Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes on the Sixth Meeting of the Sponsoring Powers, Lake Success, New York, September 8, 1949

New York, September 8, 1949

secret

Representatives:

• McNaughton—Canada
• Tsiang—China
• Chauvel—France
• Hickerson—United States
• Cadogan—United Kingdom
• Tsarapkin—USSR

(The five friendly Delegates met at Sir Alexander Cadogan’s offices at 11 a. m. Cadogan believed that we could plunge during the meeting directly into the discussion of Topic 6, since nobody had objected to this suggestion when it was made at the previous meeting. Hickerson agreed and, as Chairman of the forthcoming meeting, he proposed to read the elaboration of point 6 and ask for comments. Later, he would speak as the US representative and accept this wording as a fair statement of the principles involved, which is supported by the United States and which would serve as a good basis for discussion. Mr. Hickerson then asked the opinion of the other members as to whether it was good tactics for him to ask a direct question of the Soviet representative, the question being whether national ownership, operation and management of dangerous materials and facilities was the only basis that the Soviet Union would accept for negotiations. In Mr. Hickerson’s opinion, this is a really fundamental issue dividing us and the Soviets.

(McNaughton expressed the opinion that this question must be asked and we should endeavor to receive a clear-cut answer to it. However, the matter of timing was of great concern here as it was not considered wise to precipitate a showdown before or even during the General Assembly. This might make atomic energy a big show in the General Assembly. He pointed out that agreement on atomic energy had been found to be dependent upon agreement in broader fields of policy and in order to solve the problem of atomic energy, we should concentrate on this latter, for the time being. Hickerson pointed out that the question could be phrased so that it need not force a showdown and that time could be given for receiving and then considering any answer.

(McNaughton agreed, pointing out that when we do get the expected Soviet reply, we might undertake to re-explain to the Soviet Union the fundamentals as well as the details of the Commission Plan and attempt to disabuse the Soviet Union of its opinion that the Commission Plan is the old Baruch Plan, etc.

(All agreed that the forum of the Sponsoring Powers must continue for the time being whatever the answers received.

(McNaughton circulated a statement that he had had in mind to make for some time, explaining the Commission Plan and emphasizing the great changes, particularly in emphasis, of the Commission Plan from the original Baruch proposals. He proposed that he make this Statement or parts thereof at some appropriate time during the consultations. He still feared the consequences of a direct question to Tsarapkin.

(It was agreed that the question to Tsarapkin should take the form of an assumption on the part of Mr. Hickerson, with an invitation to the Soviet Union to correct the assumption if it were incorrect. De Rose pointed out that point 6 raised the issue of ownership. He emphasized the need for making once again the case for international ownership as was done by the testimony of many witnesses at the time of the drafting of the Safeguards Section of the First Report. We must prove once again that there is need for some derogation of sovereignty; otherwise, we would have no control at all.

(McNaughton read a statement which he proposed to make, to be followed by a procedural resolution for submission to the Security Council, transmitting to the General Assembly for its information the two UNAEC resolutions passed on July 29. After some discussion, the statement was revised to insure, if at all possible, a minimum of debate on this subject in the Security Council. McNaughton agreed to circulate the resolution immediately to all members of the Security Council.

(Because of the crowded Security Council agenda, it was agreed that we would try to set the next meeting of the Sponsoring Powers for Wednesday, September 14.)

Before the meeting started officially, the Sponsors acquiesced to a United Nations request for photographs of the Sponsoring Powers to be used only in the United Nations Bulletin. Hickerson (US), Chairman, opened the meeting by stating that we had agreed to discuss point 6 of the British paper and invited comments thereon.

McNaughton (Canada) gave Canadian support to UK point 6, since it stated the principles that made control and, therefore, prohibition effective. He stated that we were face to face with the most important part of the problem here. The Canadian Delegation had gone over this statement, with all the expert advice that it could obtain, and fully supported it as a basis for discussion.

Chauvel (France) stated that point 6 and its elaboration was not only acceptable to the French but it also contained the essentials of the problem of control.

