Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross, Deputy to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ), to the Deputy United States Representative to the Security Council ( Jessup )
Staff Meeting,3 Tuesday, January 4, 1949
The entire staff of the Mission present in New York met this morning for a general round-up in anticipation of your return.
1) Mr. Noyes4 gave a general status report on the active cases pending on the Security Council agenda. I shall not report more fully on these items since they will be discussed in greater detail with you.
2) General Osborn5 gave a status report on the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments. With regard to the former, Mr. Osborn summarized the Assembly [Page 8] action and indicated the views of General McNaughton6 which he said he felt we should support. These views may be described very briefly as follows:
- a)
- The plan for the effective international control of atomic energy developed after nearly three years of work and approved by the Assembly7 should not be changed although there may be some pressure for example, from the French or British to change this plan. On the contrary, this plan as approved by the Assembly, should be maintained intact; the remaining objective being to get Russian acceptance of the plan, if it is possible.
- b)
- The plan referred to above is perhaps not as clear to as many people as it ought to be. General McNaughton feels, therefore, that the work of the Atomic Energy Commission for the next two or three months should be devoted to drawing together in a single UN document “The Plan” of UN for the control of atomic energy, which plan would then be public and used as a basis for the discussions with the Russians contemplated by the GA Resolution.
3) Mr. Osborn outlined the objective of the Commission for Conventional Armaments as the development of a plan for providing information on armaments and the verification of such information as contemplated by the GA Resolution.8 The objective of the United [Page 9] States should be the development of a plan which the United States could comply with. This did not mean that we would be obliged to give information on all aspects of our armaments. Mr. Osborn stressed that the assistance of the military was essential in this regard. Admiral Hewitt9 indicated that the Military Staff Committee representatives and their staff were available to give whatever assistance might be required. General Crittenberger10 indicated that he has assigned Col. Townsley (who was in Paris)11 to this work. Mr. Osborn stressed that while the assistance of the Military Staff Committee people attached to the Mission, was very important, the problem was essentially one of organizing the work in Washington, who for example, would be responsible for getting the agreement of the three services to any plan which the United States might support. It was pointed out that the reduction of armaments committee12 on which the three services as well as the State Department are represented, would normally have this responsibility. Gen. Harmon13 observed that decision by the Joint Chiefs would be required. It was agreed that General Osborn and the representatives on the Military Staff Committee would work closely together to get this organizational and procedural problem ironed out.
4) Admiral Hewitt gave a summary of the work of the Military Staff Committee, emphasizing the stalemate that exists in this area of our work.14 This stalemate is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that [Page 10] the Committee meets every two weeks, approves the minutes of the previous meeting and adjourns.
Commenting on Gen. McNaughton’s query, concerning the desirability of SC discussion of the General Principles applicable to the Article 43 forces (see memo of conversation with Harry Lewis),15 Admiral Hewitt noted confidentially and personally that he was not sure how pleased we would be if the Russians should suddenly turn around and accept the general principles agreed upon by the majority as the basis for further work by the Military Staff Committee.
Gen. Osborn made the observation as a “kibitzer” that in his opinion the UN was not yet ready for the contingent forces contemplated in Article 43. On the other hand, the idea of the need for these armed forces in order to enforce UN decisions, was firmly rooted in the public mind, particularly in this country. Mr. Osborn doubted the possibility of making any substantial progress toward the provision of these forces under present circumstances, but if there were any possibility of such progress this would be far preferable to the idea of a UN “police force” which might start with 500 or 1000 men and then grow.
I observed that the concept of providing the organized world community with the armed forces necessary to carry out its decisions was firmly established; the question, therefore, was not whether we would have such force, but the question of timing and tactics. I intended to share the opinion that in the present stage of the development of the UN, with particular reference for example, to the current phases of the Indonesian and Palestinian cases, it was doubtful whether the UN would employ such armed forces, if they were available. It also seemed doubtful whether in the present state of world affairs, we could hope to make very much progress in the direction of establishing forces contemplated in Article 43. On the other hand, we should not lose any opportunity to make whatever progress might be possible. It was particularly important in my opinion, that the public understand as fully as possible just what is going on. For this reason, I was somewhat inclined to favor the idea raised by Gen. McNaughton.
Gen. Harmon observed that he felt that while the forces contemplated by Article 43 were desirable, if somewhat utopian, there was no likelihood of getting these forces set up in the present state of the world and in the UN.
