’s offices. McNaughton, who would be in the Chair, indicated that he would ask Hickerson to follow up on his offer of the previous week to explain the Commission Plan to Tsarapkin. Hickerson suggested that perhaps in the first instance Sir Alexander might remind Tsarapkin that his interpretation of the very condensed Statement of Principles under paragraph 6 was not the same as that contained in the Commission Plan. Cadogan agreed.
(McNaughton felt that not all of the Soviet misinterpretations were willful ones. In a general discussion of sovereignty, it was agreed that we should use the expression “pooling, or sharing of sovereignty in the common interest” whenever we talked to this point. It was pointed out by several that the Soviet proposals themselves involved a derogation of sovereignty which in some instances would be greater than that of the Commission Plan. De Rose emphasized that we should make clear that the Soviet Union was against management and operation by the international agency.
(Hickerson (US) stated that there were three fundamental weaknesses in the Soviet proposals. The one just pointed out by De Rose was the most serious, but it was also the most difficult to explain. We were all agreed that the Soviet proposals for national ownership, operation and management will not work. It was only the pooling of sovereignty that would work. We also knew that periodic inspection and recommendations to the Security Council where the veto applies would not work. These last two were more easy to explain.
(McNaughton (Canada) agreed, emphasizing that operation and management under national auspices could not stop diversion, that periodic inspection was inadequate and there was no hope for action in the Security Council.
(Tsiang (China) stated that he was most bothered by Tsarapkin’s statement that ownership was not relevant to control. He felt we must refute this statement.
(There followed the usual discussion on what was meant by “ownership” or “holding in trust”, with Mr. Hickerson arguing that there [Page 161] was really no great difference in principle between us all and that we should not permit our fundamental agreement to be obscured by details. Tsiang believed that the Soviet Union was attempting to hide its refusal to accept any control by harping on the question of ownership. We must try to expose the basic Soviet opposition to effective control.
(Hickerson (US) suggested that all of us undertake to hammer home the fact that national operation and management would not work, especially against diversion.
(McNaughton (Canada) brought up the subject of the General Assembly, pointing out that only the Report of the Sponsoring Powers appears on the agenda and suggested that he undertake, in talking to the SYG, to make certain that the two UNAEC resolutions be somehow combined with this report so that they would not be debated separately. It was also agreed to attempt to set a date for the next meeting for the following Thursday, even though it might have to be cancelled, in order to establish the principle that the Six Powers intended to consult during the Assembly.)
McNaughton (Canada), Chairman, announced that after consulting with the Secretariat, he had received assurances that the summary records of these meetings would be made available on the third day after the meeting. Several delegates had complained that they had not been receiving these records soon enough. (It was learned that the chief reason for the delay was the fact that, on orders from ASYG Zinchenko,1 the Secretariat had been submitting to the Soviet Delegation a draft summary for correction prior to its issuance.)
McNaughton (Canada), Chairman, stated that at the previous meeting, we had, in discussing point 6, heard two points of view expressed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This discussion had shown that a certain amount of misinterpretation of the Commission proposals existed. The U.S. representative had indicated a desire to speak further on this point, but prior to calling on him, the Chairman wished to call on the UK representative in order to expand a bit on point 6, which was quite compressed.
Cadogan (UK) took the floor, stating that Tsarapkin had charged that point 6 was all drawn from the majority proposals. Cadogan admitted this, and stated that he had made this quite clear when he had introduced the document originally. The document was derived from the Commission Plan which the U.K. supports. However, the U.K. would be willing to work on any other plan that would be effective. Cadogan pointed out that Tsarapkin had put his own interpretation [Page 162] on the meaning of point 6. He wished to remind Tsarapkin that the intent and details of the majority proposals were to be found in the majority plan. Cadogan wished to say a few words regarding sovereignty. He deplored the fact that the Soviet Union had a static or sacrosanct conception of sovereignty, as this was going backward. He wished to state that the UN Charter, the Soviet proposals themselves, in fact any treaty, involves, or at least it should involve, the relinquishing of some sovereignty. We should progress in the direction of pooling our sovereignty for the common good and, in fact, one of the attributes of national sovereignty is the right to voluntarily yield some of it. Cadogan referred to the Soviet representative’s habit of charging that the majority plan was a scheme for imposing U.S. control over the world nuclear industry. He wished to point out that the United States had, through its scientific and technical skill and, he was sure that the U.S. representative would not mind his saying so, a bit of United Kingdom assistance at the beginning, acquired a monopoly for the moment in this field. However, the U.S. was willing to share this monopoly through a system of international control. Cadogan stated that if the Soviet Union had in mind that the control agency would be so organized as to be completely under U.S. control, then he would appreciate being told so frankly so that we might know just what was in the Soviet mind.
