Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The American Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee (Arneson) to the British Secretary (Marten)¹

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Washington, December 12, 1949.

Dear Tim: You will recall that in the course of the Steering Group meeting on Friday morning, December 2,² the United States representatives gave particulars concerning some ways in which the principle of maximization of joint effort might be brought about to mutual advantage. These ideas are embodied in Enclosure I. It was agreed in this meeting that further exploration by a small group of technicians along these lines would be useful. Notes of the discussions that subsequently took place the same day are recorded in Enclosures II and III.³

It is understood that the U.K. and Canadian representatives will wish to discuss the points put forward by the U.S. representatives in these documents with their respective governments to see whether the suggestions made provide a fruitful avenue for further exploratory discussions. For their part, the U.S. representatives consider that the points reflected in the attached papers are an amplification of certain of the objectives and principles put forward in the paper dated September 20, 1949, entitled “Military Considerations Pertaining to Technical Cooperation in the Field of Atomic Energy.”⁴ As indicated in the course of the discussion the remarks covered in the three enclosed documents relate primarily to weapon aspects of the atomic energy field and further exploration into this and other phases of the atomic energy program would follow. I am sure it is appreciated that these documents are intended only to amplify the general U.S. approach to the problem and do not represent formal proposals.

Sincerely yours,

E. Gordon Arneson

Enclosure I

Remarks by the General Manager of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Wilson) in the Steering Group Meeting, Washington, December 2, 1949, 10 a. m.

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1. In approaching this question, it has seemed clear to us that the principal objective of any arrangements should be the course best calculated to increase our collective strength in the field of atomic weapons in the shortest possible period. In furtherance of this objective, it has been recognized that full cooperation among the three countries and full exchange of information on all aspects of atomic weapons are a necessary factor in maximizing our joint efforts. We have stated certain principles to this end.

2. The central theme of the initial British suggestion as regards weapons is that there should be in the U.K. substantially all facilities necessary to the production of weapons from ore, if only in limited numbers. It seems to us particularly that this suggestion gives inadequate attention to two outstanding facts.

a. The very great body of scientific knowledge of atomic weapons which has been generated in the U.S. since the war, and

b. The large and flexible weapons production capacity which has been built in the U.S. since 1946.

3. With respect to point a, the introduction of key British and Canadian scientists into the U.S. program on a working basis would surely, for the present, bring maximum benefit to the total program from their efforts, since their contributions would in effect be catalytic to a large existing and organized mass of knowledge and experience. This is an advantage which can not be expected to emerge from occasional exchange of ideas as would inevitably result if the principal British effort in the weapons program is applied to the U.K. Indeed, the development of weapons facilities in the U.K. would absorb during the next several years the major attention of the key people in question, with consequently little British contribution to the development of real advances in weapons techniques during the period.

4. With respect to point b, the introduction of new design ideas into the large and experienced U.S. production structure will bring improvements quickly and physically to a substantial number of weapons in being. We would especially stress this point: that it is essential during these critical years to be able to capitalize immediately on new ideas from development so that there may be the earliest possible benefit to the major stockpile of weapons.

5. We see that the acceptance of these principles would necessarily curtail the weapons effort proposed for the next few years in the U.K. We believe, however, that it is clear that our collective strength will be increased thereby. We believe it apparent that the British position in such a partnership must necessarily be enhanced proportionally to any improvement in the combined position, particularly in light of the fact that our suggestion does not in any way preclude the development or manufacture in the U.K. of any weapon component where such an effort in the U.K. is in the interest of the combined effort in the U.S.

1. On the same day, Arneson transmitted an identical letter to George Ignatieff, the Canadian member of the joint secretariat.
2. Tripartite negotiations on the CPC subcommittee level resumed on November 28 and were continued on December 2. For an account of these discussions, see Hewlett and Duncan, pp. 308–310.
3. Enclosures II and III are not printed.
4. Not found in the files of the Department of State.