Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

861.2423/9–2349: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Offices

confidential
priority
niact

Washington, September 23, 1949—4 a. m.

To answer some obvious questions,¹ and emphasize certain considerations that should be borne in mind, foil guidance is provided. This material to be used for your background only.

1. You will realize that it would not be compatible with national security to give further info as to how we know there was an atomic explosion.

2. As to where and when it took place, and whether it was on the ground or water, all that can be said is that we have a pretty good idea.

3. So far as we know, this is first atomic explosion that has taken place in Russia.

4. Our info does not indicate that Russians may have number of bombs.

5. It wld not be compatible with national security to give any info at this time on how far advanced Russian technology is in this field as compared with our own.

6. No reason believe this development is result anything stolen or copied from us. Nearly four years ago Pres pointed out that “Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time,”² And in Three Nation Agreed Declaration of President of US and Prime Min of UK and of Can., dated November 15, 1945, it was emphasized that no single nation could in fact have monopoly this means of destruction.

7. This development will not change our policy toward international control of atomic energy. In Three Nation Declaration of November 15, 1945, this Govt committed itself to seek such control. Since that time we have made every effort to achieve an effective system of international control. We remain prepared explore carefully and with good will any proposals for an effective and enforceable system for international control atomic energy and enter into arrangements which embody essential safeguards approved by UNGA.

8. Although we shall naturally have to reexamine our domestic atomic energy program in light this development, it not probable there will have to be any material modification of it.

9. Question naturally arises as to state our defense against atomic attack. Answer is that within limitations imposed by budget, priorities have been established for all our military tasks in case we involved in war. Defense of US is our primary basic undertaking and progress being made in meeting our defense requirements as established by Dept Defense. Concomitant with this task is offensive task of retaliation. It wld not be compatible with our national security interests to give further info on this matter.

10. As to whether this development will increase the danger of war, it is clear that the danger of war does not spring from policies of US and other democracies. US will continue make every effort avoid war by observing faithfully provisions of Charter of UN, both in letter and spirit. Everyone knows that the preparation for aggressive war is impossible in a democracy and even more so in coalition of democracies. If there is danger of war, it stems from attitudes and policies of others. We have no means of knowing what is in minds of men who control Govt of USSR. We should remember that mere fact that a country might have ability make bomb wld not in itself be an assurance to that country of over-all military superiority. Belief this Govt is that war is not inevitable; and our policies continue to be directed to its avoidance.

11. It may be asked in what way this development has been taken into account in our basic policy. As stated in President’s announcement, we have always known efforts would be made develop this weapon, and it has been no secret that such efforts were in progress in USSR. Has been for this reason, among others, that we have laid such great emphasis on necessity for firm and durable system of peaces ful relationships between nations of world and that we have made such effort and such sacrifices to this end. We have consistently refrained from basing our own policies on monopoly of weapon and have endeavored frame them throughout with view to their validity in a period when that monopoly wld no longer exist. We have tried make our mil posture one which would be an effective deterrent to aggression whether or not others had atomic weapon. Atomic bomb must always be judged not as isolated weapon but in general framework of relative mil capabilities of countries. US policies in helping strengthen economies of European countries, in participating in Atlantic Pact, and in considering program of mil assistance to other countries have all tended increase strength this country.

12. Brit and Canadians have same info this development as we. Obviously it has to be taken into account in our current deliberations with Canadians and Brit, although the discussions were scheduled for’ another purpose. Does not mean that we will change our atomic energy policy with respect to Brit and Canadians. In fact, it accentuates need for most rational and economic utilization of resources available to the three countries in field of atomic energy; and we have this consideration prominently in mind in present discussions.

13. Only effect which this should have upon Atlantic Pact and our relationships with Atlantic Pact countries is to drive home harder than ever the need for closest collaboration and mutual confidence among them. It is in no sense a problem for US alone. There could be nothing which could demonstrate more forcefully the need for true international collaboration, of which Atlantic Pact is living example. This also brings out as nothing else could importance to US of strengthening these countries.

14. This will affect MAP only in so far as it increases need for such a program. Our long-range mil objectives have been met only when our allies, strengthened through MAP, have improved to maximum extent possible their ability assist in maintaining peace and security.

15. Some may ask how our allies in West Europe can contribute to our defense now that Russians have atomic bomb. Atomic bomb, like any other weapon, has to be used prudently and be backed up by adequate over-all mil strength in order assure final superiority in war and immunity against disastrous retaliation. But these things in turn depend upon over-all relative mil potential of parties to a conflict, which is based on their economic and political health and well being. The stronger the members of Atlantic Pact are individually and collectively, in over-all economic and mil potential, which includes many factors besides atomic bomb, the less the likelihood that this weapon will ever be used against any of them.

16. We do not view this development with alarm. We are naturally concerned that this weapon should come into the hands of nation whose policies have been in many respects adverse to world stability, while there is as yet no effective system of international control. We have never thought that war is inevitable. We do not think that Sov possession of this weapon necessarily makes war more probable. We must never forget that atomic weapon, terrible as it is, is only one element in complex pattern of pol and mil realities which determines security this country. In itself it neither confers on its possessor any guarantee of achieving victory nor provides insurance against retaliation. If we carry on firmly and calmly with our own policies directed to prevention of war and to deterring of aggression, the attendant risks, which are in any case unavoidable, are no greater than those which a nation must expect in striving to exercise leadership in quest for peace and progress in modern world. We must remember that there is no such thing as total security in this world, and never has been. Security is relative. The fact that we are no longer sole possessors of atomic weapon should be a source of renewed determination make war unprofitable and therefore unlikely, and prove to peoples of world that there are better solutions to human problems than those of international violence.

17. We cannot know, of course, whether there will be any changes in Sov policy as result of this. You will recall that when we first developed this weapon, in Pres address to nation August 9, 1945, he acknowledged our responsibility to rest of world for use which might be made this weapon. He described this as “an awful responsibility which has come to us” and said that we had to “constitute ourselves trustees of this new force—to prevent its misuse and to turn it into the channels of service to mankind.”³ We wait to see whether consciousness of possessing this terrible and destructive weapon will bring to Sov leaders something of that same sense of responsibility to peoples of world and whether they will join with us and other nations in renewed search for ways of protecting humanity against destructive power this discovery.

Webb

1. In circular telegrams of 2 a. m. and 3 a. m., September 23, neither printed, all diplomatic and consular officers were advised of President Truman’s impending announcement that an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union and were provided the text thereof (861.2423/9–2349).
2. Reference is to President Truman’s Special Message on Atomic Energy transmitted to Congress on October 3, 1945; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 362.
3. This statement is found in President Truman’s Report to the Nation on the Potsdam Conference; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1945, p. 208.