Hickerson (US) spoke next and repeated that he had welcomed the Soviet statements of last week, as they had convinced him that the Soviet representative did not understand the plan. Now we were given a chance to explain it to him. He wished to point out that the U.K. document gave merely the bare bones of the majority principles and that there had been no spelling out of the details. The correct interpretation and real intent of U.K. point 6 were to be found in the Commission plan of control as approved by the General Assembly, published by the UN Secretariat.2 It was clear from this plan that arbitrary powers were not given to the agency and that the agency would be the servant, not the master of the signatory nations. The Commission plan of control contained the agreed, detailed spelling out of those powers and functions, and the limitations thereon, of an international agency, that were necessary for effective prohibition by means of effective control. Moreover, a careful study of the plan would make clear that the control agency would be given only those powers that were made necessary for reasons of security. It was clearly stated in the plan that the principles and policies concerning matters affecting national security would be carefully spelled out in the treaty which the nations would be familiar with when they accepted the treaty. Therefore, it was wrong to say, as Tsarapkin had said, that the [Page 163] control agency might have policies that differ from a particular nation’s.
The Soviet charge that the implementation of this plan would bring about an invasion of national sovereignty was true, but then, any treaty, and the Soviet proposals themselves, involve the derogation of national sovereignty. We must choose between sharing sovereignty or effective control, and on this point the record of the United States and of the Commission was clear.
The more important safeguards against arbitrary acts by the agency were provided for by writing into the treaty the principles governing the quotas for the distribution of facilities and stockpiling of nuclear fuel, together with rights of appeal against possible abuses.
“On pages 28 and 29 [19 and 20], paragraph XI of this Commission plan stated:
‘The international agency shall distribute its production facilities and other facilities containing dangerous stocks of nuclear fuel, key substances, and source material and its stockpiles of nuclear fuel, key substances, and source material in accordance with the quotas, provisions, and principles laid down in the treaty or convention governing geographical location of dangerous activities and stockpiling.’
“There were then laid down certain principles and considerations governing stockpiling.
“Paragraph XII on page 29 [20] stated:
‘The international agency shall keep the production of nuclear fuel, in a form suitable for ready conversion to use in atomic weapons, at the minimum required for efficient operating procedures necessitated by actual beneficial uses, including research and development. The agency shall not be authorized to increase existing stock of nuclear fuel for any contemplated requirement, except where it is necessary to produce nuclear fuel for use in facilities whose location, design, construction, and financing have been definitely decided by the agency and the nation concerned.’
“The following paragraph XIII, also on page 29 [20], gave the agency the power to determine distribution by nations, but in accordance with quotas, provisions and principles set up in the treaty. It was clear from this and other sections of the approved recommendations that the agency had no arbitrary power with respect to the distribution, but that it was to be set up strictly in accordance with the quotas laid down in the treaty.
“Paragraph XI also stated:
‘(a) A distribution is necessary which will avoid the possibility of nations achieving a military advantage by the seizure of existing stockpiles and facilities within or adjacent to their territories. Location of ores, refineries and facilities necessary for production, location of stockpiles of nuclear fuel and of source material and location of facilities utilizing nuclear fuel or key substances are factors that must ‘be considered in determining a distribution which would minimize the effects of seizure.’
“The above paragraph also clearly indicated that the treaty would contain the important principle of not giving any nation any military advantage by location of stockpiles.”
[Page 164]Hickerson could not agree with the representative of the Soviet Union when the latter stated that it was the location of the nuclear fuel that was important and not the question of whether it was in the hands of nations or in the hands of an agency as trustee for all nations. Both were important. Furthermore, it was a relatively easy matter for diversion to take place if nuclear fuels and facilities were in the hands of nations. Hickerson invited the attention of Tsarapkin to Chapter 6 of the Commission plan of control for more details on safeguards against possible agency abuses.
