The attached paper deals with certain problems relating to procedure.
Specifically it discusses the questions of (1) the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, (2) relations with the Congress, (3) public disclosure (the enclosure
to the paper lists the various public statements that have been made on
U.S.–U.K.–Canadian relationships in this field1), and (4) method of negotiation
and sequence of events.
This paper was prepared by the same group which produced the atomic energy
policy study discussed with you at noon today.2 The group
felt, however, that proposals on procedures should be handled separately and
that the points made should be more nearly suggestive than definitive.
You may wish to be familiar with the contents of the attached for tomorrow’s
meeting.
[Annex]
Paper Prepared by the Working Group of the Special
Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy
Policy
top secret
[Washington, March 1, 1949.]
Means of Bringing the Proposed Solutions to
Fruition
The proposed line of action represents a policy different in kind from
previous arrangements, both wartime and post-war, with the U.K. and
Canada. The wartime arrangements under the Quebec Agreement were aimed
basically at the single goal of producing in this country atomic weapons
as quickly as possible. The allocation of materials carried out under
those arrangements was pointed at this basic objective as was exchange
of information. The initial post-war period was one of doldrums in which
very little cooperation existed. As an interim measure, Congo uranium
was delivered to the U.S. and U.K. on an approximately fifty-fifty
basis, subject to future allocation.
The current arrangements under the modus vivendi
exclude direct assistance to the British on the production of plutonium
and atomic weapons.
Two major questions arise in considering the steps that should be taken
in establishing the proposed new program of action. The first has to do
with the question of public and Congressional acceptance of the
proposals and the relation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to the
proposed course of action. The second concerns the negotiating situation
itself whereby certain short term and long term objectives may be agreed
upon by the three countries in the interest of mutual security.
congressional reaction and the atomic energy act
of 1946
Questions have been raised as to whether the Atomic Energy Act stands as
a bar to the course of action that has been proposed. While it may not
be possible to give a definitive answer at this time, it might be
helpful to consider the arguments advanced that the Act itself
[Page 437]
does not constitute an
important obstacle to our moving ahead with exploration of the
problem.
By the mandate of Section 1(a) of the Atomic
Energy Act, the atomic energy policy of the United States is declared to
be “subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the
common defense and security.” The policy governing the Atomic Energy
Commission’s control of atomic energy information is the declaration of
Section 10(a) of the Act that “it shall be the
policy of the Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data
in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security.”
It will be recalled that, in giving effect to these directives of the
Congress, this Government on January 7, 1948, entered into a modus vivendi with the Governments of the United
Kingdom and Canada. Included in the modus vivendi
were arrangements for technical cooperation in nine defined
areas. These areas did not include information relating specifically and
primarily to weapons, or to the design or operation of plants for the
production of weapon materials or of weapon parts.
It will also be recalled that during the discussions which preceded the
agreement of this Government to the modus vivendi
the question of the proper interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act was
carefully considered, first within the executive branch of the
Government and at a later date with the appropriate representatives of
the Congress. In these discussions there was agreement, within the
executive and legislative branches, to the view that, in order to give
effect to the above-mentioned directives of the Congress, this
Government could properly enter into understandings with the United
Kingdom and Canada of the type which had then been proposed, provided
that this Government was satisfied it would be in the interests of our
national security to engage in such technical cooperation. In other
words, the technical cooperation program then approved and entered into
was founded on a Governmental decision that the program was justified by
and consistent with the basic policy of the Atomic Energy Act, which
controls the narrower principle set forth in Section 10(a) (1) of the Act as one of the principles by
which the Atomic Energy Commission shall be guided.
The course now proposed may well involve problems which are different
from those previously considered. It is not unlikely, however, that the
basic questions of policy will be essentially the same. Hence, the same
approach to the question of statutory interpretation would seem to be
proper. It will be necessary for a determination to be made by this
Government whether such a new understanding was in the interest of the
common defense and security of the United States. In making such a
determination it would be both necessary and desirable, as before, to
have appropriate consultation with the Congress.
[Page 438]
Whether any new understandings should take the form of an “international
arrangement” as defined in Section 8 of the Atomic Energy Act, is a
matter which can well be left for future consideration. However, in
terms of continuity of policy, there would seem to be advantage in
having the proposed course of action undertaken only after the Congress
has expressed its general sentiment in favor, by a joint resolution or
other appropriate means.
The important point is that in arriving at any Governmental decision
there would be appropriate consultation with the Congress. Since such
consultation would seem to be desirable for reasons unrelated to the
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, it is likely that any question of
statutory interpretation will turn out to be rather incidental to the
larger questions of policy which will have to be considered. In any
event, any legal questions which might be raised could be resolved by a
unity of view on the part of the executive and legislative branches of
the Government.
extent of public knowledge (details in unclassified
enclosure)
At various times and in various places references have been made to the
broad outlines of cooperation that exist among the three countries. On
August 6, 1945 Secretary of War Stimson in announcing details of the
Manhattan District project,3 reported the existence of the Combined Policy
Committee and referred to the cooperation that existed among the three
parties. The Smyth Report, which gave the official history in some
detail of the atomic bomb project refers to the fact that a team of
British scientists under the leadership of Sir James Chadwick was
stationed during the war at Los Alamos where they made important
contributions to the work. The Truman–Attlee–King Declaration of
November 15, 19454 speaks of “the three countries which possess the
knowledge essential to the use of atomic energy.” On August 21, 1948 Mr.
Lilienthal acting on the basis of a decision reached by the Combined
Policy Committee, stated in a public speech5 that
wartime collaboration among the three countries was continuing “in an
expanded way.” He made reference to the existence of the Combined Policy
Committee as the body supervising the cooperative arrangements among the
three countries, such arrangements including exchange of information and
“problems of raw materials supply common to the three governments.”
