Office of the Historian

560.AL/7–149: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1

confidential
Washington, July 1, 1949—5 p. m.

2381. For Martin from Gay. MFN Japan. Dept agrees that to press for detailed negots may be impractical in time available but in view action taken Brussels2 Dept believes aide-mémoires should be presented Paris. Due special problem NEI presentation Hague shld be postponed.3 (Urtel 292 June 29) At all four capitals you should:

1.
Push ahead with discussions top civil servants and ministerial level if possible to give maximum emphasis importance US attaches to question.
2.
Discuss concrete agreement, using Annex 1 as basis, and possible provisions to meet their problems.3
3.
Urge that answers to aide-mémoires (except at Hague) receive full cabinet review and not be handled in routine fashion.
4.
Explore proper timing bringing issue to head in Cabinets at same time making clear US intends continue press for satisfactory agreement.

Re your Para 3 last sentence,4 some explanation basis US objectives probably desirable, turning emphasis on importance peaceful, well integrated Jap. Re Para 1 b and Para 4 believed wise avoiding encouraging prolonged postponement.5 [Gay.]

Acheson
  1. Repeated to Annecy (269), Brussels (811), The Hague (578), and London (2276).↩
  2. The Embassy at Brussels had presented the aide-mémoire to the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on June 30, prior to receiving Annecy’s telegram 292 to the Department, June 29, 5 p. m. (telegram 933, from Brussels, June 30, not printed, 560.AL/6–3049)↩
  3. This point had been emphasized again by the Embassy at The Hague in its telegram 554, June 30, 4 p. m. The Embassy had cited other economic factors also as boding “serious resistance in obtaining assurances” from the Netherlands Government, and cautioning that “US may have to resort largely to political arguments.” (560.AL/6–3049)↩
  4. This point had been emphasized again by the Embassy at The Hague in its telegram 554, June 30, 4 p. m. The Embassy had cited other economic factors also as boding “serious resistance in obtaining assurances” from the Netherlands Government, and cautioning that “US may have to resort largely to political arguments.” (560.AL/6–3049)↩
  5. Refers to the draft agreement.↩
  6. References in this paragraph are to numbered paragraphs in Annecy’s 292, June 29, supra.↩