Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn)
Summary of statements by Consultants at meeting of March 8th:
Oppenheimer:
Speaking with respect to the first question, whether in the past three years there have been changes affecting the basis of the Commission’s work: “Things that have not happened give us a longer time scale. This is reflected in the Second Report.”
[Page 42]Speaking after a remark by Conant: “Horrified at the thought of what we would be called on to do if these proposals should now be accepted. The public and the Senate would never ratify them.”
Further remarks on the same subject: “We now have stockpiles which, if distributed, would result in a formidable threat to security, which cannot be solved until there are plants to put the stuff in.”
“Initiative (on withdrawal) should be taken by the U.S. after consultations.”
“We should extract ourselves in an honest, candid way that will not antagonize others.”
“Preposterous position of being forced to advocate something we know the U.S. cannot go through with. Should make public statement that we would be willing to negotiate when political position is different. Cannot face problem now. The world situation required isn’t there. We can no longer wholeheartedly advocate it.”
“Pre-conditions for the plan have not been fulfilled. They extend far beyond the technical and scientific conditions.”
Bacher:
“One of the big changes is the accumulation of stock, but if that were the only stumbling block it could be fixed. But other things couldn’t be fixed.”
“Climate altogether different now.”
“Conditions not changed in a way to alter fundamentals of the plan.”
Farrell:
“Don’t put yourself in a spot where you can’t pull out.”
“Plan as now written completely unrealistic in the world of today.”
Barnard:
“Should get this plan out of the way. Let others try their hands at it and start constructively. We started this whole negotiation in the wrong way (we were forced to do so).”
Nichols:
“We can’t offer benefits as fast as we thought we could.”
“Still have need to do away with weapon, but the international situation prevents it. But there is now no need to hurry on power.”
Conant:
“Acheson-Lilienthal report now out of date for political reasons, delay in producing power, etc.”
“Scientific position has not changed. Technical position has changed, also political position.”
“Power not in sight.”
[Page 43]“Original solution no longer applicable. We ought to break negotiations off.”
“President should make announcement that conditions have deteriorated. We are playing with dynamite now since the Soviet might accept.”
“When and if the Soviet is a friendly government we will have to make a new plan.”
Groves:
“We ought to start moving out. We ought to have done this at Paris.”
“We should announce we will not use bombs for aggression. U.S. should be trustee. Some other nation should ask us to be trustee.” (Oppenheimer: “No, U.S. should say why change is necessary, larger stockpiles now, etc.”)
Summary of entire meeting given in secret paper of this date1 and in confidential paper also this date,2 both on the same subject.