Appropriate remarks in a similar
[Page 439]
vein were made subsequently by British and Canadian representatives
in their respective countries. On May 12, 1948 the British Minister of
Defense, Mr. A. V. Alexander, stated in response to a parliamentary
question that “research and development continued to receive the highest
priority in the defense field, and all types of modern weapons,
including atomic weapons, are being developed.”6 In its fifth semiannual
report (January 1949) to the Congress, the Atomic Energy Commission
referred to the program of technical cooperation with the U.K. and
Canada. In part, the Commission report stated that: “Relationships with
the United Kingdom and Canada in the field of atomic energy have
continued under the guidance of the Combined Policy Committee of the
three nations, of which the Secretary of State of the United States is
Chairman. This Committee was first established in 1943. The members for
the United States, in addition to the Secretary of State, are the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission.”
Thus it is clear that there have been a number of public references to
the existence of cooperative arrangements between the U.S., U.K., and
Canada. It is also public knowledge that the Belgian Congo is the
principal source of supply for uranium. As far as the Belgian public is
concerned, it is generally known that Congo uranium is made available to
the U.S. and U.K. under a wartime agreement which is presumed still to
be in existence, although the term, price, and quantity data are not
generally known.
The proposed solution, however, of full and effective collaboration with
the U.K. and Canada on all phases of atomic energy including atomic
weapons represents a different order of magnitude.
Discussion of the proposed solution may, however, afford an excellent
opportunity to set this matter in its proper perspective. This
development would represent the culmination of a trend first begun with
the Bio Pact and about to be advanced still further by the North
Atlantic Security Pact. It can be shown that the proposed solution is an
arrangement designed to advance the common defense and security with our
wartime partner which will soon have atomic weapons of its own. At the
same time, it should of course, be made clear that the U.S. offer in the
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission still stands. That offer
represents the solution we most want but have been unable to secure
because of the intransigeance of the Soviet Union. The program of full
cooperation with the U.K. and Canada in this field should be stated to
be a program of action made necessary by the impasse in the UNAEC and by the failure to achieve
general collective security through the United Nations.
[Page 440]
A number of factors will have to be taken into account in laying plans
for putting forward the proposed course of action.
1. The Effect on Public Opinion
It would be necessary to lay all relevant facts bearing on this matter
before the public to minimize the risk that the proposed line of action
may not receive fully informed public support.
2. The Effect on Other Countries
A program of full collaboration among the CPC countries would probably give rise to many inquiries
from non-CPC countries. France, for
example might urge that she be made a member of the family.
Unwillingness to admit her and others might have serious repercussions
on the North Atlantic Security Pact and on whatever military assistance
programs may subsequently be worked out. In this eventuality, it is
suggested that the three CPC countries
would have to take a very firm line, pointing out that the Pact does not
provide for a sharing of any and all types of weapons but rather for
mutual assistance in the event of aggression. Efforts of the U.K. and
U.S. to strengthen their common defense and security through
collaboration in atomic weapons should be considered a strengthening in
the interests of all members of the Pact.
3. Effect on the UNAEC Negotiations
It might be argued that the proposed solution would furnish the Soviets
an important propaganda advantage. This objection is more apparent than
real. The U.S. record in the UNAEC has
been built with sufficient care and over a long enough period of time so
that no legitimate doubt can be raised about the sincerity of the
American offer. To be sure, the Communist line attempts to cast doubts
on the sincerity of that offer on every possible occasion. This is
likely to be true no matter what line of action this Government takes,
not only in this field but in all others. Provided any publicity which
is given to the proposed course of action makes crystal clear the fact
that the first objective of the United States is still to attain a fully
effective enforceable international system of control, the Communists
can have no real basis for propaganda.
4. Coordination of Public Discussion
with the U.K., Canada and Other Countries
The views of the U.K. and Canada with regard to the timing and handling
of public discussion should be clarified at an early stage in the
negotiations. It would be important also to ascertain the reaction of
the Belgian Government in this matter as well as the reactions of other
countries with whom the British and ourselves have raw materials
arrangements.
[Page 441]
5. Methods of Negotiation and Sequence
of Events
If the proposed course of action is adopted by this Government after
initial clearances in the executive and legislative branches, it will be
exceedingly important to secure informally with the British and the
Canadians an indication whether the main aspects of the proposal would
be acceptable. Informal soundings should be taken to ascertain first
whether the U.K. and Canada are willing to accede to the proposed
principles concerning the location of production facilities in terms of
strategic considerations, the coordination of programs in such a way as
to make the most effective use of joint resources, the coordination of
the disclosure of information to other governments, and the
establishment of cooperation among the three parties with respect to
bases necessary for delivery of atomic weapons; and second whether the
U.K. and Canada have any specific suggestions as to how these plans
should be implemented. As regards relations with non-Curtain countries,
the United States should ascertain whether the U.K. and Canada are
willing to accept the view that the three nations should oppose the
development of atomic energy at this time in other countries. If the
U.K. and Canada express their willingness to give consent to these
undertakings and to implement these plans in a way satisfactory to this
Government, negotiations should then be commenced through the CPC on the basis of the proposed line of
action.
In summary, it is believed that:
-
a.
- The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 does not stand as a bar to the
course of action that has been proposed.
-
b.
- The proposed course of action should be undertaken only after
the Congress has expressed its general sentiment in favor, by a
joint resolution or other appropriate means.
-
c.
- After initial clearances in the executive and legislative
branches, it will be exceedingly important to secure informally
from the British and the Canadians an indication whether the
main aspects of the proposal would be acceptable.