Hickerson, speaking as the US representative, accepted the UK statement as part of the single package solution to the entire problem and as a basis for discussion. He wished to comment on the Soviet proposals submitted at the previous meeting. These proposals reintroduced in full the Soviet control proposals of June 11, 1947. As Hickerson understood it, this was done in order to make clear to all the content of the proposed Soviet convention on control which the Soviet Union proposed should be signed and put into effect simultaneously with their convention on prohibition. Hickerson expressed the opinion that we should no longer talk about one convention, which would include both prohibition and control, or two separate conventions to go into effect simultaneously. As the Chinese representative had pointed out, it was the content, not the number of conventions, that was important. Furthermore, we should no longer have any real questions regarding prohibition, since all present had agreed that any treaty must include prohibition. The real problem raised by the Soviet proposals was whether the two Soviet conventions were the only basis for further negotiations acceptable to the Soviet Union. Hickerson pointed out that the content of these conventions had been debated in the Assembly and in the Atomic Energy Commission and had been rejected overwhelmingly by both bodies. However, the Sponsoring Powers had agreed to explore once again every conceivable approach. The US was willing to renew the debate on the Soviet proposals, even though it would be forced to repeat the same arguments used previously; but that was only because the same proposals were being debated.

Hickerson pointed out that the Soviet control proposals implied that nations should continue to own, operate and manage dangerous facilities making or using such quantities. The United States did not believe that control could work under such circumstances. That was why it supported the Commission Plan as approved by the General Assembly. It would continue to do so until a better plan could be devised and would welcome and give sympathetic consideration to any proposals to this end. A treaty which would continue national ownership and operation of dangerous materials and facilities would make impossible any agreement on prohibition. These two ideas are really a contradiction in terms because to permit nations to own dangerous quantities of nuclear fuel ipso facto permits them to own atomic weapons.

Moreover, leaving such activities in national hands would inevitably continue national rivalries in this field and would impose an impossible burden on any agency charged with supervising these activities and would engage the agency in a constant struggle to control well-entrenched Atomic Energy Commissions of every country. Such a situation would inevitably lead to frictions, extremely dangerous mutual suspicions and distrust. National rivalries would be continued and even in a more dangerous form, because the existence of a treaty would give the people of the world a false sense of security. No nation that really wanted to remove causes for fear and suspicion and to bring about an end to the atomic armaments race would be a party to such a fraud.

Before going on to other aspects of the Soviet proposals, Mr. Hickerson stated that he and the representatives of the Sponsoring Powers would want to be entirely clear on this important matter of national ownership, operation and management. It would appear from their many statements that the Soviet Union would accept no other basis for negotiation. If this were a misinterpretation of the Soviet position and if the Soviet Union were willing to conduct negotiations on some other basis, we would like to be so informed so that we might all have a clear perspective of the problem facing us. Mr. Hickerson suggested that the Soviet representative might wish to consult his Government on this important matter, and in the meantime, we might continue the discussion of other matters related to point 6 and indeed of any of the other points.

Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that the US representative had made some arguments against the plan or proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and had repeated that these proposals had been discussed many times and that they were not new. Tsarapkin stated that UK point 6 was taken verbatim from various parts of the AEC reports and they too, were not new. He pointed out that they were part of the US position on control which the Soviet Union had repeatedly rejected.

Tsarapkin then stated that the US insisted that there be no national ownership of dangerous quantities of nuclear fuel and of dangerous facilities. He argued that this was a fantastic, unreal and absurd idea. Dangerous quantities of fuel and dangerous facilities (whatever the United States means by these expressions) must be located somewhere on this earth. They cannot be kept on the moon. The entire earth was divided into national states or dependent territories controlled by national states; therefore, these materials must be somewhere within national territories, unless it was proposed that there be no dangerous quantities of nuclear fuel or dangerous facilities at all, anywhere. He could not understand how, therefore, we could hope to deprive nations of having these materials and facilities on their territory. There can be no guarantee that these materials would not be under the control of the Government on whose territory they are located. If analyzed to its logical conclusion, this whole concept was a blind alley. The control agency, according to the US plan, must own nuclear fuel, dangerous facilities and so forth and thus, we get an agency which would take over from all nations the facilities connected with atomic energy. These facilities are tremendous and use large quantities of power, etc. They are very important to a nation’s economy. Giving them to an international agency would be, in effect, turning over a large section of the national economy to the full ownership, operation and management of this agency whose economic policies may not be the same as those of the various nations. This would destroy the sovereignties of governments, and interfere in their economy. This was not a practical plan. It was a fantastic scheme and was part of the whole concept of expansionism and international acquisition which, in other fields, operates for the benefit of the United States. One has merely to look at the International Monetary Fund or the Bank of International Settlement, which work hand in glove with US foreign policy, to get the idea. This was not control. Perhaps it was the Wall Street idea of control, which has in mind the gobbling up of property the world over and invariably involves ownership. It was merely another scheme on the part of the United States, who, out of one side of its mouth, said “We want prohibition” and then put such impossible conditions on prohibition in the form of this fantastic control scheme that the US was exposed as really not wanting prohibition. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, control means inspection, checking, verification, observing, etc., to be sure that the convention of prohibition was being observed. The Soviet proposals fulfilled the need for control. We must control, not own. Ownership was not necessary, it had nothing in common with control.