Hickerson then referred to the Soviet insistence upon periodic in spection of declared facilities. Such limited inspection would be an invitation to clandestine operations even though some special investigations were envisaged in the Soviet proposals. Hickerson felt that he was forced to conclude that the Soviet Union was not willing to engage in negotiations on a basis other than that of periodic inspection of declared facilities. If this assumption were wrong, he would like to be so advised so that this question could be taken into account correctly in considering other aspects of the Soviet proposals for control.
Tsarapkin (USSR) took the floor and stated that the U.S. had attempted to clarify the substance of the U.S. plan of control and had referred to the plan approved by the General Assembly and to various reports of the Commission. He wished to repeat that everything the U.S. representative had said to him had been known to the Soviet Union. Hickerson had merely repeated what Baruch had said. The Soviet Union had given its convincing arguments proving these proposals unacceptable.
However, he had listened most carefully to the U.S. statement and had noticed that two important questions had been avoided. He would like to know how the U.S. viewed the question of the convention on prohibition and the convention on control—were they to be brought into effect simultaneously or otherwise? In addition, he would like to know whether it was the view of the United States that measures of control would apply to all phases, including the final, of the nuclear industry. He repeated he would like to get answers to these questions.
Regarding the U.S. question on the Soviet position of periodic inspection of declared facilities, Tsarapkin referred him to paragraph 6(f) of the Soviet proposals of June 11, 19473 and answers given by the USSR to certain U.K. questions on September 5, 1947,4 which provided adequately for special investigation in cases where suspicion of violation of the convention on prohibition arose. These measures were sufficient to make atomic energy control effective and would give full guarantees thereon.
[Page 165]De Rose (France) pointed out that we seemed to be wandering away from point 6. The Soviet Union had raised the question of stages, which came in point 8, and also the question of clandestine activities, point 7 of the U.K. paper. He would like to return to the question of control of the installations producing, processing or consuming the nuclear fuel. A great deal of time and expert technical ability had gone into a carefully worked out scheme of safeguards against diversion. The Scientific and Technical Committee had made a report whose technical evidence had been persuasive to the French Government in arriving at the conclusion that such facilities must be operated and managed by the agency in order to prevent diversion. De Rose pointed out that these technical considerations had never been challenged successfully. He would add that conclusions based on these are also incontestable. Nuclear fuel for bombs and nuclear fuel for power were the same. The processes for making either were also the same. He pointed out that plants and, therefore, large quantities of nuclear fuel or nuclear explosives, would be located on national territories. He emphasized once again the fact that the ready convertibility of nuclear fuel to weapons automatically made any power with a large nuclear industry a large military power in the field of atomic weapons. This was not true of conventional armaments. It is for these reasons that the French Government supported the proposal for placing such plants under the operation and management of the agency.
The Soviet proposals based on periodic inspection of declared facilities were inadequate. Access to such plants is not possible because of radioactivity; remote control operations are the rule, both of which nullified the effectiveness of the inspection system. Even if we were to assume that inspection might be possible, the inspectorate in the performance of its duties would require a plant to be shut down in order to make its inventory. This would be real interference in economic life. France could not accept proposals based on periodic inspection and therefore we proceeded logically to a permanent system of management and operation by the agency. Rather than wandering to the subject matter of points 8 or 7, De Rose proposed that the Soviet Union say yes or no to whether the scientific premises outlined by De Rose were accepted by the Soviet Union. If, in the light of Tsarap-kin’s experience or knowledge, he could give another base for our discussions we would be pleased to consider it. If, on the other hand, he did not refute the scientific and technical premises, then how could he reject management and insist upon a system of periodic inspection?
Tsiang (China) expressed his gratitude for the lucidity of the discussion to date. U.K. point 6 goes much further than the Soviet system of periodic inspection and special investigations. The Soviet proposals did not go far enough. They did not give safeguards to nations. They were half-measures. He could not understand how anyone could hold [Page 166] back on effective control. He agreed with Cadogan’s comments on the need for sharing sovereignty. Perhaps world government was an answer, although the world was not ready for it.
Regarding the Soviet charge that the U.S. would control the control agency, Tsiang wished to point out that the majority of the nations do not, in fact, have the atom bomb and certainly would want it to be prohibited through means of effective control. He wished to remind the Soviet Delegate that if the United States had other intentions than effective control and effective prohibition, and the Soviet Union insisted upon effective control and effective prohibition, the United States would not be able to control the agency because it would not have the majority with it. Tsiang repeated that the Soviet plan was not sufficient and he supported the U.K. Statement of Principles.
