The two attached documents—the memorandum of February 3, 1949 and the notes
of January 28, 1949—are not Policy Planning Staff papers, but they were
prepared with the active participation of Messrs, Kennan3 and Butler.4 Consequently, they
have been given a PPS number and included
with the regular folders of Planning Staff papers.
[Annex 1]
Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon
Arneson
5
to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of
State (Webb)
[Washington,]
February 3,
1949.
Subject: Atomic Energy Policy vis-à-vis U.K. and
Canada.
Under the terms of the wartime Quebec Agreement of August 19436 the U.S., U.K.,
and Canada cooperated in producing the atomic bomb.
[Page 420]
The major effort, of course, was centered
in the U.S. but both the British and Canadians made valuable
contributions to the project, particularly in terms of scientific
knowledge and talent. During this period teams of British scientists
worked in this country on various phases of the project including
weapons. Sir James Chadwick headed the British team at Los Alamos
which—according to the Smyth Report7—made important contributions to the
work.
A Combined Policy Committee was established under the Quebec Agreement to
implement the arrangements concerning exchange of information and the
allocation of ores. The Agreement provided that information was to be
exchanged only in those areas where parallel activity was being carried
on and where such exchange would hasten production of the weapon. Ores,
the principal source of which was the Congo, were allocated almost
entirely to the United States. These ores were made available under the
terms of a tripartite agreement between the U.S., U.K., and Belgium
which was signed in September 19448 and is still
in effect.
Toward the close of the war the British began raising questions
concerning postwar arrangements in this field. While concerting with us
in the attempt to secure international control of atomic energy through
the United Nations, they pressed for clarification of the provision of
the Quebec Agreement whereby the U.K. would be admitted to participation
in the commercial peace-time benefits of atomic energy on terms
considered equitable by the President. They wished also to establish the
basis on which exchange of information would proceed after the war. For
a long period of time no fully responsive answers were given to these
questions. The United States argued that the negotiations proceeding in
the UN for international control made any
firm settling of these matters undesirable at the time. We also stressed
the uncertainties arising from domestic legislation establishing the
Atomic Energy Commission.9 The net result was that our relations in this field with
the U.K., and to a lesser extent Canada, rapidly deteriorated.
Meanwhile, the Combined Policy Committee (and its subsidiary body the
Combined Development Trust, the mission of which was to secure on behalf
of the three countries jointly, maximum supplies of uranium and thorium)
continued to function. A temporary allocation
[Page 421]
formula was arrived at in May 1946 which resulted
in an approximately 50–50 split between the U.K. and U.S. of ores made
available principally from the Congo.10 As a
result the AEC found that its planned
production programs were becoming seriously jeopardized for lack of
sufficient raw material. At the same time large stocks were accumulating
in the U.K. far in excess of current requirements. This matter was
brought urgently to the attention of the American members of the
Combined Policy Committee (the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission) in the fall
of 1947. After Appropriate consultations with the Joint Congressional
Committee on Atomic Energy, the American side CPC decided to undertake negotiations with the British and
the Canadians in an attempt to secure a more favorable allocation of
ores, to define possible areas of exchange of information, and to clear
up past misunderstandings.11
These negotiations were quite satisfactory. All previous agreements
between the Governments were superseded by a modus
vivendi recorded in the January 7, 1948 minutes of the CPC.12 It provided that the
total output made available from the Belgian Congo for calendar 1948 and
1949 should be shipped to the United States. It provided further that
should such supplies be insufficient to meet the stated requirements of
the U.S. program U.K. stocks would be drawn down to meet the
deficiencies. During 1948 Belgian supplies proved sufficient for the
U.S. program. Prospects are that the United States will have to call on
U.K. stocks in 1949 in an amount between 600 to 1,000 tons. (Long
overdue developmental work in the Congo which is now underway will
result in a considerable reduction in the Congo output for 1949.) The
modus vivendi provided for interchange of
information in 9 general areas. These areas do not include information
on the production of plutonium or the manufacture of weapons. The basic
criterion followed in establishing these areas was that of mutual
advantage in advancing general knowledge concerning the non-military
phases of atomic energy. The modus vivendi
continued the CPC as the organ to
supervise these arrangements as well as the CDT under the name of the Combined Development Agency.
At the time the modus vivendi was being negotiated
it was generally understood by all concerned that the U.K. planned and,
indeed, was proceeding toward the production of plutonium and the
manufacture of atomic weapons. The scheme of allocation arrived at took
into account U.K. requirements for two plutonium production piles
although
[Page 422]
the areas of exchange
laid down sought rigorously to exclude information on plutonium
production and weapons manufacture.
