Department of State Disarmament Files
Position Paper Approved by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments1
RAC D–35b
United States Policy in the United Nations for the International Control of Atomic Energy
problem
To determine the United States position with respect to the international control of atomic energy which will take into account the following factors:
A. The ultimate United States objective to achieve effective international control.
B. The approval by the General Assembly of the UNAEC and United States sponsored plan of control as constituting “the necessary basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy to insure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons.”
C. The impasse in the UNAEC negotiations resulting from the continuing refusal of the Soviet Union to accept the United Nations plan of control.
D. Actions in which the United States is called upon to participate as a result of its support for the General Assembly resolution of November 4, 1948.
- (1)
- In the UNAEC:
- (a)
- A survey of the Commission’s program of work
- (b)
- A further study by the Commission of such of the subjects remaining in its program of work as the Commission considers to be “practicable and useful.”
- (2)
- With sponsoring Powers:
- (a)
- To consult with Canada, China, France, United Kingdom, and USSR “to determine if there exists a basis for agreement on [Page 71] the international control of atomic energy to insure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and to report to the General Assembly the results of their consultation not later than its next regular session.”
facts bearing on the problem
See Appendix A.2
discussion
See Appendix B.2
conclusions
1. The objective of the United States in this field continues to be the establishment of an effective international system of control.
2. The characteristics of an effective system of control are clearly set forth in the plan now approved by the General Assembly. No change in the control features of that plan can now be envisaged without serious jeopardy to effectiveness of control.
3. The developments of the past year demonstrate the soundness of the position taken by this Government in supporting the analysis of the impasse in the UNAEC and the Conclusions and Recommendations resulting therefrom as contained in the Commission’s Third Report dated May 17, 1948. Indeed, since resumption of its sessions following on the General Assembly resolution of November 4, 1948, the activities of the UNAEC have sharpened the differences between the majority and the minority and have revealed even more clearly the basic nature of the impasse.
4. It is the view of this Government and the view of the other permanent non-Soviet members of the UNAEC that there is no likelihood that the Soviet Union will accept the UN plan of control or any plan which will require effective control and inspection as long as the USSR maintains its present motivations and methods. As in certain other areas of international affairs, the Soviet delegates in the UNAEC evidently have been, and are, under instructions not to negotiate but only to give the appearance of negotiation so as to improve their propaganda position.
5. In view of the foregoing the United States should take the position:
- (a)
-
In the UNAEC:
After a review of the Soviet proposals for simultaneous conventions, and appropriate comment thereon, and after further study of the program of work, the United States should join with other delegations in the conclusion that there is no further work which the Commission can do that would be practicable or useful unless the [Page 72] Sponsoring Powers find that there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy.
- (b)
-
With the Sponsoring Powers:
That no such basis for agreement exists or is possible until the USSR has demonstrated a willingness to accept that degree of openness, accessibility and cooperation in the world community required by the UN plan which constitutes the necessary basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy.
6. The UNAEC should submit a Fourth Report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly at its fourth regular session which will reaffirm the validity of the analysis contained in the Third Report and which will emphasize the need for demonstrated openness, accessibility and willingness to cooperate in the world community on the part of the USSR before any realistic work on the further development and ultimate implementation of the UN plan of control can take place. This report should find that no further work that is practicable or useful can be done in the UNAEC until such time as the situation analyzed in the Third Report no longer exists.
7. The consultations among the Sponsoring Powers called for by the General Assembly Resolution and on which a report must be rendered to the Fourth Regular Session, should be held at a level below that of the Foreign Ministers, preferably at the level of UNAEC members. Its sessions should be closed. Its agenda should be confined to the question whether the USSR is prepared to accept the basic principles derived from the UN plan of control. Unless the USSR expresses a willingness to accept these requirements, the Sponsoring Powers should report to the Fourth Regular Session that no basis for agreement exists, or can exist, until the USSR has demonstrated its willingness to accept that degree of openness, accessibility, and cooperation in the world community required by the UN plan, which constitutes the necessary basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy.
8. At the earliest practicable date the United States should inform friendly governments of its position as set forth above as being in the common interest.
9. At an early stage in the General Assembly debate on this subject the United States should express its unequivocal support for the Fourth Report of the UNAEC and the Report of the Sponsoring Powers as set forth in Paras. 6 and 7 above. The United States should emphasize strongly its conviction that UNAEC negotiations have been rendered futile by the persistent refusal of the Soviet Union to accede to the requirements of the UN plan. The United States should encourage other nations to make similar declarations.
10. The United States does not, at this time, consider it necessary that the General Assembly take any action beyond receiving and discussing [Page 73] the Fourth Report and the Report of the Sponsoring Powers. In the event that resolutions are put forward by other Delegations, the United States should support those which recognize the need for a fundamental change in Soviet attitudes before any useful purpose can be served by further negotiations. The United States should oppose any resolution which seeks to continue negotiations in the absence of such change.
11. The United States Representative on the UNAEC should be authorized to explain to other delegations that this is the United States position and intention.
views of the joint chiefs of staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff “concur fully in the conclusions in paragraphs 5 to 11” (Appendix C).3
recommendations
It is recommended:
- (a)
- that the above conclusions be approved, and
- (b)
- that upon approval of this paper by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, it be forwarded to USUN as guidance.
- On May 25, position paper RAC D–35 was circulated in the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments at the request of the State member. On June 3, RAC D–35a, a revised draft, was approved by the Committee. After concurrence by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 14, and incorporation of minor changes of a non-substantive nature suggested by Ambassador Austin, the paper in final form (RAC D–35b) was transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission on June 20 for approval. It was transmitted to the United States Mission at the United Nations on June 21. The paper received the approval of the Secretary of Defense on June 23, the Chairman of the USAEC on July 5, and the Secretary of State on July 12. (Department of State Disarmament Files) In telegram 364 to New York, July 14, the Department of State informed the United States Mission that it should be guided by the policy stated in RAC D–35b (501.BC Atomic/7–1449).↩
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