PM Files1
The Chairman of the General Advisory Committee
(Oppenheimer)
to the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission (Lilienthal)
top secret
Washington, October 30,
1949.
Dear Mr. Lilienthal: At the request of the
Commission, the seventeenth meeting of the General Advisory Committee was
held in Washington on October 29 and 30, 1949 to consider some aspects of
the
[Page 570]
question of whether the
Commission was making all appropriate progress in assuring the common
defense and security.2 Dr. Seaborg’s3 absence in Europe prevented his attending this
meeting. For purposes of background, the Committee met with the Counsellor
of the State Department, with Dr. Henderson of AEC Intelligence, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee, the Chairman of the
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, General Norstadt and Admiral Parsons.4
In addition, as you know, we have had intimate consultations with the
Commission itself.
The report which follows falls into two parts. The first describes certain
recommendations for action by the Commission directed toward the common
defense and security. The second is an account of the nature of the super
project and of the super as a weapon, together with certain comments on
which the Committee is unanimously agreed.5 Attached to the report, but not a part of it, are
recommendations with regard to action on the super project which reflect the
opinions of Committee members.
The Committee plans to hold its eighteenth meeting in the city of Washington
on December 1, 2 and 3, 1949. At that time we hope to return to many of the
questions which we could not deal with at this meeting.
[Enclosure 1]
Statement Appended to the Report of the General
Advisory Committee6
top secret
[Washington,] October 30, 1949.
We have been asked by the Commission whether or not they should
immediately initiate an “all-out” effort to develop a weapon whose
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energy release is 100 to 1000
times greater and whose destructive power in terms of area of damage is
20 to 100 times greater than those of the present atomic bomb. We
recommend strongly against such action.
We base our recommendation on our belief that the extreme dangers to
mankind inherent in the proposal wholly outweigh any military advantage
that could come from this development. Let it be clearly realized that
this is a super weapon; it is in a totally different category from an
atomic bomb. The reason for developing such super bombs would be to have
the capacity to devastate a vast area with a single bomb. Its use would
involve a decision to slaughter a vast number of civilians. We are
alarmed as to the possible global effects of the radioactivity generated
by the explosion of a few super bombs of conceivable magnitude. If super
bombs will work at all, there is no inherent limit in the destructive
power that may be attained with them. Therefore, a super bomb might
become a weapon of genocide.
The existence of such a weapon in our armory would have far-reaching
effects on world opinion: reasonable people the world over would realize
that the existence of a weapon of this type whose power of destruction
is essentially unlimited represents a threat to the future of the human
race which is intolerable. Thus we believe that the psychological effect
of the weapon in our hands would be adverse to our interest.
We believe a super bomb should never be produced. Mankind would be far
better off not to have a demonstration of the feasibility of such a
weapon until the present climate of world opinion changes.
It is by no means certain that the weapon can be developed at all and by
no means certain that the Russians will produce one within a decade. To
the argument that the Russians may succeed in developing this weapon, we
would reply that our undertaking it will not prove a deterrent to them.
Should they use the weapon against us, reprisals by our large stock of
atomic bombs would be comparably effective to the use of a super.
In determining not to proceed to develop the super bomb, we see a unique
opportunity of providing by example some limitations on the totality of
war and thus of limiting the fear and arousing the hope of mankind.
-
James B. Conant
-
Hartley Rowe
-
Cyril Stanley Smith
- L[ee] A. DuBridge
-
Oliver E. Buckley
- J. R[obert] Oppenheimer
[Page 572]
[Enclosure 2]
Statement Appended to the Report of the General
Advisory Committee7
top secret
[Washington,] October 30, 1949.
An Opinion on the Development of the “Super”
A decision on the proposal that an all-out effort be undertaken for the
development of the “Super” cannot in
our opinion be separated from considerations of broad national policy. A
weapon like the “Super” is only an
advantage when its energy release is from 100–1000 times greater than
that of ordinary atomic bombs. The area of destruction therefore would
run from 150 to approximately 1000 square miles or more.
Necessarily such a weapon goes far beyond any military objective and
enters the range of very great natural catastrophes. By its very nature
it cannot be confined to a military objective but becomes a weapon which
in pratical effect is almost one of genocide.
It is clear that the use of such a weapon cannot be justified on any
ethical ground which gives a human being a certain individuality and
dignity even if he happens to be a resident of an enemy country. It is
evident to us that this would be the view of peoples in other countries.
Its use would put the United States in a bad moral position relative to
the peoples of the world.
Any postwar situation resulting from such a weapon would leave
unresolvable enmities for generations. A desirable peace cannot come
from such an inhuman application of force. The postwar problems would
dwarf the problems which confront us at present.
The application of this weapon with the consequent great release of
radioactivity would have results unforeseeable at present, but would
certainly render large areas unfit for habitation for long periods of
time.
The fact that no limits exist to the destructiveness of this weapon makes
its very existence and the knowledge of its construction a danger to
humanity as a whole. It is necessarily an evil thing considered in any
light.
For these reasons we believe it important for the President of the United
States to tell the American public, and the world, that we think it
wrong on fundamental ethical principles to initiate a program of
development of such a weapon. At the same time it would be appropriate
to invite the nations of the world to join us in a solemn pledge not to
proceed in the development or construction of weapons of this category.
If such a pledge were accepted even without control machinery,
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it appears highly probable
that an advanced stage of development leading to a test by another power
could be detected by available physical means. Furthermore, we have in
our possession, in our stockpile of atomic bombs, the means for adequate
“military” retaliation for the production or use of a “Super”.
- E[nrico] Fermi
- I[sidor] I. Rabi