We were also told that our plan was ineffective, that it won’t make control or prohibition effective. Tsarapkin wanted to know how we arrived at this conclusion, lacking as we did both experience and data on this particular problem. Only oral statements were made against the Soviet plan. The Soviet Union could not accept the US idea of ownership. If we really wanted control and if we agreed that atomic weapons must be prohibited, then we must have control to this end and the Soviet proposals were an adequate and a real basis for agreement.

The United States said either take the US plan or there would be no control at all, and we would continue the armaments race. The US tactics were clear. The US desired an atomic armaments race and did not want prohibition; therefore, it insisted upon an impossible plan. If the US really did not want an armaments race, it would accept prohibition and not dictate the conditions under which it would be brought about. As Cato used to say at the end of every speech—“Carthage must be destroyed”, Mr. Hickerson has for six consecutive meetings repeated that the US supports only the US plan and no other. That was no way to reach agreement. The US plan was not acceptable and it could not be a basis for agreement. No arguments could convince the Soviet Union otherwise. The US insistence upon ownership was made all the more absurd because an owner did not control. If a man owned something, he did not need to control it. The whole idea was therefore absurd. If the US really wanted control, let us discuss the Soviet paper. The US said it was ineffective; perhaps the US could suggest some amendments to make it effective. Tsarapkin invited a point by point discussion of the Soviet proposals. The Soviet proposals had not yet been tested. Let us work with them and draft them in the treaty and see what we come out with. Tsarapkin stated that he had not had time really to prepare a statement and reserved the right to go into greater detail at the next meeting.

Hickerson (US) stated he was sorry that the Soviet Union had not fully understood his previous statements. Hickerson had never said that the US wanted the Commission Plan or no plan at all. He had repeatedly invited fresh proposals designed to produce a better plan. He did not insist upon the Commission Plan. He merely supported it until a better plan could be devised.

For his part, Mr. Hickerson was grateful to the Soviet colleague for his statement. It had convinced him of something that he had suspected for some time; namely, that the Soviet colleague did not understand the Commission Plan of control; otherwise he could not have talked about it as he did. For example, the Commission Plan did not provide for stockpiling atomic materials and facilities on the moon. Mr. Hickerson stated that he was ready and willing to explain to the Soviet colleague the Majority Plan. There was one charge that Tsarapkin had made about the Majority Plan; namely, that it would involve an invasion of national sovereignty. That charge was true. We all admitted it, but unfortunately, we saw no alternative. Some interference was necessary but a careful study of the plan as outlined shows that this interference was kept to a minimum. The international agency would not have the extensive powers ascribed to it by the Soviet Union. There were many safeguards provided against abuses. Mr. Hickerson repeated that he was grateful for the Soviet remarks and that he was willing to cooperate in explaining the Commission Plan to the Soviet Delegate.

Tsarapkin (USSR) stated he had listened carefully to Mr. Hickerson’s statement, which included an allegation to the effect that Tsarapkin did not understand the Majority Plan. Tsarapkin stated that he got his ideas on the extensive powers of the international agency directly from the point 6(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the UK paper which he then read. Moreover, the United Kingdom had stated that these points must be part of any plan of control. The US had agreed to the UK statement. Therefore, he does not understand why the US believed that the Soviet Delegate did not understand the plan. Here, very clearly, we have ownership, etc. The US had indicated that there were some safeguards and limits on the agency. Perhaps Mr. Hickerson had referred to para 6(e). However, 6(e) does not provide sufficient guarantees against interference. Tsarapkin then took five minutes to explain that the US representative had mistakenly taken him too literally regarding storing facilities on the moon. He had merely used this example to emphasize that atomic materials and facilities must be located within national territories. They could not be located outside them.

The usual press communiqué was approved and the next meeting set for Wednesday, September 14 at 3 p. m.