McNaughton (Canada) suggested that a number of questions had been put to the Soviet Delegate and perhaps he would care to answer them.
Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that he had already answered the U.S. on periodic inspection. Regarding the questions put by the French, Tsarapkin stated that the Soviet Union did not accept the premises mentioned by De Rose. De Rose had led us into a technical blind alley, and on the basis of complicated technical explanations, he had stated that the Soviet proposals were inadequate and then had got involved on the question of ownership by the agency. Tsarapkin stated that he could not accept ownership as a basis for control. He repeated that the Soviet proposals were effective and that none could deny that they were strict and would bring about a strict control. He re-read paragraphs 8(c), 6(c), (d), (e) and 7(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Soviet proposals of June 11 to prove his point. He repeated that the Soviet proposals fully covered all possible contingencies and were the complete answer to the artificial questions raised by the French Delegate. He could not accept the inconsistent French argument that it was technically impossible to control in accordance with the Soviet plan.
Tsarapkin (USSR) then stated that Tsiang had concerned himself only with general terms, had brought no technical data to support his statements and that he was merely juggling with words. He pointed out that nobody could say that the Soviet proposals would not work until they had been tried and tested. He repeated that the Soviet proposals fully guaranteed the strictness of control and would ensure that the convention on prohibition would be observed.
De Rose (France) suggested that perhaps some error had occurred in the translations of his statement. It seemed to him that Tsarapkin had directed his reply to De Rose on the assumption that De Rose had made an argument for ownership. Therefore, he could not consider that his question had been answered. De Rose was certain that [Page 167] he had not once used that word in his argumentation. He had argued for management and operation and could hardly believe that Tsarapkin was, as he had accused other delegates, “juggling” words. He requested the Secretariat to check into this question of translation most carefully in order that the confusion might be cleared up and not repeated in the future. He wished to add, however, that the technical facts that he had referred to were not complicated ones. On the contrary, they were rather simple. He did not see how anyone who had been connected with this problem could not be aware of the Scientific and Technical Committee Report, upon which the French relied. He stated that he would like to speak on the question of ownership at the next meeting.
Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that De Rose apparently had not understood him and that De Rose had tried to raise difficulties based on imaginary obstacles. He repeated that the Soviet proposals had an adequate technical basis. As far as ownership is concerned, perhaps the French Delegate had not used the word, but he had argued for operation and management and what else was there left? De Rose had stated that technical factors made the Soviet proposals impossible to accept and that effective control can come only from management, not by the present owners of such facilities, but by the international organization. The Soviet Union insisted that the ownership and operation of these enterprises should remain unchanged. There would be, of course, a strict and effective control imposed upon such enterprises in order to ensure that no violation of the convention on prohibition occurred, either openly or clandestinely. Since France proposed that such plants be turned over to the control agency and had supported point 6, particularly sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), it would appear that there should not be any objection to the word “ownership”. The French position seemed to be quite clear, and Tsarapkin did not understand how De Rose could object to this interpretation or to indicate that the interpretation had been faulty. If, on the other hand, Tsarapkin misunderstood the French position and De Rose does not support the thesis that the agency should hold these facilities, he would like to have this cleared up.
McNaughton, Chairman, stated that he had just been informed by the Secretariat that the expression “hold in trust” had been translated in the official Russian text by a word which also means “own” in Russian, making the expression “own in trust”. He suggested that we might at the next meeting have De Rose explain what the difference is between “own” and “hold in trust”. He wished to remind the Soviet Delegate that many changes had taken place in the original proposals on atomic energy control in the past three years. This was merely one of them.
[Page 168]Tsarapkin (USSR) interrupted adjournment proceedings to deny the statement by McNaughton that many changes had taken place in the original proposals. He saw no difference between ownership and holding in trust. He referred to paragraph 6(b) and 6(c) of the U.K. paper and stated that if the international agency got these rights, there were no rights of ownership left to nations.
The usual press release was approved. It was agreed that the next meeting would take place Thursday, September 22 at 3 p. m. with U.K. points 6 and 7 as the agenda, provided that neither a GA Plenary nor a General Committee meeting interfered. The meeting rose at 6 p. m.