In carrying out technical cooperation under the modus
vivendi it has been found exceedingly difficult to furnish
information for use in other areas which did not contribute useful
knowledge to plutonium production or weapons manufacture. The essential
reason for this lies in the fact that the British already possess a
great fund of knowledge much of which was gained during the period of
wartime collaboration. It is fair to assume that the British have all
basic information concerning the fabrication of the weapon itself and a
considerable fund of knowledge in all other phases of atomic energy.
While no British scientists were stationed during the war at Hanford and
they may, therefore, be assumed not to have detailed knowledge of the
engineering and technical problems of Hanford-type piles, yet their
basic knowledge is such that they should not meet any insuperable
obstacles in erecting and operating plutonium production piles of their
own.
In September 1948 Admiral Sir Henry Moore13 presented
to Mr. Forrestal14 on behalf of the British Minister of
Defense, a memorandum proposing complete interchange of information on
weapons.15 The
immediate U.S. reaction was negative, but no final answer has yet been
given to the request.
Meanwhile the Soviet Union and other countries are proceeding on
independent atomic energy programs. A number of non-Curtain countries
are pressing for assistance in advancing rather modest research and
experimental activities.
The situation shown by the foregoing recital of events recently was
discussed by staff members of State, Defense, and AEC who came to the conclusion that a
general re-examination should be made of this Government’s atomic energy
policy with regard particularly to the U.K. and Canada. In order to
facilitate such re-examination a group was called together on a purely
informal, individual basis at Princeton on the 24 and 25 of January.
Those attending were:
James B. Conant16
J. Robert Oppenheimer17
[Page 423]
National Military Establishment
- William Webster18
- Lt. General Lauris Norstad19
- Maj. General Kenneth Nichols20
Atomic Energy Commission
- Carroll Wilson21
- Joseph Volpe22
Department of State
- George F. Kennan
- George Butler
- R. Gordon Arneson
This group was made up of individuals representing various shades of
viewpoint and possessing extensive information concerning the subject at
hand. It was asked to consider various alternatives that might be
suggested with regard to our relations with the U.K. and Canada on
atomic energy matters and the subordinate problem of our relations with
other countries in this field. The attached paper represents the
consensus of view of this group. It represents a remarkable area of
agreement forged from a completely frank and straightforward
presentation of viewpoint on the part of all participants. While the
group has no official status it does represent a fair selection of
informed opinion which it would be hard to duplicate.
The Princeton group did not attempt to outline the steps that should be
taken to secure Governmental approval for the position suggested: it
recognized that this was a matter to be worked out by State, Defense and
AEC. The group felt strongly,
however, that the problem of atomic energy no longer can be safely dealt
with under the present severe restrictions of secrecy and that it would
be dangerous and unsound to undertake any revision of present
arrangements without full public disclosure of the relevant facts and
proposed arrangements. Final decision on the question of publicity must,
of course, take into account the reactions not only of the U.K. and
Canada but also of those countries with which we have secret agreements
on raw materials, especially Belgium.
The following sequence of steps, based on the assumption of publicity, is
suggested for your consideration:
When the responsible officials of the three agencies come to a consensus
of view on the suggested solution in Tab D23 (the problem is
[Page 424]
scheduled for Commission discussion on Thursday,
February 3,24 and is presently the subject of intensive
soundings throughout the National Military Establishment), a meeting of
the American side CPC should be called
to arrive at a method of procedures which might take the following form:
-
a.
- Steps should be taken soon to inform the President of the line
of action proposed by the three agencies.
-
b.
- The proposed program should be discussed with appropriate
Congressional leaders. These would include at minimum the Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, and the leaders of the
Foreign Affairs Committees.
-
c.
- Until the support of the President and Congressional leaders
has been obtained the American side CPC would not be in a position to propose any
specific basis for negotiation with the U.K. and Canada, but as
soon as such support is obtained, the U.K. and Canada should be
sounded out as to their views on an appropriate solution to the
problem. In particular, the United States should ascertain first
whether the U.K. and Canada are willing to accept a commitment
(as suggested in III 2 (b) of Tab D) to
consult on the location of production facilities in terms of
strategic considerations, the coordination of programs in such a
way as to make the most effective use of joint resources,
specifically raw materials and of effort, and the coordination
of the disclosure of information to other government, and,
second, whether the U.K. and Canada have any specific
suggestions as to how these plans should be implemented. As
regards relations with non-Curtain countries, the U.K. and
Canada should be urged to accept the principle (VI and 2 of Tab
D) that the three nations are opposed to the development of
atomic energy at this time in other countries. If they are
willing to give these undertakings and indicate their
willingness to implement these principles in a way acceptable to
this Government, negotiations should be begun on the basis of
the position suggested in III 2 and V 1 and 2 of Tab D.
