PM Files
Mr. Lewis L. Strauss,
Member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, to President
Truman
1
top secret
Washington, 25 November
1949.
Dear Mr. President: As you know, the
thermo-nuclear (super) bomb was suggested by scientists working at Los
Alamos during the war. The current consideration of the super bomb was
precipitated, I believe, by a memorandum which I addressed to my fellow
Commissioners following your announcement on September 23rd of an atomic
explosion in Russia. I participated in the discussions which were antecedent
to the letter to you from the Commission on November 9th, but did not join
in the preparation of the letter as I was then on the Pacific Coast. It was
my belief that a comprehensive recommendation should be provided for you,
embodying the judgement of the Commission (in the areas where it is
competent), together with the views of the Departments of State and Defense.
My colleagues, however, felt that you would prefer to obtain these views
separately.
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Differences on the broad question of policy between my associates as
individuals were included in the Commission’s letter to you, and it was
correctly stated that the views of Commissioner Dean and mine were in
substantial accord on the main issue. It is proper, I believe, that I should
state them on my own responsibility and in my own words.
I believe that the United States must be as completely armed as any possible
enemy. From this, it follows that I believe it unwise to renounce
unilaterally any weapon which an enemy can reasonably be expected to
possess. I recommend that the President direct the Atomic Energy Commission
to proceed with the development of the thermonuclear bomb, at highest
priority, subject only to the judgement of the Department of Defense as to
its value as a weapon, and of the advice of the Department of State as to
the diplomatic consequences of its unilateral renunciation or its
possession. In the event that you may be interested, my reasoning is
appended in a memorandum.
Very respectfully,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Member of the
United States Atomic Energy Commission
top secret
[Washington,] 25 November 1949.
This is a memorandum to accompany a letter of even date to the President
to supply the reasoning for my recommendation that he should, direct the
Atomic Energy Commission to proceed at highest priority with the
development of the thermo-nuclear weapon.
Premises
- (1)
- The production of such a weapon appears to be feasible (i.e.,
better than a 50–50 chance).
- (2)
- Recent accomplishments by the Russians indicate that the
production of a thermo-nuclear weapon is within their technical competence.
- (3)
- A government of atheists is not likely to be dissuaded from
producing the weapon on “moral” grounds. (“Reason and experience
both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in
exclusion of religious principle.” G. Washington, September 17,
1796.)
- (4)
- The possibility of producing the thermo-nuclear weapon was
suggested more than six years ago, and considerable theoretical
work has been done which may be known to the Soviets—the
principle has certainly been known to them.
- (5)
- The time in which the development of this weapon can be
perfected is perhaps of the order of two years, so that a
Russian enterprise started some years ago may be well along to
completion.
- (6)
- It is the historic policy of the United States not to have its
forces less well armed than those of any other country (viz.,
the 5:5:3 naval ratio, etc. etc.).
- (7)
- Unlike the atomic bomb which has certain limitations, the
proposed weapon may be tactically employed against a mobilized
army over an area of the size ordinarily occupied by such a
force.
- (8)
- The Commission’s letter of November 8th [9th] to the President mentioned the “possibility that
the radioactivity released by a small number (perhaps ten) of
these bombs would pollute the earth’s atmosphere to a dangerous
extent.” Studies requested by the Commission have since
indicated that the number of such weapons necessary to pollute
the earth’s atmosphere would run into many hundreds. Atmospheric
pollution is a consequence of present atomic bombs if used in
quantity.
Conclusions
- (1)
- The danger in the weapon does not reside in its physical
nature but in human behavior. Its unilateral renunciation by the
United States could very easily result in its unilateral
possession by the Soviet government. I am unable to see any
satisfaction in that prospect.
- (2)
- The Atomic Energy Commission is competent to advise the
President with respect to the feasibility of making the weapon;
its economy in fissionable material as compared with atomic
bombs; the possible time factor involved; and a description of
its characteristics compared to atomic bombs. Judgement,
however, as to its strategic or tactical importance for the
armed forces should be furnished by the Department of Defense,
and views as to the effect on friendly nations of our unilateral
renunciation of the weapon is a subject for the Department of
State. My opinion as an individual, however, based upon
discussions with military experts is to the effect that the
weapon may be critically useful against a large enemy force both
as a weapon of offense and as a defensive measure to prevent
landings on our own shores.
- (3)
-
I am impressed with the arguments which have been made to the
effect that this is a weapon of mass destruction on an
unprecedented scale. So, however, was the atomic bomb when
it was first envisaged and when the National Academy of
Sciences in its report of November 6, 1941, referred to it
as “of superlatively destructive power”. Also on June 16,
1946, the Scientific Panel of the Interim Committee on
Nuclear Power, comprising some of the present members of the
General Advisory Committee, reported to the Secretary of
War, “We believe the subject of thermo-nuclear reactions
among light nuclei is one of the most important that needs
study. There is a reasonable presumption that with skillful
research and development, fission bombs can be used to
initiate the reactions of deuterium, tritium, and possibly
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other light
nuclei. If this can be accomplished, the energy release of
explosive units can be increased by a factor of 1000 or more
over that of presently contemplated fission bombs.” This
statement was preceded by the recommendation, “Certainly we
would wish to see work carried out on the problems mentioned
below.”
The General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy
Commission, in its recent communication to the Commission
recommending against the development of the super bomb,
noted that it “strongly favors” the booster program, which
is a program to increase the explosive power and hence the
damage area and deadliness of atomic bombs. These positions
and those above appear not to be fully consistent and
indicate that the scientific point of view is not
unanimous.
- (4)
- Obviously the current atomic bomb as well as the proposed
thermo-nuclear weapon are horrible to contemplate. All war is
horrible. Until, however, some means is found of eliminating
war, I cannot agree with those of my colleagues who feel that an
announcement should be made by the President to the effect that
the development of the thermo-nuclear weapon will not be
undertaken by the United States at this time. This is because:
(a) I do not think the statement will
be credited in the Kremlin; (b) that when
and if it should be decided subsequent to such a statement to
proceed with the production of the thermo-nuclear bomb, it might
in a delicate situation, be regarded as an affirmative statement
of hostile intent; and (c) because
primarily until disarmament is universal, our arsenal must be
not less well equipped than with the most potent weapons that
our technology can devise.
Recommendation
In sum, I believe that the President should direct the Atomic Energy
Commission to proceed with all possible expedition to develop the
thermo-nuclear weapon.
