Policy Planning Staff Files
Minutes of the 171st Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, Friday, December 16, 1949, 11:30 a. m. to 1:00 p. m., Department of State
top secret
| Present: George F. Kennan | Robert G. Hooker, Jr. |
| Paul H. Nitze | Carlton Savage |
| Ware Adams | Harry H. Schwartz |
| George H. Butler |
- Mr. Scammon—R
- Mr. Schwinn—P
- Mr. Perkins—EUR
- Mr. Thompson—EUR
- Mr. Martin—EUR
- Mr. Ohly—S/MDA
- Mr. Battle—S
The Secretary
Mr. Kennan said that it was the desire of the group to discuss with the Secretary the military problem in Europe, which is at the core of [Page 414] many problems, including not only the arms program but our whole approach to the cold war, the German problem, ERP, the international control of atomic energy, and conventional disarmament questions. The question is what do we expect to receive by the devices which we have chosen to meet the military program in Europe? There has been and still is a difference of opinion on this and therefore on what to do about it, and a deeper exploration would seem to be called for. One school of thought approached the North Atlantic Pact on the basis that we can afford a military guarantee of Europe to the extent that that guarantee serves as a deterrent to war, and we must gamble on the chance that we would have to deliver on the guarantee. Others seem to have approached it from the point of view that war is inevitable and that NAP and the arms program are preparatory steps. The question then arises—is the arms program sufficient for the purpose, or is even the atomic bomb sufficient for such a purpose?
At this point, Mr. Nitze showed a series of charts designed to bring out the relative war potentials of the U.S. and its allies, and the U.S.S.R. and its satellites.
Mr. Kennan said that one question which was raised is whether the arms program is the best way to overcome the military weakness of the West. Mr. Nitze suggested that our objectives must be examined in the light of the risks, and he suggested further that the Russians are more apt to get the satellites involved with the West, as they have gotten the Chinese communists to do their dirty work in the Far East, rather than deliberately start a total war themselves. In fact, he suggested that in his opinion a total war started deliberately by the Soviets is a tertiary risk.
Mr. Thompson said that we have two objectives, a short-term and a long-term, the first being to win the cold war and the second to prepare for a hot war. He felt that the Pentagon is confused between the Soviet regime and the Soviet Union. It was his opinion that the Politburo realizes that if they get into war it must be both short and successful if the regime in which they are so vitally interested is to survive. Mr. Kennan agreed, adding that the Kremlin instincts are against an outright communist versus anti-communist war, as the Kremlin would prefer to intervene cheaply in someone else’s war, their ideal being a total conflict between “imperialists”. He added that we have a stake in announcing an intention to keep Europe from being overrun in that, if we don’t make such a guarantee, it greatly increases the chances of Western Europe being overrun. Mr. Nitze pointed out on the charts that in the long run, if the Soviet Union gained control of all of Western Europe, their total war potential would not be so far below ours as it is now. Mr. Martin suggested that the Russians would run into raw material problems (particularly oil) if they took over Western Europe, although it was pointed [Page 415] out that this, of course, would depend on whether or not they also gained control of the Middle East.
The view was expressed by Mr. Thompson that the military seemed to seek total security which, if it were ever achieved, would mean unacceptable insecurity for the other side; and Mr. Kennan added that, if you think in terms of a hot war, almost everything you do in the cold war is wrong. An example was given in the case of Austria where the military insistence on setting up an Austrian army prior to withdrawal would mean a provocation of the Russians without accomplishing anything constructive. Such Austrian army as could be built would be of no real value in either deterring or holding the Russians. On the other hand, you can build up a police force in countries like Austria and Japan until they are capable of maintaining public order and you can do it inconspicuously and without resulting provocation. In answer to the Secretary’s question as to how you would apply this theory to Yugoslavia, Mr. Thompson and Mr. Perkins pointed out that the difference in potential is infinitely greater in the latter case, the Yugoslavs already have a large army, and the peace treaty would restrict the Austrian army to an inconsequential amount in any case.
The Secretary said that our major objective is the prevention of war and that he thought it was well established that the military aid program was designed to warn the Russians that if they want to take aggressive moves toward Western Europe, they must seriously mobilize their forces and make a very determined effort out of it. On the other hand, the Europeans want to go considerably farther in that they insist on feeling that they have a chance successfully to resist a Russian invasion. Mr. Martin said that it would appear that there is no real will to fight in France in the absence of the conviction on the part of the French that they have a chance to win a war. Mr. Kennan expressed an interest in the meaning of the word “win”. He said that the French probably think of it in terms of defense of Western Europe, which would involve stopping the Russians somewhere around the Rhine and, if possible, on the Elbe, after which one would keep the Russian soldiers fighting far from home for a long time with what one could hope would be very poor results on the fighting ability of the Red Army. Mr. Kennan said that if that is what we mean by “winning the war”, it is most important that we immediately make up our minds definitely and clearly that such a limited end is our objective. Mr. Ohly agreed that we have never reached such a conclusion. Mr. Kennan felt that we should not even contemplate trying to occupy all of Russia and Siberia.
The Secretary felt that the Pentagon was not so unresponsive to the idea that our war preparations are designed to keep us out of war, and that we have a war machine whose objective is that it never be used. He said that he felt that the military considers that if the Red [Page 416] Army got started they would not be able to stop it, even with the bomb; and that such thoughts make them unhappy and responsive to the thesis that our objective is to prevent war. The Secretary added, however, that it was difficult to accept the statement that the bomb is not a deterrent to war—to which Mr. Kennan replied that it may be a deterrent but it may also be a superfluous deterrent. The Secretary commented later that in dealing with such intangibles as go to make up the problems facing us he would hate to state flatly that the bomb was superfluous.
Mr. Thompson suggested that if the Russians engaged in hostilities it might very well be with limited objectives; for instance, they might go through Germany and then stop firing and start a psychological war on the French. If as a result of such a move we dropped the atom bomb on Russian cities we would then almost inevitably have a total war instead of battles with limited objectives. Mr. Hooker suggested that if the Russians have any thoughts that such would be our reaction, those thoughts may act as a deterrent to the Russians undertaking any hostilities.
There was at the end some discussion of the effects on the Russian people in the event of war if the United States atom bombed their cities, Mr. Thompson’s view being that while such an act on our part might unite the Russian people behind the regime during the first few weeks or months of war, such would not be the long-range effect if the Soviet Union were clearly the aggressor.