-
d.
- It has been suggested that the proposed arrangements with the
U.K. and Canada should be related to the North Atlantic Security
Pact.25
Consideration should be given to the question whether the
President in presenting the Pact to the Senate for ratification
should make reference to this problem. In asking for Senate
ratification the President might review our efforts in the
United Nations to secure collective security, the development of
regional arrangements in view of the failure to achieve
collective security arrangements on a universal basis, citing
the Rio Pact,26 the Marshall
Plan,27
and the proposed North Atlantic Security Pact. He might then
draw a parallel
[Page 425]
between this broad development and the history of events in
atomic energy. He could stress that while international control
remains our first objective and that the U.S. offer still
stands, the United States is forced by world developments to
take some action in this field parallel to those represented by
the Rio Pact, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Security
Pact. He might make clear that Congressional approval for the
last would be taken as an indication by the Congress of its
support for expanding present cooperative arrangements with the
U.K. and Canada to cover the whole range of atomic energy,
including atomic weapons. In doing so the stress would have to
be laid on the fact that the U.K. would soon be in a position to
have atomic weapons by her own efforts and that a major
objective of concerting efforts would be to secure the most
efficient use of joint resources.
It is evident that the foregoing program calls for considerable niceness
of timing. It is hoped that a meeting of the American members of the
Combined Policy Committee may be called at an early date in order that
the techniques can be worked out with precision.
Approved by: George F. Kennan
[Annex 2]
Notes on a Meeting at Princeton, New Jersey, January
24–25, 1949
[Washington,]
January 28,
1949.
I. The following working hypotheses emerged from an all-day discussion on
January 24: (No significance should be attached to the order in which
points are listed.)
1. By at least the following criteria the atomic bomb is a unique weapon.
- (a)
- Today we alone have them.
- (b)
- Plans for their use form a central core of our offensive
capabilities.
- (c)
- When the USSR has any atomic bombs a critical reexamination of
our war plans will probably be required.
2. The position as to the supply of uranium ore if allocated in relation
to needs for the U.S. and U.K. programs is about as follows:
- (a)
- If used to supply the contemplated present U.S. program and
present U.K. program it is expected that there will be
sufficient production from the Belgian Congo, Canada, U.S. and
South Africa to supply both programs for the period 1949 through
1955 (and probably beyond), assuming benefits from Redox28 are felt in the U.S.
program by 1952.
- (b)
- In the unlikely event that Redox fails there will be
insufficient supplies for more than the U.S. program.
- (c)
- The next two or three years will be tight and especially so
during 1949 when we expect to have to draw on reserves in the
U.K. to the extent of 600 to 1,000 tons in order to maintain the
U.S. program.
3. Extension of U.S. cooperation with the U.K. in the U.K. program for
the production of fissionable materials and weapons has no determinable
bearing on the rate of progress of the USSR program. (In any event, it
was not believed to be significant.)
4. Effect of U.S. cooperation in relation to the progress of the U.K.
program, assuming no expansion of U.K. program for producing fissionable
materials beyond present two piles plus modest diffusion plant, is
estimated to be as follows:
- (a)
- No extension of U.S. cooperation to the fields of production
and weapons— ....
- (b)
- Full U.S. information and general cooperation—might allow U.K.
to get the first bomb in two and one-half years and to make 50
in seven to eight years. (Principal effects of U.S. assistance
would probably be to increase reliability of production of
fissionable material and economy in the use of raw materials and
effort.)
5. Belief as to the reasons for the U.K. program:
- (a)
- Freedom of action in terms of national self-sufficiency in
terms atomic weapons.
- (b)
- National prestige and position in regard to atomic energy in
connection with future peacetime applications require a program
for production of fissionable material and for reactor
development.
- (c)
- Uncertainty and apprehension as to the attitude (and
continuity of attitude) of the U.S. towards the U.K. in atomic
energy matters.
6. U.S. objections to the existence of a program for the production of
fissionable materials and weapons in the U.K.: (While indefinite
retention of U.S. monopoly in this field was recognized as desirable, it
was evident to the group that this was wholly impracticable.)