Gen. Crittenberger referring to Gen. McNaughton’s idea, expressed the view that the SC action to break the deadlock in the MSC, with particular reference to the Committee’s procedures, would be useful. [Page 11] He thought it would be useful to bring out in public what actually has been going on in the MSC. Not only are the Committee proceedings conducted in secret, but none of the representatives on the Committee are free to discuss the subject.
Our representatives on MSC had been discussing this matter among themselves with a view to preparing a paper on this subject. I asked Admiral Hewitt if we could have this prepared by next Tuesday as a basis for a meeting with you. If we could agree on a Mission paper, this could then be sent to Washington as recommended course of action.
Mr. Noyes pointed out that before raising this question in the SC, we should be sure that we were in agreement with the British, French and Chinese in order to get out on top in the SC propaganda-wise.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
- Lot 58D133, a consolidated lot file in the Department of State containing documentation on regulation of armaments and disarmament, 1942–1962.↩
- Information regarding personnel at the United States Mission at the United Nations is contained in documentation on organization and arrangements for the conduct of United States relations with the United Nations, vol. ii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Charles P. Noyes, Adviser, United States Mission at the United Nations.↩
- Frederick H. Osborn, Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and Commission for Conventional Armaments. Warren R. Austin, United States Representative at the United Nations, was formally U.S. Representative to both the UNAEC and the CCA. Osborn, however, usually represented the U.S. on those commissions and was the ranking official at the United States Mission concerned with their work on a day-by-day basis.↩
- Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton, Permanent Canadian Representative at the United Nations; Representative to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.↩
-
On November 4, 1948, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 191(III), which approved the General Findings (part II C) and Recommendations (part III) of the First Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Specific Proposals of part II of the Second Report of the Commission “as constituting the necessary basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy.…” The resolution also requested the six sponsors of General Assembly Resolution 1(I) of January 24, 1946, establishing the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France, China, and Canada), to consult in order to determine if, in view of their prevailing lack of unanimity, there existed a basis for agreement on international control of atomic energy. Resolution 191(III) also called upon the Atomic Energy Commission to resume its sessions and proceed with further study.
For the full text of Resolution 191(III), November 4, 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 1, p. 495. For the text of the First Report, see United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Special Supplement, Report to the Security Council (1946) (hereafter cited as AEC, 1st yr., Special Suppl.). For text of the Second Report, see United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, Special Supplement, The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, September 11, 1947 (hereafter cited as AEC, 2nd yr., Special Suppl.). For the text of Resolution 1(I), January 24, 1946, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 822–824, or United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the First Part of the First Session, p. 9 (hereafter cited as GA (I/1), Resolutions).
↩ - On November 19, 1948, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 192(III), which recommended that the Security Council continue to study the regulation of conventional armaments through the agency of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, with first attention to be devoted to the formulation of proposals for the receipt, checking, and publication of information to toe supplied by members of the United Nations with regard to their effectives and their conventional armaments. The Security Council was invited to report to the Assembly no later than its next regular session (fall, 1949) on the effect given to the above recommendation. For the text of Resolution 192(III), see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 1, p. 503. For information on the establishment and terms of reference of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, see ibid., 1947, vol. i, pp. 327 ff.↩
- Adm. H. K. Hewitt, United States Naval Representative to the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations Security Council.↩
- Lt. Gen. W. D. Crittenberger, United States Army Representative to the Military Staff Committee.↩
- Col. C. P. Townsley, Staff Member, United States Delegation to the Military Staff Committee; Adviser, United States Delegation to the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly, Paris, September–December 1948.↩
- Reference is to the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC). This interdepartmental (committee was responsible for the formulation, development, and coordination of United States policy with respect to the international control of atomic energy and the regulation of armaments. For information on the establishment and terms of reference of the Executive Committee, see ibid., pp. 327 ff. The records of this committee are contained in the Department of State Disarmament Files.↩
- Lt. Gen. H. R. Harmon, United States Air Force Representative to the Military Staff Committee.↩
- Under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, all members undertake to make available to the Security Council, in accordance with agreements to be negotiated, armed forces and facilities necessary, for the maintenance of international peace and security. On February 16, 1946, the Security Council directed the Military Staff Committee to “examine from a military point of view the provisions of Article 43 and to submit the results of the study and any recommendations to the Council in due course”. For documentation on the unsuccessful efforts of the Military Staff Committee to implement Article 43, see ibid., 1948, vol. i, Part 1, pp. 311 ff.↩
- General McNaughton was President of the Security Council during January. The memorandum of conversation with J. H. C. Lewis of the Permanent Canadian Delegation at the United Nations is not printed.↩