- (a)
- Greater vulnerability in the event of war to destruction of
installations in the U.K. as compared to those in the Western
Hemisphere and hence loss of productive capacity in terms of our
common defense. (The destruction in time of war of the present
U.K. project will not have an important effect on the total
output of weapons.)
- (b)
- In terms of raw materials, the expectation that more efficient
conversion of U3O8 to
weapons might occur if done in U.S. plants.
- (c)
- Uneconomic diversion of U.K. technical and economic
resources.
[Page 427]
7. Technical benefits to the U.S. of sharing in the fruits of U.K.
effort:
- (a)
- As to new technical ideas there is a reasonable presumption
that important advances will be made by the U.K.
- (b)
- As to industrial technology there is probably not much to gain
because their practice is not readily adaptable to our
use.
8. In view of the large amount of classified information already known to
the U.K., it will be impossible to separate further information they may
gain from the U.S. into two categories—one useful for production of
fissionable materials and weapons and one not useful for such
purposes.
II. Objectives of the U.S. in regard to atomic weapons:
- (a)
- To obstruct Soviet progress as much as possible, both as to
the time of securing the first bomb and the subsequent rate of
production.
- (b)
- To improve the position of the U.S. as much as possible
vis-à-vis Russian position.
- (c)
- To reduce vulnerability of productive capacity and stockpiles
to destruction by Russian action.
- (d)
- To improve the means of delivering atomic bombs against Soviet
targets in the event of war.
- (e)
- To have our policy in this field consistent with our general
foreign policy.
III. Proceeding from the above hypotheses, discussion on Tuesday, January
25, led the conferees to the following common view of the appropriate
position of the U.S. in relation to the U.K. and Canada:
- 1.
- After examination of the alternative courses of action, there
was no advocate either for continuation within the present modus vivendi or the alternative of
attempting to stop the U.K. program by U.S. pressure.
- 2.
- The following position appeared to offer the greatest
assurance of serving the common defense and security:
- (a)
- Provide for complete interchange of information in all
fields of atomic energy, including weapons.
- (b)
- Provide for consultation among the parties on policy
and program with particular reference to the following
principles:
- 1.
- Production facilities should be located with
due regard for strategic considerations,
and
- 2.
- The programs of the three parties should be
coordinated in such a way as to make the most
effective use of joint resources, specifically raw
materials, and of effort, and
- 3.
- The establishment of effective coordination
with respect to the disclosure to other
governments, including the Dominions, or
authorities or persons of classified information
in this field.
- (c)
- Provide for full freedom of action on the part of the
three parties with regard to their respective atomic
energy programs.
- (d)
- Provide for the continuation of the CPC with its present ratio
of membership from U.S.–U.K.–Canada to carry out and
supervise these arrangements.
IV. Implementation of U.S. position:
- 1.
- It would be dangerous and unsound to undertake any revision of
present arrangements without full public disclosure of the
relevant facts and proposed arrangements.
- 2.
- In presenting it publicly it should be related to the North
Atlantic Pact but not made a part of that Pact.
- 3.
- There should be Congressional action in some form to confirm
the course of action chosen.
V. An attempt was made in the discussion on Tuesday to define some
principles which might be useful as a guide to a position vis-à-vis
friendly countries outside the U.S., U.K. and Canada. It was the common
view that:
- 1.
- The three countries should establish that they were opposed to
the development of atomic energy at this time outside these
three nations.
- 2.
- That they would be agreeable to giving certain scientific
assistance to other nations. This might take the form of:
- (a)
- Welcoming and facilitating study by scientists of such
nations so that they might work in universities and
unclassified scientific laboratories in the U.S., U.K.
and Canada.
- (b)
- Encouraging interest in and assisting in connection
with the development of accelerator projects and other
activities in nuclear science not related to atomic
energy for making fissionable materials or
weapons.
- 3.
- That it would be undesirable for CPC countries to take the initiative to provide
assistance beyond (a) and (b). However, it was proposed that we
consider the declassification and publication of the design and
how to make a simple heavy water reactor of the Zoe type (French
reactor). The wisdom and feasibility of this proposal was
questioned. There was a difference of view as to whether an
effective line could be held if there were any cooperation in
relation to reactors. It was agreed that preservation of secrecy
in relation to such matters is a “rear-guard action” and there
is difference in judgment as to where and how the line should be
held and when changed. It was concluded that prior to attempting
a decision the proposal required careful study by a qualified
group of technical experts.
